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Abstract 
The situation in South Africa presents unique challenges to achieving sustained poverty 
reduction. Although it is an upper-middle-income country with a per capita income 
similar to that of Botswana, Brazil or Malaysia, a significant proportion of South African 
households have remained poor despite a plethora of government policies that target the 
less resourced. While estimates vary, over 22.9 million South Africans are categorised as 
being poor, with almost 2.5 million people suffering from malnutrition. Most analysts 
now agree that while poverty increased during the 1990s, some progress has been made 
in reducing both the incidence and depth of poverty after 2000. 
This thesis argues that the economic and social dynamics set in motion by apartheid that 
produced this situation, may also have generated a low-level equilibrium trap from which 
some the poor in South Africa will find it difficult to escape. The thesis suggests that the 
explanation for this 'poverty trap' lies in what Sen has termed the exchange entitlement 
mapping that poor households face when attempting to use their assets/endowments. In 
other words, the processes that underpin the accumulation of assets, the opportunities to 
use these assets, and the returns obtained are structurally prejudiced against the poor. 
The implication is that the current experience of poverty leads to its reproduction and to a 
structurally persistent poverty. 
The central research question of this thesis is then: "Did the extent, distribution and 
experience of poverty of the apartheid era persist in the immediate post-apartheid South 
Africa despite the efforts of government to foster pro-poor reforms?" The central policy 
concern is that if asset accumulation failure underpins persistent poverty, policies for 
those who are structurally poor should be differentiated from that which is directed at 
those who are transitorily poor. As an example, the policies of the South African 
government concerning the redistribution of agrarian assets (principally land and finance) 
may not be sufficient to assist the poor in rural areas, and may only increase intra-rural 
inequality. 
The thesis draws on two principal data sources: the South African Participatory Poverty 
Assessment completed in 1997, and the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS) 
which contains panel data collected from the same households in 1993, 1998 and 2004. 
Using these data, the thesis identifies a typology of structural poverty classes. At the 
bottom of this typology are those trapped in poverty with an asset base that is inadequate 
to meet their immediate needs as well as their ability to accumulate further assets over 
time. Other are stochastically poor or non-poor, moving in and out of poverty according 
to their good or bad fortune. Finally some have never been poor and have the asset base 
to ensure that they remain in this position or indeed improve over time. 
The livelihood strategies of households are used to differentiate households according to 
their participation in labour markets, farm and non-farm own production and access to 
social grants. The livelihood clusters that result are then matched to the poverty classes 
in order show differentiation among the households surveyed in KIDS. This allows for 
more nuanced policy recommendations that can be tailored to the needs of households 
experiencing different forms of poverty. 
This thesis is 87 000 words in length excluding appendices. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
CONTEXT AND OBJECTIVE 
"To those peoples in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break 
the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help 
themselves " (Inaugural Address of President JF Kennedy, 1961) * 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
In January 1961, the United Nations declared its first 'decade of development' 
focusing on increasing the growth rate of aggregate national income in developing 
countries while recognising the need to benefit the poorer sections of the population. 
Commenting on the poor record of this first decade of development in 1970, Robert 
McNamara, then president of the World Bank Group, argued for a ".. .whole 
generation of development that will carry us to the end of the century" (cited in Meier, 
1970:4). In the decade to follow, another World Bank President, Alden Clausen, 
stated that "... a key and central aim of the World Bank is the alleviation of poverty" 
(Clausen, 1982) while in 1980, 1990 and again in 2000/1, 'Poverty' was the title of 
World Development Reports (World Bank, 1980; 1990; 2001a). At the start of the 
fifth decade after President Kennedy's inaugural address yet another World Bank 
President, James Wolfensohn, emphasised the need to "...create an environment in 
which you can ... give opportunity and empowerment and recognition to people in 
poverty" (Wolfensohn, 2000). Lending support to these statements, numerous 
international declarations have been made since the General Assembly's resolution 
1710 (XVI) of 1996 committing most countries in the World to a range of laudable 
goals, all of which are appropriate if poverty is to be eliminated. Of these, the United 
Nations Millennium Declaration in 2000 and the commitment by 189 countries to the 
eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) was especially noteworthy.1 
Despite these sentiments, at the beginning of the 21st century high levels of poverty 
have persisted in almost all regions of the world and especially in sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA). In its PovertyNet WebPages, the World Bank reported that while the share of 
the global population categorised as being poor had declined during the 1990s, the 
actual number of poor people continued to rise, and had approached 1.2 billion by 
2001, the most recent baseline available. Although Global Economic Prospects 
V The Declaration may be accessed at http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm. 
1 
Report of 2006 remains sanguine about achieving the MDG goal of halving world 
poverty, the prospects for sub-Saharan Africa are not promising. The Report predicts 
that this region is expected to contain 55 percent of the world's poor by 2030 
representing an 80 percent increase on its share in 2000 (IMF/World Bank, 2007:78). 
Moreover, in 2003, and in contrast to the findings of other international agencies, the 
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) reported an unrelenting increase in the 
numbers of those that are poor in the world. From this it is clear, that however 
defined and measured, the concern for poverty, and poverty itself, has persisted for 
more than four decades while reasons for this intransigence remain poorly articulated 
and largely unresolved. 
The persistence of poverty is also apparent in South Africa. On the eve of South 
Africa's transition to democracy, the country was described by international 
development agencies as an upper-middle-income country with a per capita income in 
1991 similar to that of Botswana, Brazil, Malaysia or Mauritius (World Bank, 2001a; 
UNDP, 2000). However, it was estimated that over half of South Africans were poor, 
with almost 2.5 million people thought to be suffering from malnutrition (ANC, 
1994:14). The South African Participatory Poverty Assessment (SA-PPA) conducted 
in 1996 concluded that the experience of the majority of South African households 
remained one of outright poverty, or of continued vulnerability to becoming poor 
(May etal, 1997:1). 
Worryingly, despite the priority given to reducing poverty and inequality in 1994 by 
the incoming government, most studies have revealed that levels of poverty continued 
to increase in South Africa between 1993 and 2000 (Hoogeveen and Ozler, 2004; 
Leibbrandt et al., 2001:26-27; Leibbrant et al, 2005: 13; Stats SA, 2002; van der 
Berg and Louw, 2003). The result has been an increase in the number of people 
categorised as poor between 1995 and 2000 by some 2 million irrespective of whether 
the poverty line used is the well known $1- or $2-per-day corrected for Purchasing 
Power Parity (PPP), or any of the various national poverty lines that have been 
proposed. Thus despite being one the 30 largest economies in the world in terms of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), with a population of some 16 million poor people as 
reported by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), South Africa is home 
to the 16l largest number of poor people in among the 67 countries for which 
7 
comparative data are provided, and the fifth largest in SSA (UNDP, 2006). This, 
coupled with the gloomy predictions for poverty reduction in this region provides the 
motivation for understanding poverty dynamics in South Africa. 
This thesis explores this persistence of poverty in South Africa between 1993 and 
2004 through a case study of the province of KwaZulu-Natal, one of the poorer 
regions of the country. The focus of the research is on uncovering the dynamics of 
poverty, and in particular, those economic constraints that limit the ability of 
individuals and households to accumulate and effectively utilise their assets, and 
which result in differentiation among the poor. The thesis examines whether the 
economic and social dynamics set in motion by apartheid produced a low-level 
equilibrium from which some poor households in South Africa find it difficult to 
escape. This, it is argued, would result in persistent 'livelihood failures' underpinned 
by an 'asset accumulation failure' whereby poverty becomes structural for at least a 
segment of the population. Building on this analysis, the thesis goes on to explore 
whether shared characteristics can be identified for households that fall into a set of 
dynamic poverty categories. Finally, it is suggested that despite the uniqueness of 
post-apartheid South Africa, the extreme situation in the country produced by the 
discriminatory policies of the past may help to throw light on the conditions that result 
in persistent or chronic poverty in other unequal societies, especially those in SSA. 
1.2 HYPOTHESIS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1.2.1 Research Question 
The central issue lying behind notions of persistent poverty in South Africa is whether 
there are households caught in a poverty trap from which they are unable to exit 
despite their strategising, endeavour and scrimping. If this is the case, in the language 
of Nobel Economics Laureate, Amartya Sen, the explanation for the poverty trap 
suggested by this thesis may lie in the exchange entitlement mapping that the poor 
confront when attempting to use their endowments. In the perhaps more accessible 
language of the sustainable development literature, the livelihood portfolio assembled 
by those who are poor fails due to the limited assets that they have at their disposal, 
the paucity of opportunities that are available to them, and the uncertainties and 
shocks that they encounter. The implication is that the differential experience of 
3 
poverty itself is a factor that results in its reproduction. If this is so, then as Michael 
Lipton identified almost two decades ago, the broad category of 'the poor' should be 
deconstructed in some manner if more effective policies for poverty reduction are to 
be developed (Lipton, 1988). 
Distinguishing the trapped or 'chronic-poor' from the 'transient-poor' is also a useful 
starting point for policy as there are significantly different implications for households 
that are trapped in this manner compared to those that are able to accumulate assets 
over time (Carter and Barrett, 2006; Hulme and Shepherd, 2003). For example, in the 
absence of complementary reforms in financial, input and commodity markets, the 
policies of the South African government for the redistribution of agrarian assets 
(principally land) may not benefit the chronic-poor in rural areas, and instead risk 
increasing intra-rural inequality. For the transient-poor, such transfers may require 
complementary policies that offer insurance against intermittent shocks, such as crop 
failure, ill health or theft. Likewise, policies intending to promote micro-enterprises 
may not improve the situation of transient-poor informal sector producers, and 
instead, may result in informalised labour practices as formal enterprises endeavour to 
cut their wage bills, thereby increasing the number of chronic-poor. From this 
perspective of policy formulation, the primary question of this thesis could be restated 
as: "Did the extent, distribution and experience of poverty of the apartheid era as 
reflected in money-metric measurements and access to assets and services persist for a 
part of the population in post-apartheid South Africa despite the efforts of government 
to foster pro-poor reform?" 
An alternative and more opportunistic viewpoint might be that the rising poverty 
levels in South Africa observed between 1993 and 2000 were nothing more than a 
temporary legacy of apartheid, perhaps even due to error in the data collection 
process. In time these will diminish in the face of more efficient markets that result 
from pro-growth macro-economic policy tempered by appropriate social policy 
interventions and good governance. In many ways, this viewpoint can be said to have 
substantially informed the poverty reduction strategies adopted by the South African 
government during the first 10 years of democracy which have relied upon 'market-
friendly' approaches. 
The enquiry to be undertaken by this thesis can then be formally stated as follows: 
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Hypothesis: The conditions of deprivation in South Africa in the post-
apartheid period produced social and economic dynamics that caused 
poverty to become structurally self-reinforcing for a part of the 
population. As a result, in the absence of fundamental reforms, poverty 
for some may become structural and self-perpetuating even if economic 
growth is achieved and some asset transfers do occur; 
Alternatively: 
Null hypothesis: The extent of poverty in South Africa in the post-
apartheid period was the result of inadequate economic opportunities for 
the poor and inadequate access to essential services. As a result, policies 
that promote economic growth will reduce poverty on a broad front by 
offering prospects for employment, entrepreneurship and accumulation, as 
well as for greater delivery of services. 
To explore this hypothesis, a number of key research questions are identified: 
• Does recent literature support the notion of dynamic reproduction of poverty, in 
other words, a poverty that persists? If so, can an analytical framework for the 
investigation of such poverty be developed, along with instruments with which to 
measure it? 
• What was the extent, distribution and experience of poverty in South Africa in the 
post-apartheid period, and what changes occurred in the first ten years after South 
Africa embarked on its transition to democracy in 1994? 
• Is there evidence that poverty traps existed from which certain groups of the poor 
were unable to escape? In other words, can the broad group of 'the poor' be 
differentiated in some way between those who are chronically poor (trapped) and 
those who are transitorily poor (able to get ahead given enough time)? 
• If so, what is the underlying asset portfolio available to those who are 'not poor', 
'poor and able to get ahead', and 'poor and unable to get ahead'? 
• How are the different groups using these assets in order to generate a livelihood 
strategy, with what effect, and how did this change over time between 1993 and 
2004? 
• Can categories of households be identified who share a common asset base and a 
concomitant set of livelihood activities, but who have different livelihood 
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outcomes in terms of their ability to escape poverty over time? What 
differentiation occurs, and how has this changed? And finally, 
• What role potentially could be played by government policies when attempting to 
influence the outcomes being achieved by these different categories of households 
in terms of asset accumulation, sustainable livelihood strategies and their dynamic 
poverty status? 
In answering these questions, the original contribution made by this thesis is fourfold: 
• Firstly in the creation of the database used in this analysis: the data collected for 
the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS) created the first major panel 
study in South Africa while the third wave of data collection has produced the 
longest running panel in the country. KIDS has been placed in the public domain 
while the various publications detailing its methodology have provided a useful 
resource for the panel studies which have followed. The demonstrated usefulness 
of these data have contributed towards the decision to introduction of a National 
Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) being led by the Office of the President and 
scheduled to collect a first wave in 2008. 
• Secondly, in the adaptation and synthesis of conceptual frameworks developed for 
the asset/vulnerability and sustainable livelihoods approaches with the capability 
approach developed by Amartya Sen. This brings together micro-economic and 
economic anthropological analyses on poverty dynamics that has used both 
quantitative and qualitative data. 
• Thirdly, in the application of this framework to the analysis of structural poverty 
and the use of assets as a way of separating chronic/structural poverty from 
transitory/stochastic poverty provide new insight into the underlying dynamics of 
poverty and its persistence. Although the original conceptualisation of structural 
poverty was co-authored and published some years ago, in this thesis I have 
adapted the earlier work and extended the analysis from a 5 year time-frame to 
include the 2004 wave of data collection. 
• Finally, the examination of livelihoods and differentiation of households by their 
livelihood strategy is a wholly new contribution that builds on work that I began 
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in 1987 using data from the former Transkei region of South Africa. This work 
makes use of a statistical procedure (cluster analysis) infrequently encountered in 
poverty analysis as a way of maximising the observed differences between 
households in terms of selected variables. For this thesis, I have chosen variables 
that define different livelihood classes derived from earlier attempts to 
differentiate the African population in South Africa. When linked to the poverty 
typology, alternative trajectories out of, and into poverty can be distinguished. 
1.2.2 Thesis Structure 
Having introduced the topic to be investigated, and outlined the central research 
questions for this thesis, Chapter Two examines alternative conceptualisations of 
poverty and tries to situate the current work within broader views on what constitutes 
poverty. The chapter examines the 'new agenda' for poverty reduction taking into 
account the approaches introduced as part of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries 
Initiative (HIPC), and in particular, the preparation of Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSPs). Chapter Three is the key theoretical, and thus the lengthiest, section 
of this thesis and moves on to examine the theoretical underpinning of persistent 
poverty. This chapter tries to understand why some households move in and out or 
poverty, whilst others remain permanently poor and to develop a framework through 
which this process can be understood. Following Moser (1995; 1998a) and others, an 
'assets-vulnerability' framework is developed and linked to a livelihood map. Issues 
to be examined include the livelihood tactics that are adopted, impacts of shocks, life 
cycle changes, differentiation, adaptable livelihoods and coping strategies, asset 
accumulation and Sen's notion of entitlement failure. Noting that different conceptual 
frameworks may imply different indicators of poverty, issues of measurement are also 
covered in this chapter. 
Chapter Four will detail the methodology used in the collection and compilation of 
the data that are used in this thesis. Three primary sources of information have been 
used of which the 1993 national living standards measurement survey (LSMS) 
undertaken by the South African Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) 
and a repeat survey of a sub-sample of that study undertaken in 1998 and again in 
2004 in the province of KwaZulu-Natal is the most important. Used as a panel, these 
data are known as the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS) and were 
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collected in collaboration with researchers from the University of Wisconsin-
Madison, the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM), the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the Norwegian Institute of 
Urban and Regional Studies (NIBR). These data are contextualised using the 1995 
and 2000 Income and Expenditure Surveys (IES) undertaken by Statistics South 
Africa (Stats SA) supplemented by the October Household Survey (OHS) and Labour 
Force Survey (LFS) undertaken in 1995 and 2000 respectively. In all instances, the 
quantitative data in this thesis are analysed using SPSS 11 (Chapter Five) and SPSS 
13.0 (Chapters Six and Seven). Finally qualitative data collected for the South African 
Participatory Poverty Assessment (SA-PPA) during 1996 and 1997 will be used 
where appropriate. Data from the various October Households Surveys (OHS) 
conducted between 1995 and 1999 by Stats SA will also be referred to as well as the 
1996 and 2001 Censuses. More detail concerning some of the technical choices made 
for this thesis are provided in Appendix One which will be frequently referred to in 
this chapter. 
The poverty measures discussed in Chapter Two are then used to present a poverty 
profile of South Africa and the study region, KwaZulu-Natal, in Chapter Five using 
these data sets that will show the extent and distribution of poverty. Time series data 
are provided to show changing levels of poverty in South Africa as a whole and both 
money-metric and basic needs indicators are discussed. Qualitative data concerning 
the experience and perceptions of poverty are introduced from both the SA-PPA and 
the KIDS sub-sample in order to enrich this analysis. 
Chapter Six describes a model of dynamic poverty. Elsewhere, in collaborative 
articles, I have looked at dynamic poverty using a production function based on 
household assets, and related achieved outcomes to this asset base and to the shocks 
that have been experienced by households (Carter and May, 1999; Carter and May, 
2001; Adato, Carter and May, 2006). This chapter will summarise and update this 
analysis. Then using the asset-vulnerability matrix developed in Chapter Three, and 
the dynamic categorisation of poverty developed in Chapter Six, the 'asset portfolio' 
of poor and non-poor households is investigated, as well as that of the chronic-poor, 
21 Data from the 2005 IES had not been released at the time of writing and it is not yet known whether 
these data will be comparable to earlier surveys due to a change in methodology from recall-based 
questions to a diary method. 
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compared to the transient-poor. Another lengthy chapter, this forms the core of the 
empirical work undertaken for this thesis. 
Chapter Seven returns to my earlier work that examined the livelihood strategies that 
are adopted by poor households (May, 1987a; May, 1987b; May and Rankin, 1991; 
May, 1996). The KIDS data are used to show the extent of mobility and persistent 
poverty in KwaZulu-Natal by means of a transition matrix and distribution 
frequencies. This allows the poverty profile to be recast to show transient and 
structural (trapped) poverty levels. Further, the different livelihood activities of the 
various groups are examined as well as the way in which these are combined into a 
livelihood-generating strategy. Finally, concepts of differentiation among the poor 
will be re-examined based on their changing livelihood strategies. Adding to the range 
of ideas and concepts introduced in earlier work that I have published, this chapter 
breaks new ground in understanding the differentiation of poverty in South Africa. 
Chapter Eight concludes the thesis, and looks at the policy implications of poverty 
that persists. In particular, the rationale for asset redistribution in South Africa, as well 
as reforms in input markets and commodity markets are re-examined in the light of 
the findings that have been presented. The recommendations of the Poverty and 
Inequality Report (PIR) that I directed and edited between 1997 and 1998 will be 
revisited in terms of their implications for poverty that persists (May, 2000). The 
thesis concludes by reflecting on the potential contribution of the forthcoming South 
African National Income Dynamics (NIDS) due to commence in 2008. 
9 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE RE-EMERGENCE OF THE POVERTY REDUCTION AGENDA 
...[there is an] urgent need for national strategies to reduce overall poverty 
substantially, including measures to remove the structural barriers that prevent 
people from escaping poverty, with specific time-bound commitments to 
eradicate absolute poverty by a target date to be specified by each country in its 
national context. (WSSD Programme of Action, 1995, paragraph 25). 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews the emerging international research and policy agenda on 
poverty since the mid 1990s to provide the context for this thesis. The chapter 
explores some of the reasons why poverty has once again been placed on the 
international agenda and why poverty dynamics are an important issue for 
investigation. This introduces the core argument of the thesis to be discussed in 
Chapter Three: that asset accumulation failure underpins poverty that persists, and 
that as such, policy for those who are structurally poor should be differentiated from 
that which is directed towards those who are transitorily poor. This concern is linked 
to debates concerning poverty, inequality, growth, and the alignment of macro-
economic and micro-economic policy. The chapter goes on to examine the 
burgeoning literature on the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) that represent 
recent debate concerning the role of governments and markets in facilitating improved 
human well-being. 
2.2 A NEW POVERTY AGENDA? 
2.2.1 Summits, Declarations and Policies 
The initial commitment made by governments at the first World Summit for Social 
Development in relation to poverty eradication is contained both in the Copenhagen 
Declaration (Commitment 2(a)) and the Programme of Action (paragraph 26(b). In 
these documents, participating governments pledged to develop: 
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... national poverty eradication plans to address the structural causes of 
poverty, encompassing action on the local, national, sub-regional and 
international levels. These plans should establish, within each national 
context, strategies and affordable time-bound goals and targets for the 
substantial reduction of poverty and the eradication of absolute poverty 
(WSSD, 1995). 
These commitments were later confirmed by the United Nations (UN) General 
Assembly in its resolution 50/107 (1996) on the Observance of the International Year 
for the Eradication of Poverty. Subsequently, the UN declared 1997 - 2006 as the 
"Decade for Poverty Eradication". Momentum was added by the Highly Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, and the requirement of this initiative that Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) be prepared by countries seeking debt relief or 
preferential finance. 
This Decade for Poverty Eradication has taken place at a time when the international 
community is experiencing renewed interest in and commitment to poverty reduction. 
In the most noteworthy display, in 2000, following a proposal by the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), 189 countries, including South Africa, committed themselves 
to the a set of measurable goals and targets in the Millennium Declaration and the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that it proposed for poverty reduction in 
2015. These include halving the proportion of people living in extreme poverty, the 
provision of universal primary education in all countries, the reduction of infant and 
under-five child mortality rate by two-thirds and the reduction of maternal mortality 
by three-fourths (Faure, 2002).3 
For Maxwell (2003:5), these declarations, policies and approaches constitute a 'new 
poverty agenda' that is made up by the MDGs; an international consensus poverty 
reduction summarised in the 2000/1 World Development Report; the PRSPs; new 
mechanisms and institutions for aid provision, including Medium-Term Expenditure 
Frameworks (MTEF), Sector-Wide Approaches and Poverty Reduction Support 
Credits; and finally, Results-Based Management and Impact Assessment. 
The decade has also coincided with a burgeoning poverty literature including the 
3/ Other important events include the Doha Ministerial Declaration issued at the 2001 meeting of the 
World Trade Organization, the 2002 Monterrey Conference, and the 2002 Johannesburg World 
Summit on Sustainable Development. 
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publication of a second World Development Report on poverty, the release of a 
UNDP report on poverty, and as with many other countries, the publication of a 
National Human Development Report for South Africa (World Bank, 2001a; UNDP, 
2000a; UNDP, 2004). It has also coincided with the release of better international 
quantitative data with which to monitor the extent of poverty on a global, regional and 
national basis (Deininger and Squire, 1996; Ravallion and Chen, 1997) as well as 
international qualitative data that documents the experience of poverty (Narayan, 
2000). Alongside these developments, the capacity of many developing countries to 
collect and analyse national data has also substantially improved (May, 2001; May 
and Roberts, 2005). 
At the same time, there have been significant strides made in rethinking poverty and a 
deepening sophistication in its conceptualisation and the approaches used for 
measurement (Blotvinik, 2001; Hulme and Shephed, 2003; Kanbur and Squire, 1999) 
There has also been a sharpening of critique which has challenged the conventional 
wisdoms often promoted by the international development agencies, drawing attention 
to the importance of inequality, the political economy of poverty, deficiencies in 
conceptualisation, measurement and data and the production of poverty (Birdsall and 
Londono, 1997; Bracking, 2003; Reddy and Pogge, 2003; 0yen, 2002). This has been 
accompanied by more effective activism seeking alternative policies and interventions 
including the abolition of the World Bank (Jubilee, 2000; Danaher, 2001). 
2.2.2 Global Poverty Trends 1981-2001 
Part of the explanation for this interest has already been alluded to: despite 
commitments made to the contrary, however measured, global poverty has remained 
high throughout the last few decades, and by some measures, may have increased. 
Illustrating this using the improved data just mentioned, Table 2.1 shows information 
released by the World Bank on poverty levels between 1981 and 2001. 
The table shows the percentage of the world's population categorised as poor.4 
4/Data taken from http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/isp/index.jsp. For the purposes of this 
table, the default absolute poverty line of $32.74 has been accepted which equates to $1 per day 
adjusted for 1993 Purchasing Power Parity. Chen and Ravallion (2000) provide a detailed discussion 
of the preparation of this data set. See also Chen et al, (1994) for an earlier review and Reddy and 
Pogge (2003) for a critique. 
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Table 2.1: Global Poverty (<PPP$1 per day), 1981-2001 
East Asia and Pacific 
(EAP) 
East Europe and Central 
Asia (EECA) 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC) 







































































Source: Povcalnet (http://iresearch.worldbank.org/Povca1Net/isp/index.isp): Chen and Ravallion (2004) 
These data show a steady decline in the proportion of the world's population who earn 
less than PPP$1 per day, and are therefore categorised as being poor. When China is 
excluded from the analysis, this trend remains, but is less significant. There are 
important variations between regions, with poverty levels increasing until 1999 in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA), and increasing until 1997 in sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA), with a modest decline for a few years before climbing to a high of 
almost half the region's population in 2001. In South East and Pacific (EAP) and 
South Asia (SA), poverty rates consistently decline. 
In terms of the absolute numbers of the poor, as shown in Figure 2.1 the situation is 
more complex. This figure makes use of an update of the same data base which 
includes poverty thresholds of $1 and $2 per day re-adjusted for Purchasing Power 
Parity in 2000, and for greater clarity, shows only the total, the figure for SSA and 
those for China and India. This shows that while the number of people living below 
$1 per day may have declined by 39 million people between 1981 and 2001, to just 
over one billion, 28 million people have been added to the world's poor population at 
the higher threshold taking this figure to 2.7 billion. Once again, there are important 
regional differences, and, unlike most other regions, the position in sub-Saharan 
Africa deteriorated for much of the period regardless of which threshold is used. In 
this region, between 1981 and 2001, the numbers in poverty grew by 15 million 
people at PPP$1 per day, and 23 million at PPP$2 per day. 
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Figure 2.1: Population below $1 and $2 per day, 1981-2001 
PPPS1 per day 
0 -I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2001 
Source: Chen and Ravallion (2004). 
As numerous analysts have pointed out, poverty is more than income, and the Human 
Development Index (HDI) provides an alternative way of expressing changes in 
human welfare. The HDI is a composite index derived from life expectancy, adult 
literacy and economic well-being measured by GDP per capita.5 Figure 2.2 show 
trends in the HDI between 1980 and 2002. 
Figure 2.2: Human Development Index (1980-2002) 
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Source: HDR 2004 (http://pooh.undp.org/maindiv/hdr dvpt/statistics/data/indic/indic 10 1 l.html and author's 
calculations. 
While these trends largely map onto the changes in income poverty, and indeed 
suggest that progress has been achieved in all regions in terms of the underlying 
51 As with income based measures of poverty, the HDI has been subject to critique. See Ravallion 
(1997a) and Sagar andNajam (1998) as examples. 
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components of the HDI, the enormous and widening gap between SSA and the rest of 
the world is evident. 
2.2.3 Growth and Poverty Reduction 
Chen and Ravallion (2000:21) attribute this failure to significantly reduce poverty 
throughout the world to two related causes: 
• Although the global economy grew at around an average 2.5 percent per annum 
during most of this period, this growth was not evenly distributed and insufficient 
growth took place in the poorest countries; 
• Persistent inequalities within the poorest countries meant that the poor were 
unable to participate fully in the benefits of that growth that did take place. 
Certainly, as Table 2.2 shows, the average growth rates in Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) confirm the first of these suggestions. 
Table 2.2: Growth Rates in GDP, 1980-1998 
Regions 
East Asia and the Pacific 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Latin America and the Caribbean 






















Source: World Bank, 2001a: 184. 
However, while the second statement seems intuitive, empirical evidence supporting 
this view is less conclusive and has been the topic of a sometimes stormy debate over 
the past decade, and especially during the lead up to the World Bank's second World 
Development Report on poverty reduction. Specifically, the microeconomic and 
institutional mechanisms that link poverty with inequality remain an inadequately 
researched area. Moreover, there has been insufficient analysis of the distribution of 
wealth/assets and instead, income inequality has tended to be the favoured measure of 
inequality. However, at the cross-country level, even though the relationship between 
/ See Reddy and Minoiu (2006a) for an interesting evaluation of poverty measurement as applied to 
China. 
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income inequality and growth is ambiguous (Banerjee and Duflo, 2003), the 
distribution of assets seems to be strongly associated with subsequent growth 
performance (Birdsall and Londono, 1997; Deininger and Squire, 1998; Deininger 
and Olinto, 2000). Furthermore, the ways in which economic markets are structured 
so that the poor are not able to benefit from economic growth are not well understood, 
nor as are the ways in which governments can influence this outcome. 
Despite the energy directed towards poverty reduction, the prognosis for success is 
not promising. Calculating poverty elasticities and projecting human development 
indicators, and employing alternative projected long term regional economic growth 
rates, Hamner et al. (1999:561) conclude that a reduction in income poverty by 50 
percent by 2015 is unlikely for most developing countries. Indeed, the situation for 
sub-Saharan Africa is particularly dismal where there is little chance that any of the 
poverty reduction targets will be met including those for human development. In 
reality this situation may be far worse than this given that these projections are based 
on trends prior to 1993, and thus do not take account of the direct impact of 
HIV/AIDS on life expectancy let alone its secondary impacts on livelihoods and well-
being. Moreover, the authors stress that the pattern of growth is important, with pro-
poor growth yielding more promising results as measured by poverty elasticity of 
growth. 
The global data presented so far suggest that achieving economic growth, and 
ensuring that the distribution of the benefits of this growth reach the poor are critical 
issues in the design of public policy that aspires to achieve a reduction in poverty. 
This raises a concern over the limits to government action more generally, and, in 
particular, that action which seeks pro-poor growth. 
2.3 GOVERNMENT ACTION AND POVERTY REDUCTION 
2.3.1 Pro-Poor Growth 
Conventionally economic growth takes place if the total value of all goods and 
/ Poverty elasticities refer to the percentage change in the proportion of people below a poverty 
threshold produced by a percentage change in economic growth. Thus a high elasticity of the poverty 
incidence with respect to GDP per capita implies greater efficiencies in translating economic growth 
into poverty reduction. In these circumstances, consistent per capita growth rates of 2.0 - 2.8 percent 
would achieve the international targets for income poverty by 2015 (Hamner et al, 1999:556). 
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services exchanged or purchased in an economy increases over some agreed time 
frame. Moreover, growth implies that resources have been used or transformed in 
some fashion that makes the end result more valuable in monetary terms. Changes in 
technology may mean that resources are used more efficiently, with the result that 
fewer resources are needed for the same or a better end product. As researchers 
concerned with sustainable development point out, it makes no difference whether the 
extra goods and services are beneficial or useful, or if it may have been better for the 
environment or for some segments of the population had they not been produced 
(Douthwaite, 2002). 
Economic growth is also associated with other transformations including the 
accumulation of physical and human capital, shifts in the structure of economic 
production from agriculture to industry, and then to services, and lessening reliance 
on natural resources (Kaldor, 1963; Kuznets, 1955). Finally, growth also leads to 
increasingly complex institutions regulating the activities of individuals, states and 
markets. Growth is often accompanied by increasing urbanisation, increased water 
and energy usage, and more solid and water borne waste. These transformations also 
bring dynamics that impact upon the net result of economic growth and the 
distribution of its costs and benefits. 
Turning to the question of how growth might benefit the poor, that is to say be pro-
poor, the current consensus among many development economists insists that poverty 
reduction is mainly the result of economic growth, which in turn is the result of good 
economic policies. Empirical studies have shown that effective economic policies for 
growth include adherence to fiscal discipline and thus low budget deficits, 
maintaining a competitive currency and a positive balance of payments, low and 
stable inflation rates, openness to trade and the protection of property rights. Other 
policy options being recommended include privatisation, tax reforms and the removal 
of market controls such as subsidies on food and essential services, minimum wages 
and currency restrictions. In the light of this, it might be thought that pro-poor growth 
is also best achieved by the consistent application of these policies. 
The notion of 'good growth' and 'bad growth' developed by 'green economists' can 
be usefully extended beyond the issues of sustainable development that are their 
immediate concern (Douthwaite, 2002). The questions become instead, how might 
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economic growth translate into increased income for the poor, as well as into 
improvements in the other aspects of improved well-being that are considered part of 
poverty reduction (good growth)?8 Or alternatively, what might result in less 
satisfactory growth in which the poor benefit little, benefit only in terms of certain 
aspects of well-being, such as income, while losing out on others, such as health 
status or leisure, or indeed, experience forms of bad growth that perpetuate or even 
produce poverty. 
Taking the characteristics of good growth first: in many developing countries in 
which the subsistence economy has collapsed, the most direct way in which growth 
assists the poor takes place through the jobs that are created. This is particularly so 
when growth occurs in labour absorbing sectors of the economy such as agriculture, 
construction and in clothing and textile manufacturing. Policies that seek to attract 
foreign investment and to promote exports are often proposed as a way of dealing 
with high unemployment. This is certainly true of South Africa where employment 
creation remains at the top of the agenda of government, business and civil society 
and where unpopular macroeconomic reforms were introduced as the 'Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution' strategy (GEAR) in the hope of promoting 
employment. 
A second route is by creating a better environment for the entrepreneurship and 
industry of the poor themselves and improved returns on the assets that they are able 
to access. This would apply to many of the chronically poor who probably have little 
potential to obtain employment, even if the economy expands, due to their low skills 
and resource base. Although the informal and subsistence agricultural sectors are 
generally included in the calculation of GDP, in many cases the contribution of these 
sectors is poorly estimated. Nonetheless many countries recognise the important role 
that is played by such production in boosting the incomes of the poor. Indeed, in 
South Africa, increasing employment in the informal sectors has been held out as 
evidence of successful job creation brought about by macroeconomic reforms, rather 
than as being one of the possible costs of adopting such policies when certain jobs are 
informalised. This route relies upon policies that build assets as well as improve the 
returns of the assets of the poor, and frequently makes use of various 'market assisted' 
7 See also Ravallion's more critical review of the notion: 'good and bad growth' (Ravallion, 1997a). 
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strategies for implementation. It seems reasonable to characterise South Africa's 
Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative (ASGISA) as an example of this approach. 
Also of help for the chronically poor, meaning those who are trapped in poverty and 
unable to improve their position through their own efforts, the greater revenue 
collected by the state through taxation on the expanded activity can be used for 
increased social spending as well as on further improvements to infrastructure 
utilised by the poor for production and reproduction. With growth, such expenditure 
can be achieved without the cost of increasing the budget deficit. Broadening systems 
of social security such as the Child Support Grant (CSG) introduced in South Africa 
in 1998 are among the policy options that might be considered as well as policies that 
ensure the provision of basic services such as South Africa's Community Water 
Supply and Sanitation Scheme that provides subsidised basic services. Increased 
revenue can also improve the capacity of the state to effect redistributive strategies 
such as land reform, thereby directly transferring assets into the hands of those who 
are poorly endowed. 
A less direct impact is through the trickle down impact of the improved 
circumstances of the less poor and the rich who are able to consume and invest more. 
This might increase domestic demand, especially for services such as domestic 
labour and recreation, and promote the growth of labour intensive small and medium 
sized business. 
And finally, there may be an indirect effect through a more general impact of the 
policies that have been adopted to promote growth, such as more stable prices, better 
access to the cheaper goods being imported, cheaper credit and reduced political 
instability and violence. 
In contrast, with bad growth, greater output is achieved through unsustainable 
environmental, social or economic degradation. In terms of the environment, this is 
increasingly receiving attention as awareness is raised concerning pollution levels, the 
devastation of forests and other natural habitats and water crises in developing 
countries. Without effective control by governments, many countries are sacrificing 
their natural capital in an effort to attract investment and reach short-term targets for 
job creation. While the long term consequences of this are clear, such degradation 
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also brings short term costs to segments of the population who still rely upon the 
environment for aspects of their livelihoods, or as the source for meeting their basic 
needs. Furthermore, the least well off tend to be those who are forced to work in, or 
to live near, hazardous environments due to the absence of alternatives. Man-made 
environmental catastrophes resulting from inadequate safety regulation also impact 
disproportionately on the poor. While Bhopal is probably the best known of these, 
many examples may be given including asbestos poisoning in the Northern Cape 
province of South Africa. 
However, bad growth need not only be associated with environmental degradation 
and a second aspect of bad growth relates to the increased costs arising from 
structural changes in the economy. For example, while the urbanisation that 
accompanies economic growth may bring better opportunities for employment and 
work, an unintended consequence is that many services once obtained directly from 
the environment must now be purchased, while opportunities for own-production are 
reduced. There are also new costs levied on obtaining services. The example of user 
tariffs on water supply and the escalating cost of water provided through the private 
sector are examples. Once again, South Africa provides a useful example, in which 
some researchers claim that the recently privatised water supply in Johannesburg has 
compelled the municipality to cut the water supply of 800 households per day as a 
result of non-payment (MacDonald, 2002: 3). 
Some mass produced products may 'crowd out' local production and local 
technologies and undermine the capacity of the poor to gain a return from their own 
assets. If this does take place, there is a good chance that labour-absorbing forms of 
production and distribution may be negatively affected, and local entrepreneurship 
displaced. An example is the collapse of the low cost clothing industry in KwaZulu-
Natal in the face of cheap imports, and the subsequent loss of thousands of jobs in 
this sector, or the importation of cheap long-life milk with negative consequences for 
dairy producers and their labourers. 
'Crowding on' of costs to future generations, other countries or to other sectors is a 
feature of economic growth that is often overlooked. The assumption that the 
adoption of growth friendly policies by all countries or regions results in a win-win 
situation flies in the face of much economic theory which holds that there are almost 
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always winners and losers. At best, such policies might simply defray the costs 
associated with their adoption (the example of environmental degradation has already 
been mentioned), or crowd on the costs to other regions, or to those less able to 
influence policy. Examples might be small town industries unable to compete with 
mass produced imports nor able to lever mediating support from the government 
(Hart, 2002). 
The social costs of bad growth can be linked to the presence of poverty producing 
forces as described by 0yen, (2002) whereby growth in some sectors or places either 
requires immiseration elsewhere, or has the unintended consequence of this. Once 
again, the development of South Africa's minerals industry is a glaring example of 
the adoption of poverty producing policies by the apartheid government to ensure a 
supply of cheap labour to the mines (Wolpe, 1972). Other examples include the 
social impact of environmental degradation on indigenous populations in South 
America or the forced removal of populations arising from the construction of large 
dams in Asia. Structural reforms that lead to the closure of labour intensive industries 
are also poverty producing forces that may be unavoidable. Once again the case of 
the clothing sector in the KwaZulu-Natal Province of South Africa is an example in 
which the removal of tariff barriers and apartheid era incentives resulted in massive 
job losses (Palmi, 2007). 
Having outlined some of the mechanisms that condition whether growth is good or 
bad, meaning pro-poor as opposed to poverty producing, it is now necessary to look 
more closely at the recent evidence that argues that growth is indeed good for the 
poor. This might give some clues as to which policy options best ensure that poverty 
reduction is maximised. 
2.3.2 Growth, Poverty Reduction and Inequality 
An important resource now available to researchers concerned with poverty reduction 
and growth is the large multi-country data base of household surveys and national 
statistics compiled by the World Bank (Deininger and Squire, 1996). With the 
correction of these data to ensure that variations in prices and methodology can be 
/ Interestingly, Reddy and Minoiu (2006b) suggest that the failure to reduce poverty in many parts of 
the world might have been an unintended consequence of China's success in reducing poverty. 
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taken in account, and the use of sophisticated econometric modelling techniques, 
comparative analysis can now be undertaken of trends and the impact of differing 
contexts or different policy options. After a careful analysis of the relationship 
between changes in per capita GDP on the incomes of those at the bottom end of the 
income distribution, World Bank economists Dollar and Kraay (2000) use these data 
to conclude that the effect of growth on the incomes of the poor is no different in rich 
countries than poor ones, and that the poverty-growth relationship has remained 
consistent over time. They then go further to claim that policy induced growth is as 
good for the poor as it is for the overall economy. Despite making a number of bold 
policy statements on the basis of their findings, they conclude that very little is known 
about the causes of changes in the distribution of income. 
Dollar and Kraay use per capita GDP as a measure of growth and their results refer to 
the elasticity of average incomes in the bottom quintile with respect to average 
income. That is to say, poverty is defined in a relative sense and is a constant 
proportion of all the countries included in their data regardless of the level of income. 
Growth is seen to be good for the poor if the average per capita income of the bottom 
quintile increases at the same rate or more as that of average per capita income of the 
total population. They say that the improvement in the incomes of the poor from 
growth is not sequenced, and thus is not due to the trickle down effect in which 
improved benefits to the rich eventually led to benefits being accrued by the poor. 
Instead, this is argued to follow from an improved environment for the poor to 
increase their own production and income. 
Dollar and Kraay claim that 80 percent of the variation in the incomes of the poor is 
due to variation in overall per capita incomes, and that just under half of the growth of 
the incomes of the poor is explained by growth in mean incomes. They show that the 
income of the poor does not fall disproportionately compared to the average person 
during crisis, that is, in times of recession, the average income of the poor does not 
fall more so than the non-poor. They use this to disprove the notion that crises are 
particularly hard on the poor, although they do concede that a proportional fall at a 
lower income might be harder on the poor. 
Having shown that increased economic output has a positive impact on the income of 
the poorest quintile of the income distribution, Dollar and Kraay then try to identify 
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the policies being adopted by countries that have managed to achieve this. A core set 
of institutions and policies are examined, including the usual formula: fiscal 
discipline, macroeconomic stability, openness to trade and the protection of property 
rights. The adoption of these policies is found to contribute towards increasing the 
likelihood that the incomes of the poor benefit from an increase in average incomes. 
Finally, Dollar and Kraay investigate the impact of social spending and of formal 
democratic institutions using an index of voice and accountability. They conclude this 
analysis by describing the reduction of government consumption as being 'super pro-
poor' and conclude that the income of the poor is not influenced by the presence of 
democratic institutions. However, once again they do point to the fact that research 
has been mixed about the impact of social spending and say that such expenditure 
may not have been well targeted towards the poor. Dollar and Kraay end by 
concluding that the standard pro-growth macro-economic policies are good for the 
poor as they raise mean incomes with no significant effect on the distribution of 
income. 
At one level, Dollar and Kraay provide a simple and useful message: there is nothing 
intrinsically negative about raising mean income in terms of its effect in raising the 
income of the poorest quintile of the population. However, the usefulness of their 
analysis is undermined by a tendency to overstate the implications of their findings 
and understate the sometimes quite substantial limitations of their methodology. In 
particularly, they tend to blur the difference between the measure of poverty that they 
use (the income of the poorest quintile) with the broader notion of improved well-
being of those in absolute or chronic poverty. Rather, it seems as if their concern with 
'debunking myths' leads their analysis back into the restrictive mantra of "Fiscal 
discipline, Macroeconomic stability, Openness to trade and Protection of property 
rights" and into some sweeping statements derived from doubtful indicators of social 
and political structures. 
However by demonstrating that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with the 
expectation that expanding economic output will lead to a reduction in poverty, this 
research does allow a fresh start to be made in the examination of pro-poor growth. 
Admittedly, to move from accepting that growth does lead to an improvement in the 
incomes of the poor to an assertion that growth is the solution to poverty reduction is 
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questionable. In their conclusion, Dollar and Kraay are in fact careful to note that 
growth is not all that is needed to improve the quality of life of the poor, though they 
make no mention of what else might be needed. Furthermore, other researchers have 
noted that poverty elasticities of growth vary widely and that the impact of growth on 
absolute poverty is thus unclear. Empirical studies use these results to demonstrate 
that Millennium Development Goals (MDG) of poverty halving cannot be achieved 
simply through growth and that that the poverty reducing impact of growth depends 
crucially on the distribution of income (Dagdeviren et ai, 2000; Hamner et al, 1999; 
Hamner and Naschold, 2000; Ravallion, 1997b). 
The Dollar and Kraay analysis demonstrates that there is a need to look beyond the 
broad policies that facilitate economic growth, and that deeper investigation is 
required to identify the different benefits and costs of growth and how these are 
distributed. Obviously, recognising that promoting growth through the standard 
package of economic policies is important. However, if this is at the cost of policies 
that might better reduce poverty in a sustainable fashion, there is a need to find the 
correct balance of policies and to fine tune the extent and sequence in which they are 
applied. 
Indeed, as Lipton (1997) has shown, it is evident that the major thrust of the 
development debate over the past decade regarding the relationship between growth, 
development and the reduction of poverty and inequality has shifted significantly. 
Traditionally, there has been a broad consensus that growth would be helped by 
and/or associated with increasing inequality; a notion often associated with the 
(in)famous hypothesis by Kuznets (1955). This was contested by scholars 
emphasising the importance of 'growth with equity' and redistribution as a basis for 
subsequent growth (Adelman, 1995). 
More recently, theoretical arguments that link aggregate growth to inequality have led 
to renewed interest in this debate. While some models maintain that redistribution 
would reduce growth (Persson and Tabellini, 1994), abroad stream of literature now 
suggests that redistributive efforts by government could, through increased investment 
10/ Kuznets (1955) hypothesised that inequality would widen during the earlier stages of economic 
growth, but, in time, would again narrow, hence forming an inverted U when mapped against per-
capita income. That this hypothesis was developed without any supporting evidence is often over-
looked. 
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by the poor, actually lead to higher growth (cf. Aghion et al, 1999, Bardhan et al, 
2000). 
While it is agreed that no single blueprint exists for how to simultaneously achieve 
growth and address poverty and inequality, Lipton (1997) points out that analysis has 
converged on a number of important themes. Of these, the questions of whether 
economic growth is a necessary and sufficient condition for a reduction in absolute 
poverty, and, further, whether growth leads to a reduction in inequality, have received 
considerable attention.11 Despite Deininger and Squire's preparation of the reliable 
international data set already described which permits such analysis, a conclusive 
empirically based analysis of the correlation between particular rates of growth and 
rates of inequality has yet to be presented. 
However, there is evidence that inequality can have a dampening impact on growth, 
as well as on poverty reduction. Research has shown that countries that start with 
significant inequality experience lower growth rates than those that start relatively 
equal. This is because inequalities in physical, financial and human assets may result 
in micro-economic inefficiencies that constrain poor people from participating 
effectively and efficiently in the economy. This could lead either to inequitable 
growth or, depending on the depth of poverty and inequality, to low growth. 
Conversely, available evidence suggests that the argument for poverty reduction through 
the trickle down from broad-based growth does not seem to hold, at least in the case of 
sub-Saharan Africa (Hamner et al, 1999). Even where growth has been of sufficient 
scale to make a reduction of poverty possible, the failure to generate sufficient 
employment has undermined its impact on poverty. Indeed, the positive impact of 
growth upon the reduction of poverty may be dampened at higher levels of inequality 
(Bruno et al., 1996:11). Equally though, while conceding that high inequality may be 
bad for growth, some analysts find that changes in inequality, whether up or down, are 
not necessarily good for growth (Banerjee and Duflo, 2003). 
Of special relevance to this thesis, Deininger and Olinto (2000:2) point out an 
/ The UNDP, the World Bank and independent researchers have undertaken various studies. See for 
example Bruno et a.l (1996), Anand and Kanbur (1993a, 1993b) and Bourguignon et al. (1991). Lipton 
(1997) provides a useful summary of the emerging consensus about the definition, measurement and 
policies for the reduction of poverty while Piketty (1999) brings together theoretical literature in 
support of this argument. 
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important shortcoming of much of this analysis linking growth and inequality. 
Although most of the theoretical analysis concerning the relationship between growth 
and inequality identifies the link between distributional issues and economic growth 
as being through differential access to assets, the majority of empirical studies look 
only at income. This can be taken one step further since the ways in which assets are 
used and accumulated may result in the persistence of poverty over time, forcing our 
attention onto the processes that determine household livelihoods and the markets that 
structure the relationship between assets and income. 
The UNDP (1997:72-74) has offered several explanations as to why a converse 
relationship might hold, that is, that poverty reduction might facilitate economic 
growth. Several of these lend support to the view that asset distribution, accumulation 
and use are central to the growth-poverty reduction nexus. As poverty tends to result 
in behaviour based on risk aversion, the reduction of poverty might increase 
willingness to take entrepreneurial risks. Poverty also tends to restrict spatial 
mobility, as those who are poor lack the resources required to move in search of better 
opportunities, transport their produce to markets, or carry the costs of a sustained job 
search. In addition, high levels of poverty limit the investment in human capital, 
especially in terms of the education and health status of children. Finally, poverty also 
brings with it increased vulnerability, with the result that assets are permanently lost 
when households face shocks such as injury, theft or natural disasters. 
The experience of the East Asian countries in particular, indicates that one of the 
dimensions which have buttressed their high economic growth rates has been the 
implementation of policies which focus on a more equitable human resource 
development in terms of human capital, especially education and health. Increasing 
the access of the poor sections of the society to productive assets is a related 
dimension. Specifically, the Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) of East Asia had a 
range of state-led interventionist policies which focused on human resource 
development, mild financial repression such as keeping interest rates low but positive 
and directed credit and selected industrial promotion policies which focused on non-
traditional exports (Chandra, 1997). In many cases, government action went well 
beyond the conventional set of stabilising macro-economic policies to include asset 
redistribution of which land reform was a common strategy. This raises the question 
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of whether conditions have changed to the point that such direct state action is no 
longer possible or desirable for poverty reduction. 
2.3.3 Is Macro-economic Stability Sufficient for Poverty Reduction? 
Despite the criticisms often levelled at the Bretton Woods institutions, a major 
component of advice frequently given by these institutions to governments is in fact 
on how to promote pro-poor or good growth. For the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) for example, this is growth that is: 
.. .sustainable, that brings lasting full employment and poverty 
reduction, that promotes greater equity through greater equality of 
opportunity, that militates against marginalization, and that respects 
human freedom, the diversity of cultures, and the environment 
(Camdessus, 1995). 
To achieve these goals, most IMF and World Bank economists recommend a standard 
set of policies mentioned earlier that are expected to produce specific economic 
reforms: macroeconomic policies that focus on monetary, fiscal and exchange rate 
policies that achieve macroeconomic stability. The macro imbalances to be avoided 
include high and variable inflation, high government deficits and the overvaluation of 
currency, and restrictions placed on the movement of tradables and capital. Structural 
economic reforms refer to policies that promote efficient resource usage and provide 
incentives for competition and for private enterprise. These include policies that 
remove barriers to trade and to investment, and promote the transfer of ownership of 
certain state enterprises to the private sector. 
Although this 'Washington Consensus' is frequently disparaged, few policy analysts 
would disagree with the underlying potential of such macroeconomic policies to avoid 
bad, poverty producing, growth. High inflation negatively affects those who rely 
upon wages as the principal source of income and who are unable to save in high 
1 9 
interest earning accounts. It also prejudices those with a limited ability to purchase 
goods on credit while eroding the tax base, and consequently the ability of 
government to sustain social expenditure. Finally high inflation has an adverse impact 
/ What constitutes 'high' inflation is not clear. Hyper-inflation seems generally thought of as 
inflation that exceeds three digits; extremely high inflation has be referred to as between 50 and 100 
percent; high inflation somewhere between 20 and 50 percent and moderate inflation 5 to 25 percent 
(Piana, 2001). Most countries strive for inflation rates well below the top end of the later category. 
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on the investment decisions of the rich and the poor. While the wealthy may try to 
invest in off-shore accounts, the poor may invest in unproductive stockpiles as a 
hedge against future price increases. 
Overvaluation of an exchange rate can negatively affect the incomes of the rural poor 
whose livelihoods are often dependent upon exports of agricultural commodities, and 
will also reduce the competitiveness of other low cost exports. Of course, under-
evaluation can also prejudice the poor by raising the costs of imported inputs, such as 
oil and technology, while also increasing the costs of products that are consumed 
nationally as well as being exported (Dorosh et al, 1996). An example is food, 
especially grains, in South Africa where the exchange rate crisis in 2001 provided a 
boom for exporters, but also had a knock on effect whereby local food prices 
increased by 20 percent during 2002. 
Spending by government that is far beyond available resources may lead to excessive 
borrowing from banks by government, which in turn fuels inflation and results in a 
substantial portion of government's resources being allocated to service interest 
payments. Consequently, most would agree that countries need to balance their 
budgets and that budget deficits should stay small. However, as a former structural 
adjustment advocate, Jeffery Sachs, has argued, the budget austerity that this requires 
means that impoverished countries cannot keep their populations alive because 
budgets for essential services such as health, education, food transfers and so forth are 
so small (Sachs, 2001). Debt servicing further erodes these budgets, while policies 
designed to seduce international investors may cause resources to be allocated 
towards meeting the needs of the wealthy and the foreign. Chossudovsky (1998:302) 
notes that cutting expenditure on these services even impairs the collection of 
information on poverty. He provides an example of declining recorded infant 
mortality in sub-Saharan Africa in the face of closing health clinics and the laying off 
of health professionals. 
Perhaps ironically then, calls for government action on poverty reduction such as 
those contained in the Copenhagen Declaration came at a time when it is also clear 
that the options for such action had become increasingly constrained. The influence 
that governments could bring to bear on the path of economic growth was eroded 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In particular, governments became less able to direct 
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the ways in which the distribution of the benefits of growth were allocated. 
Traditionally, resource limitations have been the constraint most often cited by 
governments. These include both the lack of financial resources as well as the 
institutional capacity with which to implement policy. While these remain important, 
global trends, macro-economic conditions and the changing institutional context are 
also believed to have closed off possibilities while narrowing the range of policy 
options open to governments. Opposition to 'Globalisation' thus became a rallying 
call for advocacy concerned with the plight of developing countries and continues to 
play a role in international negotiations. 
However, it is noteworthy that throughout the 1990s the argument that economic 
growth will automatically resolve poverty was challenged from both the perspectives 
of neo-classical economics and political economy. Examples of the former include ul 
Haque (1994) and Goldsmith (1995) while a special edition of Third World Quarterly 
(1996, 17[4]) provides an edited volume with examples of the latter analysis. Dutt et 
al. (1994) provides useful empirical support from both perspectives while the events 
leading up to the preparation of the 2001 World Development Report show that the 
debate is far from being resolved (Dollar and Kraay, 2000; Kanbur and Lustig, 1999). 
Some economists argue that economic reform and fiscal prudence is not enough to 
achieve pro-poor growth. Sachs (2001) for example, sees four pillars to the escape 
from poverty, of which economic reform is only one. A second pillar is having a 
population that is healthy and educated enough to participate in the global economy. 
This is a big order given the need for several forms of literacy including computers 
and communications not to mention a high degree of economic literacy. Many poor 
countries face widespread disease (malaria, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and cholera to 
name a few), they have degraded tropical soils, or in the case of South Africa, soils 
degraded from policies of forced over-crowding into labour reserves, and they have a 
scarcity of clean water. Many believe that poor countries cannot clear these hurdles 
on their own and that budget support rather than project support is needed. 
The third pillar identified by Sachs is technology. Despite the rhetoric of the 
'market', developing countries spend substantial public funds on research and design. 
With their budget constraints, there is no way in which this can happen in poor 
countries in which universities and other research institutions remain critically short 
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of research capacity. Linked to technology is access to information at a cost 
affordable to the poor and in a medium accessible to the poor. 
The fourth pillar is structural change. This does not refer to the structural adjustment 
promoted by the IMF and World Bank during the previous two decades, which many 
argue have contributed towards diminished capacity for governance and increasing 
poverty. Instead, in this context structural adjustment refers to policies that change the 
underlying structures that produce goods and services in an economy, and that 
distribute the benefits of this production. Examples might include export 
diversification, moving up value chains in which more processed goods are produced 
or identifying new sectors in which a competitive edge can be achieved.13 
This is a question about the type of growth that is being pursued, identifying sectors 
and forms of production that have are likely to reduce poverty. The underlying 
rationale is to move away from a limited base of primary commodities, already shown 
to contain 'growth retarding', and 'poverty producing' tendencies, and gaining access 
to the markets of rich countries that are sheltered by tariffs. Equally important are 
mechanisms for avoiding, or at least managing, the destruction of local industries 
through imports from other poor countries, equally desperate to find markets in 
countries more open than Europe and the USA. Not mentioned by Sachs, but 
potentially a component of structural adjustment, is the possible need for considered 
policies that promote the redistribution of assets, whether land or access to finance, 
both of which have been important in South Africa. 
Another pillar also not mentioned by Sachs is recognition of the historical slate. 
Many poor countries are plagued by the results of disastrous policies from previous 
regimes, often arising from the absence of democratic rule. The impact of 40 years of 
apartheid rule is an example; the impact of wars in many other parts of Africa is 
another. Decisions by governments too disempowered or disinterested to contest bad 
advice given by the international agencies, or by elites who stand to benefit might be a 
third example. However, a clean slate is obviously an unachievable requirement, and 
instead what is required is the recognition that the context within which policies are 
/ Movement up a value chain implies that raw materials are further processed within the country and 
that higher value items are thus exported. This increases the jobs resulting from the production or 
extraction of raw materials. A South African example is the export of wood pulp rather than timber for 
paper production. 
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expected to operate will vary from country to country, and will change over time. 
This is one of the reasons why generalised analyses such as the Dollar and Kraay 
study fail to provide sufficient information for policy development. 
To fill this gap, microeconomic analysis, policy reforms and interventions will also be 
required if the poor are to improve their position. These would need to involve 
interventions that improve the access of the poor to productive assets such as land 
reform, infrastructure and financial services, as well as measures that reduce the costs 
of production, including transaction and information costs. To an extent some of 
these policies are already in place in South Africa. However, in the case of some, 
implementation has been slow (land reform) and for others, the benefits have largely 
been captured by the non-poor (privatisation). However, the development of such 
policies rests on an inadequate knowledge base. The linkages between macro-
economic and micro-economic policies have received little attention globally while 
the real operation of markets remains another area in which insufficient information 
has been collected, while the determinants of the behaviour of poor producers and 
consumers are most often assumed without being empirically analysed. 
From this discussion, it seems reasonable to conclude that the role of government in 
facilitating pro-poor growth is more complex than neo-liberal polemic would have us 
believe. Instead, the results of high economic growth and rapid reduction in poverty 
and inequality have been achieved through a combination of market-oriented and 
interventionist policies. It also does not seem evident that inequality will always have 
a neutral effect on poverty reduction outcomes from growth. In particular, 
inequalities in asset distribution have been found to be negatively related to poverty 
reduction. Of interest then is how states and markets operate to support or hinder pro-
poor growth. This implies balancing the previous focus on macro-economic policy 
with appropriate micro-economic interventions that assist those at the bottom of the 
income distribution to derive greater benefit when using the assets that they do 
possess. 
2.3.4 Microeconomic Policy, Markets and Poverty 
The World Development Report produced in 1997 was an early acknowledgement by 
the World Bank that the previous over-emphasis on the market may have been 
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inappropriate, and that there is a need for more effective state action if growth is to 
result in the reduction of poverty (World Bank, 1997a). Underlying this is recognition 
of the complexities involved in the relationship between macro-economic strategy and 
micro-economic conditions, especially those affecting the operation of markets. The 
change in emphasis can be seen in new approaches adopted by many other donors 
including the Sustainable Livelihoods (SL) framework used by DFID, UNDP and 
GTZ, each of which recognises that occasions may arise when policy reforms are 
required to modify the workings of markets. Indeed, second generation PRSPs show 
an increasing tendency to extend state intervention beyond simply the provision of 
basic social services and to include the regulation of markets. 
There are many reasons why there seems to have been some shift away from the pure 
neo-liberal agendas of the early 1990s. Some of these come from economic theory 
which demonstrates that markets will only tend to work well when important 
institutions are in place. If these institutions were present, and if markets were 
perfect, it might be expected that poverty would be reduced in the manner anticipated 
in much of the foregoing discussion through the 'trickle-down' of the benefits of 
economic growth. Furthermore, it could also be expected that the rate at which both 
poverty and inequality could be reduced could be increased by policies that simply 
transfer assets, such as land or finance, from the wealthy to the poor. Beneficiaries 
would be able to buy in any complementary resources that they might need to make 
use of their new assets, including finance or insurance. This is the world anticipated 
by policies that propose reduced state intervention and reliance upon market forces. 
However, unlike the abstract world of economic text books, empirical experience has 
shown that an unqualified belief in the market is misplaced in the real world and that 
there are many ways in which economic growth can be achieved. One source of 
concern can largely be ascribed to the absence of some markets, or the presence of 
distortions in the markets that do exist, some of which are inherent, others the result 
of previous polices. Views tend to converge on several sources of market failure that 
account for this and that might call for forms of state intervention. These reasons 
include the existence of externalities, the costs of technology development, the impact 
of risks and uncertainty, the 'thinness' or Tumpiness' of certain markets and 
information asymmetries (Spence, 1976). Political economists also point to cronyism, 
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the ability of powerful interest groups to influence both government policy and 
markets, and the social, economic and political marginality of those who are poor 
(Bond, 2000; Krueger, 2002). 
As a result, the rate of return that can be achieved from different assets by different 
activities has physical, institutional and political dimensions. While exchange 
activities, for example, have agro-climatic and technical determinants, the rate of 
return that is realised from these activities is also based on the rules that structure the 
markets in which these exchanges take place. The concept of 'real markets' is useful in 
this regard as a way of drawing attention to the specific set of power and institutional 
relationships which constitute real markets, as compared to the abstract notion of 
perfectly functioning markets (Harriss-White, 1990; Mackintosh, 1996). Furthermore, 
markets may also be missing, such as when financial markets do not extend to those 
without collateral, or when property markets do not exist under conditions of 
communal tenure in rural Africa, or when plots are simply occupied without being 
owned in shanty or informal settlements on the urban fringe. Markets may also be thin 
when there are few buyers or sellers, barriers to entry or low volumes. When distress 
sales of livestock take place in isolated areas, the absence of buyers results in low 
local prices. The same situation occurs when small-scale farmers attempt to sell 
surplus crops that are not consumed locally or when large numbers of informal sector 
hawkers attempt to sell the same products to low income consumers. 
The rise of new institutional economics has supported views that economic exchange 
is not simply about anonymous markets but is a form of social and political 
interaction. As such, a variety of types of economic exchange are recognised, which 
are shaped by, or embedded in, social and cultural variables such as institutions of 
kinship, social stratification and organisational form. Karl Polanyi distinguished a 
typology of three types of economic exchange: reciprocal, redistributive and market. 
While, Polanyi argued that only the last was not embedded in social-structural or 
cultural-structural relationships (Polanyi, 1944: 57), Granovetter (1985) and more 
recently Barber (1995) contend that all forms of economic behaviour are embedded in 
social structure, although they differ on the exact nature of this structure. At issue is 
the extent to which the partners in a form of exchange are free to operate as homo 
economicus: ".. .economising, rationalising individuals, considering only price, not 
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other obligations, buying cheap and selling dear, treating all buyers and sellers 
impersonally, equally and honestly" (Barber, 1995: 398). For Granovetter, social 
structure appears to be limited to networks of interpersonal exchange, whereas Barber 
is concerned with wider structures of kinship, stratification, gender and class. Indeed, 
Barber goes further, and holds out the social embeddedness of economic action as a 
way of meeting the challenge of what he refers to as the "absolutisation of the 
market" (Barber, 1995:388). Finally, the embeddedness of economic activities is 
recognised as carrying costs, which vary as development proceeds, and which may 
offset, or change the distribution of the benefits of economic exchange. 
Gore (1993:433) points out that the rules affecting these interactions are determined in 
a number of different ways requiring that household and individuals enter into 
different processes and procedures of claiming. Some of these claiming systems can 
be legally enforced and are backed by the power of the state. Others are backed by 
'moral' rules, and are largely found within domestic units, kinship structures and 
neighbourhoods. Thus, while the claims that the household is entitled to make are 
largely determined by formal rules concerning claims made for work, on the state for 
welfare, or through the sale of produce and petty commodities, there is a 'division of 
entitlement' within the household which determines the allocation accruing to 
individual members. These are largely based upon social conventions, and 
negotiations/struggles that occur within the household. Examples of these social 
conventions would be those governing the rights of migrant members of the family to 
share in peasant production, and the reciprocal claims of household members on the 
migrant's wage. Two distinct sets of claiming system can therefore be identified: 
those in which the state plays a determinant role, and those in which the state is 
unable to play a direct role. Gore (1993) refers to these as the governmental and non-
governmental sites of rule making and rule enforcing. 
These arguments have close parallels in the earlier work of Rein (1983) who used a 
wider conceptualisation of claims whereby individuals assemble a package of income 
through their effective claiming from a range of sources, including from markets. The 
state, private sector and domestic group are identified as the major institutions against 
which claims can be made. Rein emphasises that this claiming is an active and 
strategic process by which individuals demand, extract, request or enforce their bids 
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for resources, operating as individuals, households and in wider groupings such as 
community associations, trade unions and pressure groups. In this way, claims 
become another type of asset used by households to ensure their food security (Swift, 
1989). 
In addition, Rein stresses that the process of claim packaging is linked to the dynamic 
and fluid nature of household composition. This is particularly important in view of 
debate over the permeability of household boundaries, power relations within the 
household and the allocation of labour by the household (Ginwala et al., 1991; 
Kabeer, 1991; Guyer and Peters, 1987). In essence, these writers argue that 
negotiations and conflict integrally affect individual claims on income over the assets 
that exist within the household. Clearly, there will be trade-offs between the possible 
activities that can be engaged upon, both in terms of the activities themselves, as well 
as between the interests of the members of the household itself. Put differently, these 
activities constitute the livelihood strategy of the household, which is an outcome of 
decisions and conflict over the use of the household's assets. The strategy that results 
may well benefit some members of the household at the cost of others. Furthermore, 
like any strategy, its composition and success will be determined by the constraints 
and opportunities that are available to the household as a whole and to the individual 
members. 
As a further complication, an individual's position outside the household can affect 
the division of entitlement within the household due to the increased power that 
person has in negotiating intra-household distribution. An example would be the 
greater say that an employed woman might enjoy over the returns from the use of 
household assets. Feminist analysts have also pointed out that the power of the 
individuals within the household is affected by state enforced legal rules which 
authorise particular patterns of power relationships within the household. An example 
of this is legislation that assumes that the household head and principal breadwinner is 
male and that assets such as land are owned or controlled by a male head, or 
legalisation that requires that the head of household, usually male, can enter into 
contracts, such as for the sale of crops or to access credit (Guyer and Peters, 1987; 
Haddad, 1995; Kabeer, 1991). 
A conclusion that seems to follow from this discussion is that poverty measurement 
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itself would be better thought of in terms of access to assets and (real) markets rather 
than simply access to income. This is not a new idea. Writing in the mid 1980s, 
Townsend (1985: 661) recommends the use of total resources, meaning an income 
equivalent of wealth and income in kind, as a measure of deprivation. Indeed, 
Zimmerman and Carter (1996) suggest that a dynamic asset poverty line may be 
identified which they term the "Micawber Threshold". This divides those able to 
engage in a virtuous Victorian circle of accumulation from those who cannot. Named 
after David Micawber of Charles Dickens' David Copperfield who encouraged young 
lads to sacrifice and accumulate, Zimmerman and Carter (1996) use this threshold to 
evoke the idea that there may be types and depths of poverty from which not even a 
forward looking willingness to sacrifice and save can eradicate. 
Certainly, empirical evidence supports these arguments and in many countries 
throughout the world, governments have adopted policies that systematically distorted 
almost every economic market and social institution: apartheid in South Africa being 
an extreme example of these. In these circumstances, sanguine assumptions about the 
impact of economic growth on poverty, even if supported by redistributive strategies, 
seem at best heroic. Instead, research suggests that the majority of the poor face 
markets that are thin or missing. Moreover, in virtually all economies, it can be 
argued that many markets remain strongly influenced by existing positions of power 
and influence in the institutions through which they operate, as well as by the 
differential access of the various users to information concerning these markets. 
Indeed, in many instances, the poor have not benefited from market-oriented 
macroeconomic policy reforms because the underlying institutional context has 
remained the same. Only the last half of the 1990s has mainstream development 
analysis begun to focus more seriously on the impact of inadequate or asymmetric 
information as a hindrance to development. 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
Recent policy thinking has begun to recognise that even when the macroeconomic 
conditions may appear to exist for efficient markets, underlying microeconomic 
conditions may mean that the operation of markets is not neutral. Strengthening the 
l4/ Internationally see Carter and Zegarra (1995). In South Africa, see May et al. (1995); May and 
Amin (1995) and Vaughan and Xaba (1996). 
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abilities of poor people to fight poverty by building their assets has been argued to be 
one way of responding to these considerations when developing pro-poor growth 
strategy. This requires that an incentive structure be put in place fostered by 
macroeconomic policy that increases the flow of resources to the poor in order to 
enhance and protect their access and use of economic assets such as land, credit, and 
housing. Health services and educational opportunities are complementary actions 
that build human capital. In addition, the racial, gender, spatial and other inequities 
inherent within society need to be understood so that policies at least do not 
exacerbate or perpetuate them. Finally, effective policies, institutions and processes 
need to be adopted that are responsive to the situation, activities and requirements of 
the poor. 
Of particular relevance for this thesis is the increasing recognition that poverty cannot 
be solved by macro-economic policies alone, at times from surprising quarters 
(Manuel, 2003; Williamson, 2003). Instead, poverty reduction requires both 
institutional development to support governance and micro-economic policies to 
improve the benefits that the poor derive from their assets and enterprise. Related to 
this, the increasing recognition that poverty is a not a static condition among 
individuals, households or communities, and instead, poverty varies in space and time 
in terms of its conditions, effects and causes lends support to the need for more 
nuances and tailor-made policies. Poverty should also therefore be expressed in terms 
of the relative difference between groupings of people under different economic and 
political regimes. How poor people engage with complex markets, how assets are 
used and how assets are accumulated are the themes to be analysed in the remainder 
of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
M E A S U R E M E N T A N D B E Y O N D : FINDING A D Y N A M I C ALTERNATIVE 
/ do not have a house. I do not have strength. I do not have a husband at home. 
I like to farm but I do not have power to plough with a tractor or buy fertiliser, 
because I do not work. (Mrs. H. Sikhakhane: participant in the SA-PPA) 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
A dynamic analysis of poverty brings additional problems and topics for investigation 
to those described in the previous chapter. This chapter will return to the theme of 
persistent poverty raised in Chapter One. The chapter will note that the conventional 
approach such as that just reviewed relies on a conceptualisation of poverty that is 
essentially static in nature. However, persistent poverty requires an analytical 
framework that reveals the underlying dynamics of poverty and the chapter will 
review Amartya Sen's entitlements approach to the analysis of poverty, drawing out 
the notions of 'assets and livelihoods' as a dynamic approach to the analysis of 
poverty that persists. Elsewhere this form of poverty has been described as chronic 
poverty, a terminology that this thesis will adopt for those who remain poor over time. 
Alternative approaches to measuring poverty are then discussed. Money-metric and 
threshold measurement is compared to ill-being/well-being measures, with poverty 
lines falling into the former group, while basic needs and human development indices 
are seen to fall into the latter group. Finally, the chapter goes on to outline the 
possible causes of the persistence of poverty and discusses poverty traps. Two groups 
are important to this analysis, those that are permanently poor and those that slip into 
and out of poverty. The chapter concludes by providing an analytical framework for 
the thesis based on assets, livelihoods and vulnerability and re-examines previous 
attempts to differentiate the poor population of South Africa. 
3.2 POVERTY AND P O V E R T Y THAT PERSISTS 
3.2.1 Defining Poverty 
Despite the billion or more people still living in poverty described in Chapter Two, 
and the renewed attention on poverty reduction, the definition of poverty remains the 
subject of debate amongst policy analysts. In a review of more than 40 national 
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poverty studies a pragmatic mix of three approaches were found to be commonly used 
when trying to operationalise poverty definitions (May, 2001). Firstly poverty 
conceptualised as the inability to attain an absolute minimum standard of living 
reflected by a quantifiable and absolute indicator applied to a constant threshold such 
as a minimum income line that separates the poor from the non-poor. By necessity, 
measurement is quantitative relying upon surveys of income and consumption, and 
the threshold used is most often related to those used for international comparison, 
such as $l-per-day or $2-per-day corrected for Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) in 
some way. 
Poverty may also be conceptualised as being the lack of resources with which to attain 
a socially acceptable quality of life. This approach places emphasis on a relative 
indicator which would vary according to the standards of the society being measured, 
and may also take into account distributional issues. A minimum amount, such as a 
national poverty line may be used, but unlike a $ 1 -per-day, this is usually adjusted to 
take into account changing needs, preferences and national standards of living. 
Measurement is usually quantitative, although frequently subjective or qualitative 
approaches may play a role in setting definitions and standards. 
Finally, poverty may be conceptualised as being constrained choices, unfulfilled 
capabilities and exclusion. Measurement is recognised as being complex and, as yet, 
there is no generally accepted approach being used although institutions such as the 
UNDP have begun to explore alternative methodologies. Qualitative and 
participatory research techniques frequently play a central role but, as yet, there is no 
agreed approach to determining a measurable threshold. 
Relative poverty has sometimes been related to the distribution of income or wealth 
and thus as being equivalent to inequality while the absolute definition of poverty sees 
some scientifically determined minimum required for human survival. In the case of 
the first approach, the poverty of an individual is thus relative to the well-being 
enjoyed by others, while in the case of the second, poverty has a universal form that 
holds across time and space. 
However, in their debate over absolutist and relativist approaches to defining poverty, 
both Townsend (1985) and Sen (1985) adopt a more nuanced approach and place 
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emphasis more usefully on the dynamics of poverty and wealth and the social 
determination of deprivation. Thus Townsend (1985: 659) stresses that the necessities 
of life vary over time and space, they are adapted as changes occur in society and in 
the products of society. Commodities required by people are thus relative in the sense 
that changes in institutions, technology and social structure are all influences upon the 
relationship between needs and resources. Thus poverty lines should not simply be 
updated by price changes, but also in terms of what is included in the bundle of goods 
that make up the poverty line. What constitutes well-being in one time period, or in a 
country, may not be sufficient in another context. This is agreed to by Sen who states 
that the issue of absolute deprivation is not fixed by comparisons made with others 
who may be more or less deprived, but rather by capabilities which refer to what a 
person can or cannot do or be. As Townsend wrote: 
...poverty can be defined objectively and applied consistently only in terms of 
relative deprivation. Individuals, families and groups can be said to be in poverty 
when they lack the resources to obtain the types of diet, participate in the 
activities and have living conditions and amenities which are customary, or at 
least widely encouraged or approved in the societies to which they belong. Their 
resources are so seriously below those commanded by the average individual or 
family that they are, in effect, excluded from ordinary living patterns, customs 
and activities (1979:31). 
Over time then, this social construction of need suggests that social norms and values 
determine what goods and services constitute essential needs while at the same time, 
social structures determine the allocation of the resources with which these needs are 
met. Relative poverty in this sense is not about comparison with others in a society, 
but is rather comparison with what is socially and culturally accepted or required in a 
particular society at a particular point in time. Being relatively poor compared to 
others in a community may have some bearing on capabilities if this translates into an 
inability to meet the accepted norms of that community (such as participation in feasts 
or religious events). The issue here is not being less able to perform these activities 
than others, but instead whether these obligations/standards can be met or not. As will 
be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four and in the Appendix, this approach is 
adopted by this thesis. 
3.2.2 New Directions: Entitlements and Exclusion 
Although a fuller discussion of Sen's seminal analysis of the underlying causes of the 
40 
Bengal Famine of 1943, and the subsequent book co-written with Jean Dreze, (Sen, 
1977,1981; 1985; Dreze and Sen, 1989) will follow, it is useful to introduce this 
notion at this point. Sen's work stresses the relationship of people to the resources 
that they have and the commodities that they require in meeting their basic sustenance 
requirements. In the terminology of the entitlement approach, 'ownership 
endowments' (land, labour, products, welfare rights) are exchanged for 'commodity 
bundles' (food, services, facilities) through a process of'exchange entitlement 
mappings' (the labour and other markets, bureaucratic processes). A person's 
advantage in the framework is judged by their capabilities, that is to say, what they 
can or cannot do, or can or cannot be (Sen, 1985:670; Clark, 2005). The resources that 
are required to achieve some minimum level of capability may vary over time and by 
community.15 Entitlements failure results when the commodities bundles that are 
exchanged for endowments fall short of what is required to achieve the set of desired 
capabilities. While debated, a minimum set is not identified by Sen, although several 
writers have put forward some options (Clark, 2003; Nussbaum, 1995; Rawls, 1988; 
Saith, 2001a). 
In many studies based on the perceptions of the poor, in addition to physical attributes 
such as health and senses; mental attributes such as skills and imagination; and social 
aspects of poverty include alienation from community and kin and a sense of 
powerlessness. This view has some parallel with the concept of social exclusion that 
has been the subject of debate concerning poverty in Europe. In this analysis, social 
exclusion is seen to focus "primarily on relational issues (such as) the lack of social 
ties to the family, friends, local community, state services and institutions or more 
generally to the society to which an individual belongs" (Bhalla and Lapeyre, 
1997:417; Saith, 2001b). Townsend (1985:665) talks of social needs such as being 
able/unable to fulfil the roles of parent, kin, citizen, neighbour and so forth. As 
Townsend argues, the poor not only consume less, but also change their behaviour 
15/ While Sen's work has been enthusiastically adopted by many analysts of poverty, Gasper (1993) 
cautions that usage of the entitlements approach can lead to the mutation of the original terminology 
used by Sen. As a result, entitlements theory is not only used to analyse hunger and absolute poverty, 
but is extended to analyse entire patterns of resource distribution, power and environmental impact. 
While these are critical issues requiring analysis, the entitlements approach is not necessarily the most 
appropriate for these tasks and can lead to analyses that are confusing and even misleading (Longhurst, 
1994:17). Nonetheless, on balance, as Devereux (2001) concludes, Sen's conceptualisation of poverty 
has enormously advanced the debate. 
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(Townsend, 1985:662). Being ashamed to appear in public and not being able to 
participate in the activities of the community are also noted by Sen as being aspects of 
deprivation (Sen, 1985:169, 161). In this way, exclusion may be posed as being the 
opposite of social integration. 
The concept has both economic and social dimensions. While the economic 
dimension refers to exclusion from the opportunities to earn income, the labour 
market and the access to assets, the social dimension refers to participation in decision 
making, access to social services and access to community and family support 
(Figuaroa, 2001). At one level then, social exclusion can refer to the exclusion to the 
rights of citizenship, while at another the concept refers to relationships within 
families and communities. The usefulness of the concept is the support that it lends to 
the importance of social relationships in resource allocation. Social exclusion may 
thus be linked to the existence of discriminationary forces, such as racism, and the 
outcome of market failures and unenforced rights. Alternatively, it could be argued 
that exclusion is a consequence of hierarchical power relations, in which group 
distinctions and inequality overlap (de Haan, 1998:13). 
Recent attempts to take the views of those who are poor into account have added 
support to the criticisms of a universal approach to conceptualising poverty. This type 
of research, usually termed participatory appraisals, starts with the premise that 
understanding the lived experience of poverty is an essential element to formulating 
policy that deals with the dynamics and persistence of poverty.16 In policy analysis 
and social research, the non-poor usually construct definitions of poverty. As 
Chambers has noted these definitions show a bias to what is measurable, comparable, 
and conforms to the concepts and realities of professionals from dominant disciplines 
and regions of the world (Chambers, 1993:7-8.). In the process, the multi-faceted 
experience of the rural and urban poor is reduced to measures based purely on 
constructs of household-level income and consumption: what Chambers terms 
'income-poverty' 
All of these approaches have merits: some are easier to calculate and to interpret, 
42 
while others draw out the links between economic growth, social structure and human 
well-being. Rather than seeing these as competing methodologies, it is generally 
accepted that the different approaches reflect the multidimensional nature of poverty 
and should be used in combination. Thus a consensus on the definition and 
measurement of poverty has been suggested, the components of which include: 
• Recognition that for policy purposes, poverty may be defined as private 
consumption that falls below a defined minimum level; 
• Recognition that low levels of capabilities (such as literacy and life 
expectancy) are major components of poverty, but that these are best measured 
separately rather than amalgamated with consumption measures; and finally, 
• Recognition that the lack of consumption is better measured than lack of 
income (Lipton, 1997). 
From this, it is evident that analyses that require quantification or a numeric 
measurement tend to prefer a money-metric and absolute approach to the 
measurement of poverty as a means of operationalising poverty comparisons. This 
accepts that money is commonly, but not always, the means of indirectly translating 
inputs into human development. Money is seen as the means of purchasing some of 
the direct means to well-being, such as food, clothing and shelter, and a threshold 
amount can be estimated that serves as a poverty line separating the poor from the 
non-poor. Analyses that look at other dimensions of poverty and are concerned with 
issues of causation and consequence are less concerned with money-metric 
measurement and may use qualitative or participatory methodologies in combination 
with more quantitative approaches. Most poverty profiles being developed for the 
PRSPs discussed in Chapter Two, as well as in many other policy strategy documents, 
have taken an eclectic approach, and combine a variety of definitions and 
measurement methodologies. 
/ Participatory appraisals usually make use of a suite of data collection and data sharing tools 
variously referred to as Participatory Rural Appraisal, Participatory Rapid Appraisal and Participatory 
Learning Appraisal (PRA or PL A). 
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3.2.3 Underdevelopment and Poverty Production 
However, although competing conceptualisations might be accommodated in an the 
eclectic approaches necessary for policy analysis, it is less easy to achieve this when 
attention is switched to the causes of poverty. While Amartya Sen's view of 
entitlement failure, to be discussed in more detail later, may provide part of the 
answer, not all causes of poverty are as benign. In addition, as Bracking (2003) points 
out, in many contexts apparent exclusion may actually signal inclusion on adverse or 
prejudicial terms, an idea supported by du Toit's ethnographic study of farm-workers 
in the Western Cape province of South Africa (du Toit, 2004). Certainly for a thesis 
examining poverty in South Africa, the notion of underdevelopment and of poverty 
production cannot be avoided. In a well known statement Andre Gunder Frank, an 
early theorist of underdevelopment, argued that".. .economic development and 
underdevelopment are the opposite faces of the same coin" (Frank, 1969:9). He went 
on to describe underdevelopment as an interlocking and exploitative relationship that 
extends capitalist exchange into the periphery, placing emphasis on unequal 
exchange. This argument was later critiqued by Marxist and post-Marxist theorists 
such as Laclau (1971), Amin, (1976) and Wallestein (1976) who argued for more 
nuanced views of articulation between capitalist and non-capitalist conditions and 
relations of production and in some cases called for 'de-linking' from capitalist 
economies as the solution. 
Both underdevelopment and its subsequent critique provide support for the need to 
examine poverty production. As 0yen has argued, it is the 'intentionality' of poverty 
production that is central to the concept (0yen, 2002: 5). Whether intentionality can 
easily be ascribed to 'systems, patterns, networks, discourses' is then an important 
question. The definition of poverty production as ".. .the process by which 
individuals with identifiable actions directly or through participation in institutional 
practice or other patterns of behaviour increase individual or aggregate poverty" 
offers a clue as to how the link between the production of poverty and social and 
economic systems can be researched. 
The definition of poverty that is used is important if this link is to be properly 
understood. If poverty is simply some absolute threshold, then poverty production 
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would be the forces that push people below this threshold, or that trap those that are 
already below. It is conceivable that poverty production occurs when these actions 
permit some who are poor to escape while others remain trapped, or when some who 
were non-poor are pushed below the threshold. If poverty is a relative threshold, then 
it is conceivable that actions that expand what society deems to be a minimum level of 
well-being, but which do not expand the ability of those without resources to attain 
this level, might also be thought of as being poverty production. This links poverty to 
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notions of persistence or of being, becoming or remaining capability poor. 
This idea has a particular resonance in the South African context in which both the 
colonial and apartheid policies have been analysed as leading to the systemic under-
development of the African population in order to foster higher levels of accumulation 
among the white population. Underdevelopment as an explanation of persistent 
poverty arose from perspectives that argued that either through imperialism, or 
through relationships of unequal power, extractive relationships evolved between the 
core economies and those on the periphery. This argument regards under-
development and un-development as being different. While un-development was at 
worst the benign neglect of certain regions or groups, underdevelopment referred to a 
situation in which assets and resources are being used, but in a way that is structurally 
not to the benefit of the poor or, indeed, is to their detriment. In South Africa these 
notions of destruction, subsumption and extraction have been applied to the analysis 
of the relationship that existed between the white controlled agro-industrial complex 
at the core, and the agricultural and trading activities undertaken by the black 
population on the periphery, especially those living in the former 'Homeland' areas 
(Bundy, 1972; Wolpe, 1972).18 
Thus for South Africa, examples of poverty production might be the asset stripping of 
apartheid era policies, factor markets that favour those with resources at the cost of 
those that are poor, actions that undermine the assets of those that are poor such as 
17'/ Although it is recognised that poverty production may also related to non-economic dimensions of 
being poor, such exclusion, disempowerment and further marginalisation, the focus of this proposal is 
on factors that produce economic poverty viewed within a capabilities perspective. 
18/ The terminology is deliberate: Homeland is taken to refer to the eleven geographic areas set aside 
for African residence by the Apartheid government. 'Bantustans' refer to the political structures that 
administered these areas, some of which were given nominal independence. After 1994 these areas 
were merged into the provincial structures of South Africa. 
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their health or the value attached to their knowledge or human capital. It might be also 
argued that macro-economic policies that provide opportunities for the non-poor 
while cutting off opportunities for the poor could be cast as poverty production. 
3.2.4 Chronic Poverty 
A response to the problems encountered with conventional approaches to poverty and 
the importance of taking account of the underlying causes of poverty including 
poverty reduction, is one that recognises the time dimension of poverty. Research 
using longitudinal data has shown that although some individuals or households are 
permanently poor, others move into and out of poverty (Lipton and Maxwell, 
1992:10, Baulch and Hodinott, 2000; articles in a special edition of World 
Development, 2003 especially the conceptual framework provided by Hulme and 
Shepherd, 2003). At a general level, uncontrollable shocks that harm livelihood and 
food security can be distinguished from long term trends that may undermine 
livelihood and food security. Examples of the former include drought, war, death of a 
breadwinner, ill health and theft. Examples of the latter include life-cycle changes, 
racial and gender discrimination, environmental degradation and macro-economic 
trends. The result of the dynamics is that poverty persists despite the passage of time 
during which it might have been anticipated that those who were initially poor might 
have had the opportunity to accumulate and progress. 
In his earlier work Sen (1983) made mention of the difference between those who are 
achieving relatively less than others, or as opposed to those that are achieving 
absolutely less because they are falling behind others. In the more colourful language 
of Zimmerman and Carter (1996) already mentioned, the 'Micawber Threshold' is a 
dynamic asset poverty line. This growing interest in poverty that persists represents a 
potentially important departure, moving away from the measurement of static poverty 
towards a concern with reasons for persistence of poverty and socio-economic 
mobility. 
This form of poverty is increasing being referred to as 'chronic poverty' which may 
be thought of as referring to those who are trapped in deprivation, unable to progress 
from this situation over time, lacking the assets, skills or social networks to take up 
new opportunities being offered as a result of expanded economic output or 
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government intervention (CPRC, 2004). This will be the terminology adopted and 
expanded by this thesis later in this chapter and in Chapter Six. 
As yet there is no consensus over the best way of identifying and analysing chronic 
poverty, with some researchers resorting to costly-to-collect panel data and others 
adapting a poverty threshold to reflect some category of ultra-poor, usually by halving 
the poverty line (cf. Baulch and Hodinott, 2000 for a review). In both cases, the 
assumption is that a poverty threshold exists below which people are unable to 
accumulate and thus can never expect to escape poverty, and that poverty of this kind 
is inter-generational, passing from parents to their children. 
3.3 MEASURING POVERTY 
Actually measuring these alternative notions of poverty can also be approached in 
different ways. This section reviews the various approaches commonly used actually 
to measure poverty. The section considers both money-metric based measurements as 
well as outcome-based measures. In particular, the alternative formulations of 
composite indicators are examined. 
3.3.1 Income, Expenditure or Consumption and the Poverty Line 
Money-metric approaches to poverty typically make use of household income, 
expenditure or consumption over a reference period. While income refers to the flows 
of money into the household from wages, grants, retained profits and received 
remittances, some of which may have to be imputed, household expenditure refers the 
flows of money from the household as purchases of food and non-food items, 
transmitted remittances and savings. Consumption is somewhat more restricted and 
usually limits food items to those actually used over a reference period. A 
consumption approach has been used in the analysis reported in this thesis. 
As already discussed, the poverty lines applied to this money-metric indicator can be 
relative, absolute or some combination of the two. Relative poverty lines can be 
developed based on a percentage cut-off point in the welfare distribution, below 
which some proportion of the population is located. This might be the income below 
which the bottom 40 percent of the population is located or calculated as some 
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percentage of median income. As noted earlier, poverty in this sense is conflated with 
inequality, and, as a result, it is difficult to identify changes in poverty over time and 
space. Determining the actual cut-off point is also a somewhat arbitrary decision and, 
for these reasons, this approach to the development of a relative poverty line is not 
developed further in this thesis. 
Analyses that require quantification or a numeric measurement as a means of 
operationalising poverty comparisons tend to prefer a money-metric approach to the 
measurement of poverty, whether absolute or relative. One of the most common 
definitions of deprivation is the inadequate command over commodities, proxied by 
consumption, expenditure or income (Lipton, 1997:1003). Money is commonly, 
although not always, the means of translating inputs into human development. It is the 
means of purchasing some of the direct means to well-being, such as food, clothing 
and shelter, money metric poverty lines frequently define the minimum level of 
consumption required and individuals or households falling below the threshold are 
considered poor. Indeed, some argue that consensus appears to have been reached 
that the most reliable indicator of well-being is private consumption, scaled according 
to adult equivalence, perhaps adjusted for household economies of scale, and summed 
to the household as the unit of analysis, then calculated as a ratio of the threshold 
income required to purchase some minimum basket of goods. 
In the past, the World Bank promoted the notion of "$l-a-day" as an international 
threshold intended for comparisons to be made across countries which can be adjusted 
for Purchasing Power Prices (PPP). The critique of the "$l-a-day" poverty line 
already mentioned argues that the measure is inherently flawed and likely to have 
distorted global poverty estimates (Reddy and Pogge, 2003). Among other concerns, 
their contention is that the selection of commodities in the basket are not grounded in 
a meaningful definition of poverty, nor are the purchasing power factors employed 
adequately and matched according to national currency equivalents. Chossudovsky 
(1998) vigorously criticises this norm noting that it departs from the notion of a 
threshold income, does not take account of actual living standards or requirements, 
and conceals double standards in the measurement of poverty whereby different 
standards for poverty lines are applied to developed countries and developing 
countries. As Chossudovsky (1998), Reddy and Pogge (2003) and others have 
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forcibly argued, this notion of a universally applicable measurement of poverty 
continues to be widely used and risks both under-stating the severity of poverty and of 
misrepresenting trends. 
Several attempts have been made to respond to this challenge, and a promising 
direction is suggested by Jean Olsen Lanjouw's excellent review article (Lanjouw, 
2001). Lanjouw presents an approach which she describes as an absolute poverty line. 
The methodology derived from Ravallion (1994) involves scaling up a food poverty 
line for non-food purchases using observed consumption patterns. Two ways of doing 
this are discussed: an approach described as traditional in which the total expenditure 
of those households whose food expenditure is equal to the food poverty line is taken 
to be the poverty threshold, or an austere approach of taking the non-food expenditure 
of households, whose total expenditure is equal to the food poverty line and adding 
this to the food poverty line to form the poverty threshold. The implication is that the 
non-food items that are purchased are believed to be sufficiently important to the 
household that they are willing to relinquish food, or to further scrimp on their 
preferred food consumption on order to obtain these items (Lanjouw, 2001: 8-10). 
Lanjouw depicts this in Figure 3.1 in which adding the distance between the food 
poverty line, z, and the food expenditure of households who total expenditure is z, (a), 
results in the austere poverty line. 
Figure 3.1: Scaling up the Food Poverty Line 
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However, as May and Roberts (2005: 484) point out, whichever method is adopted, 
this introduces a relational notion into the poverty line since non-food purchases are 
likely to reflect society-wide preferences. Thus, a general improvement in the well-
being of society may, in time, mean that items previously considered as being luxuries 
eventually come to be regarded as necessities, worthy of sacrifice in order to obtain. 
In this sense, this poverty line becomes a relative line as captured by the debate 
between Sen and Townsend. This expenditure will then vary between countries, over 
time, may be more or less minimalist in what is included as being essential and 
affected by issues such as tastes and cultural norms. 
Despite their advantages, one-dimensional indicators of poverty such as those implied 
by a money-metric approach may not adequately address the complexity of poverty. 
As an example, it is quite possible to have a large monetary income but have no 
access to education, potable water or adequate health care. Household income or 
expenditure only adequately reflect individual material well-being if the household 
has access to a market at which it can purchase all goods at given prices, and although 
consumption can take account of home produced items and gifts, this is still confined 
to food needs only (see the discussion in Ravallion, 1995). Many aspects of well-
being are not acquired through market transactions, especially in developing 
countries, and as such, deprivation in these aspects will not be accounted for. 
Examples include safety, environmental conditions and resouces obtained from 
common property. The importance of gifts and charity as a way of survival is another 
aspect of such support. Moreover, some goods, like safe and available water, 
sanitation and safety are indivisible and have public good components that make it 
impossible for a single household to marginally purchase more of such goods. Who 
controls the income is another concern relating to intra-household distribution and 
power relations. Women in an apparently well-off household may not have an equal 
share in the households resources, as might be the case with fostered or step-children. 
3.3.2 Non Money-metric Approaches 
Sen (1992) and the UNDP (1990) have rejected a money-metric approach to the 
conceptualisation and measurement of poverty as being unreliable. This they argue is 
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because well-being is better thought of in terms of people's ability to realise their full 
human capabilities over time. This view accepts that for development to occur, 
economic growth should not be seen as an end in itself, and emphasises that growth is 
the means by which the capabilities of people can be improved, and thereby the 
choices open to them can be enlarged (UNDP, 1990:109). 
As one way of measuring outcomes, the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) has constructed the Human Development Index (HDI), a composite index 
mentioned in Chapter Two that is based on social indicators.19 The index claims to 
measure the outcomes of development (health, knowledge and expanded choice) 
rather than inputs (health services, schools and income). In developing the HDI, the 
UNDP followed the principle that the goal of development should be to enable people 
to live long, informed and comfortable lives. The HDI was devised to determine how 
nations compare when these factors are taken into consideration. The index is thus a 
composite of three factors: longevity (as measured by life expectancy at birth); 
educational attainment (as measured by a combination of adult literacy and enrolment 
rates); and standard of living (as measured by real GDP per capita). The HDI indicates 
the relative position of a country (or region or group) on an HDI scale between 0 and 
1. Countries with an HDI below 0.5 are considered to have a low level of human 
development, those with an HDI between 0.5 and 0.8 a medium level and those of 0.8 
and above a high level of human development. 
In attempt to operationalise Sen's notions of capabilities, the Human Development 
Report of 1996, introduced a Capability Poverty Measure (UNDP, 1996). The 
measure was an arithmetic mean of three non-income 'capability' indicators: the 
proportion of children under five who are underweight; the proportion of births 
unattended by trained health personnel and female illiteracy. Blotvinik (2001: 15) 
argues that these indicators are not easily distinguishable from classic basic needs 
indicators and suggests that this reflects the difficulties of implementing Sen's 
approach. 
19/ As already mentioned, the HDI has both its champions and its critics. Its multi-dimensional nature 
makes it intuitively appealing, and it is certainly a useful way of highlighting the disparities that exist 
between countries, geographical areas or groups. Others, however, have criticised the HDI for its (of 
necessity) arbitrary choice of indicators, weights, and implicit trade-offs (Ravallion, 1997a). 
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The Human Poverty Index (HPI) was presented in the Human Development Report 
1997 as re-conceptualisation of the Capability Poverty Measure and uses a similar 
approach to measure deprivation in basic human development. The variables used are 
the percentage of people expected to die before age 40, the percentage of adults who 
are illiterate, and overall economic provisioning in terms of the percentage of people 
without access to health services and safe water and the percentage of under-weight 
children under five (UNDP, 1997). 
A related approach uses assets as a way of determining capabilities. Indeed, the idea 
that poverty is better measured in terms of access to resources than simply using 
income is not new. Indeed, writing in 1985, Townsend (1985:661) recommends the 
use of total resources, meaning an income equivalent of wealth and income in kind, as 
a measure of deprivation. This notion is central to this thesis and will be returned to 
later in this chapter and in Chapter Six. 
Finally poverty measurement can also be undertaken by directly asking respondents 
about their perceptions of what constitutes an acceptable standard of living and 
building these into the definition of the threshold income. This 'subjective' approach 
has also been termed a social mode of analysis and has been largely operationalised 
through Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPA). Specifically, the iterative and 
flexible mode of enquiry involved is particularly suited to highlighting the historical 
and process dimensions of poverty. Such rapid appraisal methodologies using 
participatory techniques are argued to lead to the timely delivery of information on the 
complex realities of the poor and local solutions for the reduction of poverty. When 
these are used by organisations with on-going relationships and capacity on the 
ground, this can also lead to local action. 
The approach draws on various traditions of research including applied anthropology, 
Rapid Rural Appraisal, agro-ecosystems analysis and most recently Participatory 
Rural or Learning Appraisal (PRA/PLA). Although the origins of the methodology 
/ See Hagenaars and de Vos (1988) for a discussion of this approach and Pradhan and Ravallion 
(2000) for an application. 
2V PPAs have been carried out in connection with World Bank country Poverty Assessment exercises 
in a number of countries including South Africa. For further information see Norton and Stephens 
(1995). Narayan (2000) provides a useful summary of the results of the many PPAs eventually 
undertaken. 
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are predominantly rural, and generally related to participatory planning of natural 
resource management, they are increasingly used in a variety of contexts, including 
urban research and poverty research. Much of the early development of these 
approaches took place within a context of participatory community development 
rather than policy research, and was carried out by NGOs in Africa and South Asia. 
PPA methodologies claim to use local people as analysts rather than informants while 
those who are outsiders, the researchers, act as facilitators. Their role is that of 
stimulating examination of issues by local research participants, while striving to 
avoid adopting a dominant mode in behaviour or attitudes. Group contexts for 
research are used, often differentiated according to different social categories 
(women, men, elders and so forth). This frequently requires the visual sharing of 
information using maps, institutional diagrams, causal flow diagrams, seasonality 
diagrams and matrices.22 
PPA is said to empower marginalised communities and groups by encouraging them 
to analyse local conditions, giving them confidence to assert their priorities, to present 
proposals, to make demands and to take action. PPA is also held to enable the 
expression and integration of local social diversity in otherwise standard programmes 
and to pursue community-based processes for development, including appraisal, 
planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. This takes place through the 
identification of local priorities for research and by encouraging organisational 
changes. PPA is said to assist with policy review, both within organisations and 
governments, through new, timely, and more accurate insights from field-level 
discussions and planning (Guijt and Cornwall, 1995:2). Certainly, an approach based 
specifically on the perceptions, experiences and aspirations of the poor can 
complement more conventional research to deal with some of the problems associated 
with objective measurements of poverty. 
3.3.3 Problems with Poverty Measurement 
Whichever approach is adopted, the measurement of poverty faces a number of 
important conceptual difficulties. While many of the measures discussed above refer 
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to the poverty of a household as a bonded unit, the concept of the household itself is 
contentious, and although the household remains the unit of analysis for this thesis, 
some discussion of the problems is essential. The boundaries of the household, the 
division of power within the household, and the division of labour within the 
household and the dynamic nature of households are all issues about which potentially 
reductionist assumptions have been made. 
This confusion of the nature of the household has led to misleading conclusions 
regarding the vulnerability of poor households and their members. As an example, 
the popular use of the household as the standard unit of analysis in surveys has led to 
a perhaps unwarranted attention on female headed households, being a readily 
identifiable means of introducing gender into analysis. However, this distracts 
attention away from the circumstances of the majority of women in rural areas who 
live in household in which a male is the dejure head (Russell, 1993:760). Moreover, 
while the orthodox notion of the household assumes a household structure that is 
applied consistently in all places and at all times, empirical studies would suggest 
otherwise, and the structure and dynamics of households and intra and extra-
household capabilities have been found to be more diverse and complex. Indeed, for 
some analysts such as Strauss (1986:298), household size and composition may be 
thought of as endogenous and as an institutional response to a set of missing land, 
credit and information markets. Members of the household are linked by ties that add 
trust and accountability to economic relations and help overcome fears of moral 
hazard in common cropping and stocking activities. In the context of South Africa, 
others have raised similar concerns in respect of the formation and splitting off of new 
households being an endogenous process (Case and Deaton; 1998, Klasen and 
Woolard, 2001). This has been observed earlier and elsewhere, and Knight (1980) 
and more recently Crehan (1992) suggest that households may vary in terms of 
composition due to economic hardship. Households often need to reduce their number 
of dependants because they cannot be supported, leading to a mobility of residence. 
Spiegel (1987), Sharp and Spiegel (1985) and Ardington (1988) provide evidence of 
this in South Africa and show that if the source of income is lost, individuals may 
disperse to join households that do have an income. Similarly, when a new source of 
22/ For a fuller discussion of the background and practice of PRA see Chambers (1994a, 1994b, 1994c). 
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income is accessed, individuals may break away from households to establish their 
own household (Ardington, 1988). These moves that are made in search of income are 
not confined to rural areas only and similar processes have been found in dense 
informal settlements (Annecke, 1993; Ross, 1995). 
In support of this, feminist researchers have shown the household to be a complex and 
dynamic concept, with boundaries that are constantly shifting and that it is also not a 
bounded entity in terms of residence (Kabeer, 1991). Anthropological evidence also 
confirms that the composition of the household in Southern Africa varies in terms of 
residence changes not only due to life cycle changes, but due to economic and social 
factors as well (Sharp and Spiegel, 1985; Russell, 1993). This permeability of 
household boundaries has been described by many researchers, and indeed Murray 
(1987:246) is of the opinion that rapid 'internal' changes of household membership 
were a distinct feature of households living in the former Homelands of South Africa. 
As a result of these changes, numerous studies have reported that poor communities in 
South Africa are characterised by a wide diversity of household structures (Ardington, 
1988; Ross, 1995). These dynamics have been shown to persist well into the post-
apartheid era (Hosegood et al., 2005). 
Related to changes in household structure, 'double rootedness' has been used to 
describe the resulting patterns of migration and dual residence in which individuals 
have stakes in households in rural and urban areas, or multiple households within 
urban areas. Dual residence is a strategy adopted by many households as a means of 
keeping their options open in rural and urban areas, thereby sharing risks between 
these areas (Mayer and Mayer, 1961; Bank, 1995; Cross et al (1992a, 1992b). Double 
rootedness thus implies that the experience of poverty may be split spatially across 
several homesteads, as well as, socially, across different households. Consequently, a 
loss of income or an adverse event in one of the households may well have negative 
implications elsewhere. It also means that if one household deliberately withholds 
income from another that is dependent upon it, the former holds power while the latter 
is rendered powerless. At the same time, this mechanism helps to smooth out 
fluctuations in income and limit the consequences of adverse events as this serves as a 
form of consumption smoothing. 
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Many poverty analysts, including Sen, have been concerned about this question over 
the distribution of resources within the household (Haddad and Kanbur, 1990). 
Quantitative and qualitative research has shown that the experience of poverty is 
differentiated within the household. Income, power and assets have been found to be 
unequally distributed within the household, suggesting that poverty may occur within 
households in a differential manner. Gender itself is an important factor affecting 
changing household structure and Preston-Whyte (1988) has suggested that domestic 
units may be structured around a core of women, even if the dejure head of the 
household is male. The South African situation is further complicated by the close 
links between and within rural and urban areas already described, whereby individuals 
are linked to more than one household (May et al, 1997:76). This link may occur via 
remittance payments, marriage, childcare services and so forth, which are in turn 
distributed unequally within the receiving household. Access to assets such as land or 
livestock also may influence power relations in the household. Where agriculture is 
undertaken, some scope is provided for women to exercise control of some resources 
and place themselves in a stronger position vis-a-vis men (Haddad and Kanbur, 1990). 
Where these resources are absent, the subordination of women is a more direct 
reflection of gender relationships in a patriarchal system. 
Finally, the notion of community is extremely tenuous in most developing countries 
as the homogenous behaviour that it implies is extremely problematic. In much of 
Africa, forced relocations, refugees and high levels of migration, mobility and 
pervasive violence have all contributed towards undermining social cohesion. The 
result is that many communities are extremely divided with little commonality in 
terms of needs and aspirations. 
Besides divisions within the community over resources and power, households and 
individuals within households have differential access to community support 
networks. In part, this is owing to inadequate resources required for participation in 
these networks being owned, and in part, is an outcome of the divisions within the 
community itself. Hence, to assume that all individuals belong to a nuclear family or a 
homogenous, harmonious community is problematic. 
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3.4 A FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF PERSISTENT POVERTY 
Despite improvements in the methodologies used, measurement is only the first step 
required for the analysis of the dynamics of poverty. Identifying the assets used by 
the poor, the ways in which these are used, and the constraints and opportunities 
encountered when using assets are next steps in the evolution of a dynamic approach 
to poverty. Returning to the concepts adopted by those writing from an 'entitlements' 
perspective can serve as a useful point of departure. 
3.4.1 Entitlements and Capabilities 
As already mentioned, Sen's entitlement approach is framed in the general terms of 
the multi-dimensional commodity bundles which an endowment can command which 
has proven difficult to demonstrate empirically. However, much of the dynamism and 
insight of the entitlement approach can be retained by thinking more simply about the 
one dimensional real income which an endowment bundle can command and the 
distinctive patterns of vulnerability which characterise the real income claiming 
mechanisms utilised by agents. For example, a semi-subsistence peasant farmer 
(endowed with unskilled labour and land) and a semi-skilled artisan (endowed with 
labour, human capital and tools) may on average be able to command the same 
commodity bundles (that is, they may have the same real income and budget sets on 
average). However, they are subject to very distinctive forms of vulnerability and 
poverty risk. The peasant farmer is exposed to production shocks (direct entitlement 
failures), while the artisan is subject to the risk of sales constraints and changes in the 
price of the commodity he sells relative to the price of subsistence goods (what Sen 
calls trade entitlement failure). Sen's (1981) analysis of Bengal famine shows that 
precisely these two groups, peasants and artisans, had distinctive histories, with the 
latter suffering trade entitlement failures and bearing the brunt of the famine-related 
deaths. 
This relational conceptualisation of poverty is also by no means unique to Sen, and 
other analysts have employed similar ideas. Contemporary social theory offers two 
useful concepts that can assist such analysis (Giddens, 1981; Siegel and Alwang, 
1999). Firstly, adopting an 'actor perspective' investigates how individuals manage 
their assets, socially defined rights and opportunities in situations of varying risks. 
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This mode of analysis can be thought of as a focus on the resources and skills that 
people have; what they do with these resources; and how this shapes the social and 
economic environment in which they are located. In the language of Sen, the concern 
here is with 'endowments' and 'capabilities' and an implicit recognition that those 
who are poor are not simply victims unable to react to their situation. The poor are 
seen to be enterprising individuals constantly on the search for new and better 
opportunities. The role of the state is largely confined to creating an enabling 
environment for their talents to unfold. 
In contrast adopting a 'systems perspective' when analysing poverty requires that we 
look at models of social and economic systems in order to understand changes in the 
constraints and opportunities that influence the success or failure of individual and 
household actions. Here, the focus shifts to the 'exchange entitlement mapping' or 
alternatively, the context within which livelihoods adopted by the poor operate and 
the outcomes that follow from these. Where the former group look for virtuous cycles 
of personal development, this group emphasises vicious cycles and the inability of 
those who are poor to cope.23 For some, the cause of these poverty traps may be 
found in personal attributes, an example of which is the "culture of poverty" proposed 
by Oscar Lewis in the 1960s that emphasised the lack of self-esteem, fatalism and risk 
aversion found among slum dwellers and the homeless (Lewis, 1959). However, 
structural variables also contribute towards this vicious circle, and within neo-
classical economics, some recent theoretical analyses explore the circumstances under 
which some poor agents may get caught in a poverty trap from which neither time, or 
the opportunity to save and accumulate assets will deliver them. 
The asset-vulnerability framework advanced by Moser (1998a) and others provides a 
useful means of operationalising a systems perspective of poverty at a household level 
that takes account of assets and capabilities and recognises the potential role played 
by wealth and power inequalities noted by analysts such as Deininger and Olinto 
(2000).24 Underpinning this framework is research that has shown that poor people are 
often among the most vulnerable in society because they are the most exposed to a 
/ Siegel (1999) provides a useful summary of these debates. 
24/ See Crehan (1992) for a comparison of livelihoods approaches that rely upon similar examination of 
assets and activities. 
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wide range of risks. Their low income means that they are less able to save and 
accumulate assets, which in turn restricts their ability to deal with a crisis when it hits. 
An asset-vulnerability framework, then, goes beyond a static measurement of the 
poor, and aims toward classifying the capabilities of poor populations to use their 
resources to reduce their vulnerability (May et al, 1997; Moser, 1995; Moser, 1998a; 
World Bank, 2001b). 
This framework recognises three important activities undertaken by the poor based 
upon their own knowledge and understanding of their environment. Firstly, that the 
poor engage in the active management of a complex asset base; secondly, that the 
poor engage in diversified livelihood activities while endeavouring to make ends 
meet, and thirdly that the poor engage iterative processes of response and adaptation 
to external and internal events that change their day-to-day environment. From the 
perspective of an asset-vulnerability framework, the more assets people command in 
the right mix, the better returns they are able to achieve and the greater is their 
capacity to buffer themselves against external shocks (May et al, 1997; Moser, 
1998a). 
Following from this framework, several questions present themselves for 
investigation. Firstly, what is the asset portfolio available to the poor? Second, what 
livelihood strategies, exchanges and claiming are undertaken by the poor based on 
these assets?25 Finally, what is the nature of the vulnerability of those who are poor, 
and what coping strategies are adopted to manage risk and uncertainty?26 
I will discuss each of these in turn and return to this conceptualisation in the empirical 
analysis that follows in Chapter Seven. 
3.4.2 Assets 
Moser (1998a: 14-16) describes a 'fivefold asset-vulnerability' which she lists as 
labour, human capital, productive assets, household relations and social capital. 
However, this framework neglects at least one important category of assets commonly 
25/ Recall the discussion in Chapter Two (Section 3.4) where the contribution of Rein (1983) was noted. 
In this context, claiming refers to the assembly of an income package through effective claims made on 
a range of sources, including from government and markets. 
26/ Derived from Sen, 1984: 509-510. 
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used by many poor households, those derived from the natural environment. The 
framework also unnecessarily separates labour from human capital, and household 
relations from social capital. The Sustainable Livelihoods framework that is used by 
DFID deals with some of these concerns, while retaining the fivefold approach. Here 
livelihood assets are seen to comprise human, social, physical, financial and natural 
capitals. This framework also has a number of short-comings. Firstly, what Figuaero 
(2001) has termed political and legal capital is subsumed under social capital, 
although the mechanisms for acquiring and using these assets may well be very 
different from that used for social capital. The result is that resources that might be 
derived through citizenship rights or political patronage are obscured. Secondly, the 
linkages and complementarities of the different assets are not drawn out or related to 
the different markets that structure access and use of these assets. For these reasons an 
adapted framework is suggested comprising five broad categories of productive 
assets, each of which contain distinct sub-groups: 
• Human capital and capabilities, including labour power, skills and capacity for 
agency, learning and adaptation; 
• Social, legal and political capital, including moral claims through household 
relationships, legal claims such as pensions and grants, access to authority and 
societal norms including charity; 
• Natural resources, including privately owned land, common property and the 
environment; 
• Physical capital, including, machinery/plant and infrastructure. 
• Financial capital, including savings, insurance, food stores and money owed 
by debtors. 
The components of these can be summed up into the map of the potential 'asset 
portfolio' of individuals and households shown in Figure 3.2.27 
211 The broad idea of this asset map was suggested by Singh (1996) and adapted by drawing on the 
analysis of Gore (1993); Figuaroa (2001); Hulme, Moore and Shepherd (2001); Moser, (1995); Moser 
(1998a); Maxwell and Smith, (1992) and Reardon and Vosti (1995). Maxwell and Smith's (1992:16) 
category of productive capital has been included in this framework as financial capital. 
60 
Figure 3.2: An Asset Map 
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This 'road-map' of assets shows that the distinction between social and economic 
assets is less sharp that is often implied. As an example, the existence of social 
networks can facilitate the use of more obvious productive assets, especially those 
that have to be managed on a communal basis. Likewise, human capital can enhance 
the returns that can be achieved from assets such as land or cattle through greater 
technical skills or better health. Furthermore, the absence of certain forms of wealth 
may undermine the position of individuals or households, leading to reduced ability to 
recover from shocks and negative long term trends. 
Two terms in the figure require further clarification. Firstly, human capabilities have 
been included to broaden the conventional view of human capital, which tends to 
focus on factors that improve productivity in the formal labour market. Human 
capabilities thus include the skills and abilities that are used in reproductive activities, 
such as child care, livelihood activities that occur outside of the labour market, such 
as vegetable gardening, and broader capabilities that assist humans to achieve their 
desired goals. This point is reflected in Sen's more recent thinking (Sen, 1999). 
The second term, social capital, has had an extraordinary rise to prominence since its 
entry into development literature in around 1993 and has refocused attention on issues 
relating to social and institutional assets such as reciprocity, trust, and association. 
Much of this work draws on the research of Robert Putnam for whom social capital 
".. .refers to features of social organisation such as networks, norms and social trust 
that facilitate co-ordination and co-operation for mutual benefit" (Putnam, 1993:36). 
More recently, the "Social Capital for Development" Homepage, defines social 
capital as "the norms and social relations embedded in the social structures of 
societies that enable people to co-ordinate action to achieve desired goals".28 
James Coleman made a useful contribution towards an operational definition of social 
capital for an analysis of the micro-economic implications of social capital for poverty 
dynamics. Social capital is seen as being those aspects of social structure that act as 
resources to individuals and groups, assisting them in achieving their interests. 
Coleman's emphasis is thus on the social institutions and organisations that bind 
/ The address for the homepage is http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital/index.htm. Several 
review articles provide an overview of the many empirical studies. Useful examples are World Bank 
(1997b, Chap 6); Wall, etal, (1998) and from a critical perspective, Fine (1999). 
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individuals and groups, and extends to relationships of authority (Coleman, 1990:302, 
311). These institutions may be argued to represent both a concrete expression of the 
social context within which economic activity is embedded, as well as an important 
medium through which linkages can be formed. 
Rapid social, demographic and economic change can undermine the basis for trust 
and reciprocal relationships and the nature of social capital might change along with 
the extent to which different groups might benefit from its use. This has been argued 
by some analysts to lead to the 'erosion' of social capital (Moser, 1998b; May and 
Rogerson, 2000). Social capital can also have negative outcomes. As Coleman 
(1988:S105) and others recognise, certain forms of social capital may constrain 
desired actions such as innovation, and "... that a given form of social capital that is 
valuable in facilitating certain actions may be useless or even harmful for others" 
(Coleman, 1990:598).29 A final and important issue relates to the gendered nature of 
social capital. Seron and Ferris (1995) argue that men secure economic gains due to 
their implicit gendered social capital that presumes that private lives (reproductive 
lives) are secondary and are taken care of by others (women). 
The identification of social capital has not been without critique. The difficulty of 
measuring such capital has received attention, while many question whether networks, 
social norms and values and the like can ever constitute capital (Fine, 1999). Since 
this thesis is primarily concerned with the relationship between access to assets and 
chronic poverty, a narrow, and thus easily measurable, definition of social capital is 
adopted for the purposes of the empirical section of this thesis. This definition 
focuses on institutions as an important and observable source of social capital and 
thus has the potential to act as an acceptable proxy measure. Social capital is seen as 
referring to the social (and perhaps political) institutions that improve economic 
efficiency for groups of economic actors, through building trust, facilitating 
information flows and providing an arena for decision-making. As a category of 
assets, legal claims, such as pensions, in the case of South Africa many of which are 
constitutionally embedded, are included as social, legal and political capital since 
these share many of the characteristics of social capital as defined above. Further, the 
estimation of poverty classes is based on more conventionally measured assets (land, 
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finance, transfers and human capital) and the other proxies for social capital are only 
reported in the poverty profiles of these classes. 
3.4.3 Livelihoods 
The assets just discussed form the basis for what Sen (1981) termed 'entitlement 
mapping'. This mapping defines the set of commodity bundles that can be claimed on 
the basis of a given asset, or in Sen's language, endowment. This may be either 
through direct use of the endowments, or by using them to claim other commodities 
through market and other forms of exchange. An alternative, and perhaps more 
conventional way of describing this process is as a livelihood strategy that involves a 
combination of assets, productive activities, the exercising of socially defined rights, 
such as access to charity or publicly provided social security, the use of the 
environment and access to common property, and the coping or adaptive actions 
undertaken to protect present and future production and consumption. In their widely 
used definition of livelihoods, Chambers and Conway mention most of these 
elements: 
(A livelihood) comprises the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims, 
and access) and activities required for a means of living; a livelihood is 
sustainable which can cope with and recover from stress and shocks, 
maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, and provide sustainable 
livelihood opportunities for the next generation (Chambers and Conway, 
1992:7-8). 
Households and individuals thus engage in a range of activities, such as wage 
employment, agricultural production, non-farm entrepreneurship or claiming, that 
make use of the resources that they have available, (also cf. Lipton, 1997, Maxwell 
and Smith, 1992). The combination of these activities or 'tactics' make up the 
household's livelihood strategy, which in turn will map onto a set of outcomes. As 
described by Sen, some of these tactics involve an exchange process whereby services 
are performed or goods produced which may be exchanged for a cash income or for 
recipient goods and services. Other livelihood options may include the consumption 
of self-produced goods, and there is also the possibility that some activities may 
involve no productive action at all, but involve no more than measures that stretch 
27 See also Harriss and de Renzio, (1997); Holland, (1998:67); Humphrey and Schmitz, (1996:20) and 
Beall, (1997:960). 
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existing resources a little further. The sustainability of the strategy that is adopted is 
determined by the extent to which it generates the means of living while at the same 
time enhancing or at least maintaining the quantity and quality of the assets that are 
available. 
In addition, the importance for poor households of a diversified livelihood strategy 
involving a number of these activities has been argued by several analysts ( cf. Ellis, 
1998; Frankenburger et ah, 2000) while Maxwell and Smith (1992) note that this 
diversification of income sources is a key factor influencing the well-being of poor 
households. Through diversification, households are able to buffer themselves against 
risk in vulnerable environments. Indeed, von Braun (1989) has suggested that 
diversification may entail a fair amount of specialisation within the household 
according to gender or age. That is to say, different household members may engage 
in different income earning tasks: women engaging in horticulture, men in wage 
labour, the young in hawking and the elderly in craft work. Likewise, different coping 
and adaptive tactics are also undertaken by different members within the households, 
women perhaps managing the diet of the household, men queuing and fighting for 
access to food aid. 
In order to assemble a livelihood strategy, households are seen to be choosing 
between these activities and tactics, as well as attempting to combine them, into a 
strategy for their survival, and hopefully accumulation. By diversifying their 
livelihood strategy, households can be seen to be trying different tactics that are hoped 
to generate an adequate and sustainable livelihood for all members. Diversification 
permits the management of risk, seasonality and market failures, as well as a way of 
coping with times of crisis. However, as Ellis (1998:1) notes, diversification involves 
more than simply undertaking more activities, and also includes changes to property 
rights, social and kinship processes and institutional structures. Clearly, there will also 
be trade-offs between the possible tactics that can be engaged upon, both in terms of 
the activities themselves, as well as between the interests of the members of the 
household itself. As such, the power relations within the household, and the manner 
in which these are determined, would form the basis of this livelihood packaging. 
The livelihood strategy that is adopted is then an outcome of decisions and conflict 
over the use of the household's resources. This strategy may well benefit some 
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members of the household at the cost of others. For example, as Davies (1996) and 
many others suggest that the burden of coping strategies tends to fall 
disproportionately on women. Furthermore, like any strategy, its composition and 
success will be determined by the constraints and opportunities that are available to 
the household as a whole and to the individual members. 
It is also important to recognise that the determinants of the rate of return that can be 
achieved by the different activities have both physical and institutional dimensions. 
While exchange activities, for example, have agro-climatic and technical 
determinants, the rate of return that is realised from these activities is also based on 
rules which structure the markets in which these exchanges take place. The literature 
on labour market segmentation offers a potentially useful point of departure from 
which this complex landscape of economic transactions can be examined. 
Labour market segmentation argues that the labour market is not homogenous and 
instead may offer structurally different rules, opportunities, security and terms of 
trade for different types of work, and for different groups of work-seekers. Originally 
applied to developed countries to describe the operation of internal labour markets in 
which administrative rules and norms apply (Doeringer and Piore, 1971) and later by 
Giddens (1981) and Littler (1982) to describe class structure, labour market 
segmentation has also been employed in the analysis of the South African labour 
market. Burawoy (1975) uses a similar analysis to examine the experiences of migrant 
labourers during the apartheid era in South Africa, while Kraak (1995) more recently 
suggests that apartheid era labour market policies may continue to shape the South 
African labour market. 
A segmented labour market approach often divides the labour market into a primary 
and a secondary component. The primary labour market is defined as that in which 
jobs are well paid and secure, and workers have prospects of career advancements. 
The secondary market is defined as everything which the primary labour market is 
not. Jobs in the secondary market are low paid and offer little security and 
opportunities for upward mobility. It is suggested that claiming systems in each of 
these markets also differ, with unionisation being more common in the primary labour 
market, incomes more secure, and greater and more varied protection against age and 
ill health. Casual labour can also be included in the secondary labour market. 
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Most analysts recognise that a dualistic notion of the labour markets is inadequate, 
noting that the boundaries between different groups of work or work-seeker are fuzzy, 
and that it is more likely that a continuum of options will exist (Devey et al, 2003; 
Standing et al, 1996). In addition, the different segments are not independent and 
may articulate, in some fashion, the existence of one segment of the labour market 
reliant upon the existence of the other. Nonetheless, this approach offers a potentially 
useful way with which the diversity of activities and tactics undertaken by individuals 
and households can be analysed, and argues differentiation emanates from the type of 
activity being undertaken rather than from the characteristics of the person 
undertaking the activity. 
Figure 3 represents an attempt to translate the foregoing discussion into a Livelihood 
Strategy Map to complement the Assets Map already presented and extends the 
segmentation of labour markets into other categories of livelihood activity: farm 
production, non-farm entrepreneurial production, claiming and non-monetary 
livelihood strategies. Recognising the informalised nature of much of the South 
African economy, the continuum of activities and tactics encompasses primary, 
secondary and subsistence dimensions, and, not shown but a possible outcome of any 
of these tactics, is failure. 









<—Continuum of Activities and Tactics—• 
Primary 
High wage, secure employment 
Commercial Farming 
Capitalist, professional & artisan 
self-employment 
Contributory social protection 
(right of membership). 
Non-contributory social protection 
(right of citizenship). 
Claiming formal common property 
rights 
Claiming constitutional or human 
rights 
Secondary 
Low wage, insecure but 
regular employment 
Family farm with market 
production 
Informal economy small and 
micro-enterprises 
Claiming from household 
members (legally enforceable 
claims such as child support) 
Claiming customary common 
property rights 
Claiming other customary 
rights 
Subsistence 
Low wage, insecure and 
casual employment 
Subsistence & survivalist 
home consumption 
Survivalist, especially in 
service sector activities 
Claiming from family & 




Unpaid domestic work 
Scrimping 
Begging 
/ Although there is some resonance with the notion of a 'First' and 'Second Economy' that has 
recently received attention in South Africa, this does not accept the implied dualism and suggests that 
different activities can have more or less of the characteristics of primary, secondary or subsistence. 
3 / The broad idea for this map was suggested by Frankenberger, et al., (2000) and adapted following 
Burawoy's (1975) discussion of the South African labour market. 
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As with the assets, the activities and tactics shown in this map lie on a continuum 
using criteria implied by the literature on labour market segmentation. The boundaries 
will be blurred in reality and a person or household may simultaneously engage in 
more than one strategy or tactic. Nonetheless for the purposes of analysis, activities 
can be said to have the characteristics of a primary market if: 
• they emanate from enterprises and institutions that are formally regulated and 
which face a stable demand for the commodities and resources that are being 
produced or being made available; 
• are the result of enforceable contracts are entered into between those providing 
the commodities, resources or services being sought and those seeking to 
make use of these, including contracts derived through the rights of 
citizenship; 
• they have an eligibility requirement, whether in the form of specific skills or 
education, access to capital or membership criteria; and, 
• they involve regular and predictable payments. 
In these activities, higher productivity or better claiming is likely to be rewarded with 
higher returns and the chance of advancement over time. 
Activities have the characteristics of a secondary market if: 
• they emanate from enterprises and institutions that are not formally regulated; 
• they involve activities in which the demand for the commodities or services 
produced is highly variable; 
• there is little security in terms of the rights over property, conditions of 
employment and terms of trade; 
• contracts are usually informally defined and are not legally enforceable; 
• there is a low or 'general' eligibility requirement; and, 
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• payments are irregular and variable. 
For these activities productivity or better claiming does not necessarily translate into 
higher returns and there is little chance for advancement. 
Finally, activities are considered to be subsistence when: 
• they are short-term; casual, and without enforceable contracts; 
• in which the demand for the commodities or resources is infrequent; 
• they have very low or no eligibility criteria; and, 
• they are subject to few, if any, rules, including those governing payment. 
In these activities returns are low and there is no chance for improvement and they are 
often undertaken in what has been described as the informal and domestic economies. 
Since waged work has already been discussed, it is useful to elaborate a little further 
on what is meant by the other four categories of livelihood tactics. Entrepreneurial 
farming strategies refer to all forms of agricultural production, including that which is 
undertaken for own consumption, as well as for sale. Clearly there are substantive 
differences between various forms of agricultural production and the exchange of 
agricultural commodities. Primary agricultural activities include: agri-enterprises 
which produce crops for sale, and operate as independent businesses; contract 
agriculture where owner-cultivators enter into formal or informal production and sale 
agreements with agro-industrial corporations and family farming with high input 
production and where exchange includes sales made through formal marketing 
channels. Secondary agricultural activities include family farming which involves 
low input production where exchange takes place but is limited to networks within the 
community, while subsistence agriculture refers to agriculture production that is 
undertaken for survivalist purposes only such as community and home gardens, 
minimal input dryland cultivation and the keeping of small herds or poultry. 
The role of the last two forms of agricultural tactics in South Africa has been the 
subject of debate as is witnessed by the two-volume collection edited by Lipton et al, 
(1996a; 1996b). While some argue that agriculture holds out some prospect of 
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reducing unemployment, others are concerned that the promotion of small-scale 
agriculture may become unsustainable if pursued too vigorously. Qualitative research 
from the SA-PPA lends support to the notion that agricultural cultivation is an 
important survivalist livelihood tactic for the poor. The cultivation of land, 
particularly garden plots, is a significant safeguard for many rural households, and it 
seems that agriculture in many parts of South Africa is more important for poor 
households than quantitative surveys have implied. This cultivation is probably 
limited to the areas in which there is sufficient rainfall to permit dry-land cultivation 
(May, et al, 1997). In the arid areas, agricultural was treated with scepticism and 
regarded as an extremely risky livelihood option, while in the relatively high rainfall 
area of KwaZulu-Natal, both men and women indicated that farming was their most 
important source of income. The risks associated with cultivation were a reported as 
being a deterrent to engaging in agriculture. These differing views on the importance 
of agriculture show that cultivators are able to use land and other agricultural assets to 
a varying degree of success and risk according to their agro-climatic zone. For the 
analysis which will be presented in this thesis, secondary and subsistence cultivators 
are regarded as those unable to manage environmental uncertainty in the same manner 
that the wealthier primary cultivators are able, either through irrigation or through 
crop insurance. 
Primary non-farm entrepreneurial activities refer to formal sector small and medium 
enterprises (SMMEs) while secondary non-farm entrepreneurial activities refer to 
micro-enterprises which might comprise the sale of anything from clothing to 
handicrafts. Subsistence activities refer to the survivalist sub-sector of SMME's such 
as street trading and hawking. Previous research in South Africa has shown that two-
thirds of this group are to be found operating in small shops or spazas with the 
balance working on the street (Devey et al., 2003). This also includes the making of 
clothes, furniture, handicrafts, baskets, brooms and the building of houses, as well as 
the production and sale of certain crops through intermittent markets. The 
construction and home crafts sub-sectors appear to be the two most important 
categories of this form of micro-enterprise in South Africa, with one third of each of 
this group engaging in such activities. Finally, there are also niche markets in the 
service sector. This refers to specific services that have a competitive advantage when 
performed by micro-enterprises. In urban areas, such activities have typically 
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included car washers, backyard mechanics, taxis, child minders, room letting and 
money lending (May, et al., 1997). In rural areas, these activities extend to traditional 
medicine, craft work and the like. It is also possible that certain highly paid activities 
would fall into this category, such as lawyers, architects and the like. 
Primary claiming activities are important in South Africa which is unusual amongst 
developing countries in that it has a well functioning state-funded and managed social 
protection system. The Old Age Pension (OAP) and Child Support Grant (CSG) are 
the most important components, the first of which has a high coverage amongst the 
elderly. The CSG introduced in 1998 is rapidly gaining in importance. Claiming these 
rights from the state in the form of pensions and disability grants has been shown to 
be of critical importance to household incomes (Case and Deaton, 1998). 
The use of secondary and subsistence forms of claiming through social networks is an 
important form of livelihood tactic: A key feature of apartheid, resulting from 
legislative controls on the urbanisation of African South Africans, was the system of 
oscillating migrant labour. Although the period from the mid 1970s to the mid 1980s 
witnessed the rapid collapse of the enforcement of the various influx laws, migration 
for employment remains an important aspect of many rural people's lives, as does the 
reliance of the rural household upon a share of the migrant's income in the form of a 
remittance. As such, effective claiming of this remittance from migrants is an 
important livelihood tactic. Payments may be regular (monthly or more frequent) or 
irregular (less frequent than monthly, or remittance made in kind). Moreover, in the 
past, and perhaps still, urban wage earners invest substantially in rural assets such as 
livestock and agricultural production, and women also use remitted money to fund 
petty commodity production (Murray, 1987; Sharp and Spiegel, 1990). 
In addition to these activities which are usually measured by quantitative surveys, 
albeit with varying success, at least three critical types of non-monetary entitlement-
generating tactics are often not adequately dealt with. These include the use of 
common property; unpaid domestic labour which refers to work performed largely by 
women, which although not paid, contributes significantly to the household livelihood 
strategy; and a disparate bundle of activities and tactics in which households engage 
in order to either stretch their income, or gain access to additional entitlements. 
Families, individuals and communities have devised and adapted to a variety of 
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survival tactics within their states of poverty and vulnerability. Migration, flexible 
household structure, begging, scrimping and seasonal adaptation are all tactics for 
survival engaged in by large numbers of South Africans. These are far harder to pick 
up using quantitative methodologies and their detection and analysis must rely upon 
qualitative research techniques. 
3.4.4 Vulnerability and Shocks 
Vulnerability is the last of the components in the asset-vulnerability framework and 
refers to the negative outcomes of processes of change and has been defined as "...a 
dynamic concept generally involving a sequence of events after a macroeconomic 
shock" (Glewwe and Hall, 1998:184). This definition appears too narrow from an 
asset-vulnerability perspective since both the shock and the events that follow may 
also be microeconomic, social, environmental or political, and may take the form of 
either long-term trends or cyclical processes such as seasonality. To broaden this 
definition, four dimensions of vulnerability that require analysis are proposed. Firstly 
the nature of the social unit concerned, its capacity to both withstand the negative 
effects of the process concerned, and its ability to recover its position afterwards. This 
is often referred to as the resilience of the social unit (Davies, 1996; Rakodi, 1995; 
Swift, 1989). The second dimension is the source, nature and duration of the threat. 
Next, the risk or uncertainty associated with responding to the threat, often referred to 
as the sensitivity of the social unit. The final dimension is the nature of the risk 
management, response, or coping strategy. 
Poor households throughout the world manage vulnerability by pursuing a mix of 
livelihood strategies (Devereux, 1993; Maxwell and Smith, 1992). These aim to 
increase their income flows and stocks of assets (accumulation strategies), to spread 
risk through livelihood adjustments or income diversification (adaptive strategies), to 
minimise the impacts of livelihood shocks (coping strategies) and, in the extreme, to 
prevent destitution and death (survival strategies). 
Such household risk management strategies can change the vulnerability of the poor 
and near poor over time. While adaptations to risk, the responses to shocks, and 
measures undertaken to recover from negative events might lower observed poverty, 
such coping strategies can also increase vulnerability over the longer term. For 
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example, as depicted in Figure 3, vulnerable households often resort to tactics that 
deplete or slow their accumulation of productive assets (such as skipping meals, 
taking children out of school, or over-harvesting natural resources). Although this 
behaviour can help households lessen the immediate impacts of risk, it can result in 
dynamic inefficiencies that lower mean incomes (and possibly increase the variability 
of incomes) in subsequent time periods, and thereby perpetuate the vicious cycle of 
poverty. This can also lead to negative externalities and, as a result, such behaviour is 
sometimes termed 'destructive coping strategies. The lack of assets, the failure of 
markets, and lack of public interventions to provide for efficiency-enhancing risk 
management strategies have adverse consequences for development and inhibit efforts 
to reduce poverty through broad-based growth. 
With respect to the first of these dimensions, the analysis of vulnerability must start 
with the assets that can be called on to withstand or mitigate the impact of the threat 
in question. Assets interact with risk in several ways. Firstly, the sources of risk 
affect households through their impact on the value and productivity (and variations 
in the value and productivity) of assets. Thus, risks are transmitted to household 
through their assets. Households also tend to reallocate their assets in response to 
risk. These reallocations affect short-term returns and the variability of returns. They 
also have an impact on the longer-term vulnerability of the households via their 
impact on savings and investments. Linked to this, a household's risk attitudes are, to 
a large extent, influenced by its asset portfolio, with wealthier households tending to 
be less risk averse, more efficient in resource allocation, and better situated to handle 
risk-related losses (Morduch, 1995). Conversely, research has long found that poor 
households tend to be risk averse (Anderson, et. ah, \911; Paxson, 1990). To rephrase 
Moser's (1998a:3) summary: the more assets that individuals, households and 
communities have, and the better that they are managed and the less vulnerable they 
are; the greater the erosion of their assets, the greater their insecurity and the risks that 
they face. 
Sources of risk include natural hazards like drought, commodity price fluctuations, 
illness and death, poorly functioning or missing input and output markets, sudden 
changes in policies, changing social relationships, unstable governments and armed 
conflicts. Some events, like drought, simultaneously affect many households in a 
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community or region. This can be termed 'covariate' or 'community-wide' risk and 
refers to the extent to which an individual, community or sub-group, structure or 
geographic area is likely to be damaged or disrupted by a disaster (UNDP, 1990; cf. 
von Kotze and Holloway, 1996 for an application to South Africa). Other risky 
events, like most illnesses, are specific to individuals or households, and can be 
thought of as 'idiosyncratic risk'. 
Furthermore, while some threatening events may be thought of as occurring 
randomly, there are a wide range of events which impact particularly severely on the 
poor, while in other cases, the poor are particularly at risk. In this context, 'risk' refers 
to stochastic (uncertain) events and outcomes with known or unknown probability 
distributions that may cause losses in household welfare. Many of these may be 
thought of a 'shocks' and are an important trigger leading to, or adding to, the 
impoverishment of households and individuals. Other types of risk are structural in 
nature and follow from the circumstances in which social actors may find themselves. 
Responding to risk and uncertainty are universal characteristics of life. However, a 
number of mediating factors may increase or decrease the propensity of the poor to 
being exposed to risk. In trying to distinguish some conditions specific to the urban 
poor, Moser (1998a:4) identifies three characteristics that differentiate the poor in 
urban compared to rural areas. Restated as continua, these can be extended to cover 
most poor people. The first is the degree of commoditisation, meaning the extent to 
which essential goods and services are acquired through market transactions rather 
than through own-production. This can also be thought of as the degree to which the 
sale of labour is the sole means of deriving an income: in other words, the 
proletarianisation of the poor. 
The extent to which social fragmentation has taken place is a second mediating factor. 
In communities in which there is a high level of trust, social cohesion and reciprocity, 
support networks are likely to be stronger and offer both a buffer to negative events, 
and a source of information. Indeed, as already noted, social capital can be thought of 
as an asset in its own right. Households that face a confined risk pool, that is the 
network that households can draw upon for assistance in managing the impacts of 
risk, are likely to be less able to respond to negative events. Groups range from the 
household itself, a subset of households within a community, an entire community, an 
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extended household with members in and outside the community, a group of 
communities, a region in a country, a country, and can also be multi-national or 
international. The 'assistance' can be through formal or informal arrangements using 
a variety of instruments. The risk management strategies adopted by poor households 
may tend to be inefficient and can have negative implications for social welfare and 
equity. Finally the degree of exposure to environmental hazards is the last of the 
characteristics identified by Moser. At issue here is the extent to which the 
environment acts as a buffer, or as a source of risk. 
When shocks occur, the poorest households are faced with certain trade-offs that are 
often extremely unfavourable. Those that experience shocks are said to engage in 
various coping strategies to reduce the effect of the shock on income. These strategies 
are as diverse and complex as the livelihood strategies of the household and depend 
on the prevailing social and economic climate, cultural norms and practices, and the 
political environment within which the household finds itself. If these measures are 
insufficient, a household may be required to reduce consumption or increase its labour 
supply, which could involve working more hours and using more members. The 
household composition will determine the amount of labour that can be activated, and 
it is often women and children who are called upon for this purpose at times of crisis. 
Austerity measures, such as withdrawing children from school, which have negative 
implications for long-term well-being, could also be part of the household's response 
to a shock. Such measures often result in short-term benefit, and an unfortunate high 
long-term cost, by compromising economic and human development prospects. While 
these responses are largely economic, coping with shocks often requires social 
support: families may move in together, the endogenous nature of household 
formation discussed earlier (Devereux, 1993; Davies, 1996). 
Davies (1996) offers complementary insights from an anthropological perspective that 
shows how a poverty trap situation can emerge for asset-poor households. Davies 
notes that there are three forces that interact when households experience an economic 
shock: sensitivity; resilience and susceptibility. While the first refers to the depth or 
the severity of a shock on a household's well-being, resilience refers to the ability of 
the household to recover from the shock. Susceptibility refers to frequency with 
which shocks take place and all three factors determine the vulnerability of the 
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household. Those that are highly sensitive to shocks, with a low resilience, are in an 
extremely hazardous state. They may be forced to sell off or neglect productive assets 
in order to survive. Over time, the third dimension becomes important: the 
susceptibility of the household to multiple shocks. Households that are highly 
susceptible face multiple shocks over time, and may ratchet down over time to the 
point at which they eventually become trapped in a situation of structural poverty. 
The choice of coping strategy is dependent on the cause of the shock, while proximate 
and structural factors also play a role, as well as the type of livelihood system. 
Naturally, household criteria such as the number of members, household composition 
and control of resources also play a role. Whether it is a community wide shock, or 
whether it is localised to a small number of households also influences the choice of 
strategy. Fundamentally though, income is the crucial determinant of which strategies 
are used. Wealthier households are likely to have formal insurance measures to cope 
with a shock such as death, while the same will not be true of households that are less 
well off. In addition, these households claim more than poorer households, and, 
ironically they are able to mobilise assets more readily, although such strategies are 
clearly more important for poorer households (Stewart, 1988). 
Households will therefore devise strategies from the range of resources that are 
available to them. However, the response of the household also depends on its 
capacity to respond to changes in the external environment. Internal life-cycle factors 
such as birth, marriage and death, as well as social cohesion which is embedded in 
household and intra-household level relationships, and community level trust and 
collaboration, all affect a household's ability to respond to shocks (Moser, 1998a). 
Households demonstrate a wide array of coping strategies that have two broad effects: 
to prevent costs from increasing and to manage costs so that the negative impact on 
household livelihood is minimised (Sauerborn et ai, 1996). Chambers (1983) for 
example describes survival strategies of'the poor' in terms of three options: exit 
(migration or educating children); voice (organisation, protest, collective negotiation 
or force); and loyalty. This last involves working within the local society and is 
probably the most common strategy of the poor as the others are often too risky. 
Corbett (1988) reveals that a striking feature of many case studies on coping 
behaviour is that not only do households plan how they are going to respond, but there 
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is also a distinct sequence in what they do. Some responses are more likely to be 
adopted at the start of the crisis, while others may be adopted later. The order in 
which these responses are selected will be a significant part of the household's overall 
coping strategy, and may have important consequences for the welfare of some or all 
of the household members. 
The use of the term coping strategy has proved to be problematic since it implies that 
the household does in fact cope. Many households in fact do not actually cope in these 
circumstances. In addition, private and social welfare losses result both from the risky 
events and from household strategies to manage the risk. It has also been shown that 
coping strategies may also become less effective over time and even detrimental to 
the household in the longer term (Davies, 1993). Poor households have also been 
shown to pay a higher cost (actual outlays and opportunity costs) for reducing, 
mitigating, and coping with risk (Zimmerman and Carter, 1995). Finally, poorer 
households tend to adopt risk management strategies that concentrate in lower risk 
and lower return assets, which can lead to a poverty trap and exacerbate asset and 
income inequality (Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1989; de Janvry et ah, 1991; Jalan 
and Ravallion, 2002). In particular, poor households will require reasonable assurance 
that market activities will not penalise their family's access to food before household 
decision-makers will risk market orientated production. 
Finally, Corbett (1988) notes that in most studies of coping strategies the household is 
taken as the unit of analysis since it is assumed that decisions about production, 
investment and consumption are primarily taken at the household level. However, it is 
also quite likely that different views may be held by different members of the family 
about this according to perceived responsibilities. Child-carers, most likely women, 
are likely to be more risk adverse in the short run, while migrant men may be more 
concerned about long term investments for their return. 
3.5 ASSETS, LIVELIHOODS AND DIFFERENTIATION 
Writing in the mid 1970s, Lionel Cliffe offers a useful starting point for drawing these 
themes together. He warned that the tendency of researchers to analyse social survey 
results in terms of aggregate statistics reinforces the popular misconception of African 
society as being classless, and free of conflict (Cliffe, 1977:195). Writing a little 
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later, John Iliffe (1987) makes the following remarks on poverty dynamics in Africa: 
Examination of the sources [of poverty] suggests that two levels of want 
have existed in Africa for several centuries. On one level have been the 
very large numbers - perhaps most Africans at most times - obliged to 
struggle continuously to preserve themselves and their dependants from 
physical want. These will be called the poor. On another level have been 
smaller numbers who have permanently or temporarily failed in that 
struggle and have fallen into physical want. These will be called the very 
poor or destitute. Of course, there was no sharp dividing line between 
them. Yet the distinction has cross-cultural validity (Iliffe, 1987:2) 
Understanding the dynamics of poverty would then also require that an appropriate 
differentiation be developed, not to simply pigeon-hole social groups in a convenient 
typology, but rather to understand their systemic relationships to the overall structure 
of society and the way in which these impact upon livelihood security. In order to 
achieve this, the population would need to be sorted into categories in an analytically 
rigorous manner. This could involve no more than stratification by some variable, 
such as income or land-holding. However, stratification using the former reveals 
only the outcomes of the livelihood strategies adopted by individuals and households, 
and stratification by the latter simply indicates the distribution of endowments but not 
the use to which these are put. It is argued therefore that simple stratification does not 
yield very satisfactory results, as this merely indicates that at a particular moment in 
time, certain households have greater access to resources than others and would tell us 
little about the tactics that households engage in as a way of survival, and the 
constraints which limit their choices. Rather, an approach that is more sensitive to the 
dynamics of persistent poverty is necessary. 
The examination of the activities and tactics adopted by individuals and households 
when assembling claims presented earlier offers a more promising entrance to 
understanding the dynamics of livelihood generation. These strategies may be seen as 
representing the combinations of choices made by households when attempting to 
make the best use of the endowments which are available to them. The outcome of 
these strategies then represents relative success in the utilisation of endowments, or 
alternatively, the outcome of an 'exchange entitlement mapping' as described earlier 
and which result in the differentiation of the population under investigation. 
From this, it is proposed that one way in which groups/classes can be distinguished 
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within society is through the common strategies for survival that are compelled by the 
endowments available to these groups. Elster (1986) frames this as endowment-
necessitated behaviour, meaning the activities that households and individuals must 
undertake in order to make the best use of what they own when generating a 
livelihood. Identifying this behaviour should assist in indicating how inequalities are 
entrenched over time, leading to the emergence of strata, factions, and classes. 
In a complementing argument, several analysts have argued there are structural causes 
of chronic poverty that result in the inability to make a minimum level of investment 
to maintain or enhance the different assets. Such adverse 'initial conditions' have 
been termed 'investment poverty' by Reardon and Vosti (1995:1498) or 
'economically persistent poverty' by Zimmerman and Carter (1995). These structural 
causes produce unfavourable outcomes for some people, and therefore result in 
persistent vulnerability and poverty, maintaining existing economic and social 
inequalities. Several categories of such structural conditions can be identified of 
which asymmetric markets that discriminate against the less well-off are perhaps the 
best known. This refers to situations where the allocation of costs and benefits of 
exchange occurs in a manner that consistently prejudices the least well-off. The 
lumpiness of finance markets is a frequently cited example, whereby small sums of 
money cannot be easily obtained from the formal financial sector, forcing poor 
households to make use of informal money-lenders at high interest rates. Information 
markets have more recently been included as another example of asymmetric markets 
while transaction costs have also been identified as being another important cost to 
fall asymmetrically on the poor (Bardhan, 1989; Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990; Jaffee and 
Morton, 1995). 
As already mentioned, demographic change also plays a role in this analysis, and 
include the household life-cycle itself as the members of a household age, the labour 
available to the household changes, as may the number of consumers dependent upon 
the household's assets. Changes to household structure are also a coping strategy 
when members leave or join the household in search of better opportunities while its 
human capital may be eroded over time through illness, injury or continuous 
32/ These are used as analytical constructs rather than as descriptive categories. Strata may be viewed 
as broad social categories lacking cohesion, factions are groups which share economic interests and 
may act as social forces, whereas classes are classically defined as aggregations of people who have a 
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pregnancies. 
In addition, since households are not static entities, but change in composition and 
size over time, their demographic life cycle is also of interest. This has been linked to 
consumption smoothing (Modiglaini and Brumberg, 1954), a household development 
cycle (Chayanov, 1966; Shanin, 1972), income distribution (Murray, 1987), and class 
formation (Cooper, 1982). Speigel (1982) and others have criticised much of this 
analysis as being demographically determinist, and Deaton and Grosh (2000) note the 
difficulties in actually measuring life cycles. However household life cycles remain a 
useful mechanism for understanding the dynamic nature of rural households and will 
also need to be taken into consideration. 
These forces do not act independently and are often linked and mutually reinforcing. 
Some may operate in a single period setting, such as when individuals without 
adequate water and sanitation suffer greater sickness and hence will have lower 
incomes in this period. However the connections between income and capabilities-
based measures are best understood from a dynamic or multi-period perspective. For 
example, individuals who have few assets and inadequate drinking water and may be 
exposed to greater risks and suffer more frequent income shocks will ultimately be 
precluded from accumulating the skills and assets needed to establish a trajectory that 
will permanently enable them to escape from a poverty trap. 
All of these factors are argued to produce differential asset accumulation failures 
whereby the forces above combine to reduce the ability of the less well-off to 
accumulate, use and protect their assets over time despite their effort and saving. An 
emerging economics literature provides some support for this conceptualisation of 
dynamic poverty (Banerjee and Newman, 1994; Dasgupta, 1997a, 1997b; 
Zimmerman and Carter, 1995). In all these analyses, vulnerability and imperfect 
markets play key roles in preventing initially poor agents from using time as a way to 
build up asset stocks and achieve a high level of well-being. Effectively, it is argued, 
initially poor agents are caught in a poverty trap in terms of their available assets and 
their vulnerability to negative events. This is a situation from which neither time or 
the opportunity to save and accumulate assets will deliver them. 
common location in the relations of production (Poulantzas, 1978; Therborn, 1983). 
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Modifying Davies' analysis, these different asset-vulnerability trajectories can be 
depicted as follows: 
Figure 3.4: Trajectories of Vulnerability 
Shock ^^wiw^wHiPool of Risks 
Coping Strategy <3 ' Portfolio of Assets 
& Capabilities 
Source: Adapted from Davies (1996). 
Two households starting at the same level of well-being, facing similar risks, but with 
different underlying asset portfolios are depicted as having experienced a shock. The 
extent to which each household is affected by the shock reveals the severity of the 
shock, and provokes a coping strategy that draws on the household's portfolio of 
assets. This allows each household to return to their initial level of well-being, 
although the asset-poor household is depicted as taking longer to do so, as well as 
having being affected more severely. Both households experience a second shock, 
although the asset-rich household is depicted as being less susceptible (it is longer 
before this household experiences its second shock), and more resilient (the household 
is able to recover to its initial position more quickly). Indeed, extending Davies 
conceptualisation of the production and reproduction of poverty, the asset-rich 
household is able to avoid some shocks altogether, while the asset-poor household 
becomes increasingly unable to recover to its initial position, and ultimately moves 
from being poor only occasionally, to becoming chronically poor. 
Thus although accumulation failure rests at the heart of Davies' understanding of 
persistent structural poverty, her analysis also reveals how differentiation follows 
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from different asset bundles, livelihood activities and experience of vulnerability. 
Although asset rich households may spend spells below the consumption poverty line, 
they are better able to return to their initial position, are affected less, recover more 
quickly and are able to avoid certain shocks. They thus remain on a successful 
accumulation trajectory over time. In contrast, asset poor households eventually 
ratchet below the consumption poverty line to become enmeshed in a poverty trap, 
unable to maintain or build assets, and, indeed, may have to shed assets as a coping 
mechanism. In this way, these households experience asset accumulation failure 
which results in widening differentiation. 
Socio-economic differentiation has received some attention in Southern Africa, 
although little has been done in recent years. Previous studies have confirmed both 
the extent of differentiation as well as the determinant role played by access to formal 
wage earning opportunities. Heron (1991), investigating only households involved in 
agricultural production, links economic differentiation to access to livestock, with 
higher maize yields being achieved and greater areas being planted by households 
with more stock. Southall (1980) stresses the role played by efforts to 'reform' 
apartheid policy during the 1980s in the creation of entrepreneurial groups whereas 
Murray (1987) notes that apartheid policy both limited and distorted the process of 
differentiation for the bulk of the rural population within the former Homelands. 
Extreme demographic instability arising from forced removals, 'Betterment 
Planning', and oscillating migration, as well as complex patterns of survival 
necessitated by the harsh conditions prevalent in these areas meant that household life 
cycles had an insignificant impact upon the household.33 
3.6 A MODEL OF DYNAMIC POVERTY 
To bring these themes together within the framework of asset-vulnerability, a change 
in a household's well-being over a period of time can be thought of as having three 
components. Firstly, changes in the quantity or quality of assets available to the 
household. Secondly, changes in the output and outcomes derived from the assets 
either through productivity changes (a shifting outwards of the production function), 
diversification or changes in the terms of exchange or costs of transaction. Finally, 
33/ Betterment Planning was a system of villagisation in South Africa that entailed forced removals and 
often dispossession of land and livestock. Cf. Yawitch (1981) for a full account. 
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changes in a diverse set of factors that include unobservable characteristics of 
household members such as entrepreneurship, good or bad luck, and the shocks that 
have affected the household's asset base or livelihood activities. In each case, external 
forces may improve or adversely affect the household, its assets or the terms of trade 
that it faces. 
From the perspective of an assets-vulnerability framework, the implication is that 
economic vulnerability may preclude those who are poorly resourced from ever 
realising their full potential as economic or social agents. A parallel implication is that 
there may be some minimum level of assets below which it becomes impossible to 
overcome structural constraints, and thus to accumulate assets or improve 
productivity. If so, the starting point for a dynamic analysis of poverty is developing a 
way in which this asset threshold can be identified and measured. 
Looking for explanations why some encounter poverty that traps while others 
accumulate, Carter and Barrett (2006: 185) suggest three possible reasons why a 
positive relationship between wealth and marginal returns might exist: 
1) the underlying income generating process may itself directly exhibit 
increasing returns to scale, either because the primal technology exhibits 
locally increasing returns or because input (output) prices, or transactions 
costs are negatively (positively) related to scale over some significant 
range; 
2) some high return production processes may require a minimum project 
size such that only wealthier households can afford to switch to and adopt 
the high return process; and 
3) risk and financial market considerations may cause some lower wealth 
households to allocate their assets so as to reduce risk exposure, trading 
off expected gains for lower risk, thereby making expected marginal 
returns to wealth lower for lower wealth households. (Carter and Barrett, 
2006: 187). 
Attempting to show the accumulation failure that might result from any of these, 
Carter and May (2001) developed a model of poverty.34 Motivated by narratives 
concerning the life-time experience of poverty contained in the SA-PPA, the first step 
in this analysis is the construction of an asset-based poverty threshold that replaces 
/ While I contributed towards the conceptual development of the model discussed in this section and 
the subsequent empirical analysis as an equal co-author, it should be noted that the econometric 
specification of the model was undertaken by Michael Carter, cf. Carter and May, 2001 for detail. 
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the standard consumption-based money-metric poverty line discussed in earlier and 
Appendix Two, and which will be used for the poverty profile to be presented in 
Chapter Five. To do this, the standard poverty line is rephrased so that the threshold is 
again denoted as c_, whereby a household, i, is said to be poor in period t if: 
(1) cit<c. 
This single-period poverty analysis can be thought of in terms of realised levels of 
wellbeing, cih and the various measures discussed earlier can then be applied to 
produce a poverty profile that can show the incidence, depth and severity of poverty 
in terms of distance from the threshold. This is the conventional and static approach to 
poverty measurement that is widely used in most of the poverty profiles prepared for 
poverty reduction strategies such as those being advocated in the PRSP processes 
being undertaken in many developing countries. 
An alternative approach is suggested by Carter and May (1999) who directly 
estimate c(A), that is to say, the expected consumption level, c, for a household given 
its assets, A. These would consist of the human, social, natural, productive and 
financial capitals to which household members have access as described in the Asset 
Map shown earlier. This estimation is used to explore the structural or asset basis of 
poverty by developing 'asset-basedpoverty lines', (A), defined as: 
(2) A = {A\c(A) = c}. 
Thus A is the combination of assets that yield an expected level of well-being exactly 
equal to the single-period poverty line: c_ . 
Carter and May (2001) then go on to define an asset-based multi-period poverty line 
( J ) as: 
(3) 
where t indexes years and 8P is a discount factor. J is then the present value of a 
sequence of poverty level living standards. 
J(u,Sp) = 




From this, the standard definition of poverty is extended to a multi-period context in 
which a household is defined as being dynamically poor if: 
(4) J\A0,)<J 
A household is thus dynamically poor if their expected long-term stream of well-
being, J*(AQl) is less than the certain equivalence value of a stream of single- period 
poverty living standards. This is conditional on optimal accumulation behaviour in 
which the household must balance current needs with anticipated future needs and the 
anticipated ability to meet these. 
This notion that there are initial asset positions from which successful accumulation 
and upward mobility are not possible suggests a dynamic equivalent to the single-
period asset poverty line defined in (2) above. Carter and May (2001) define this 
dynamic asset poverty line, A as: 
(5) A = {A\J\A0) = J}. 
The figure of asset-trajectories developed by Davies shown Figure 3.4 in can be 
reworked to depict this model of dynamic asset poverty: 
/ In this approach, an economic model of inter-temporal choice underlies the proposed chronic 
poverty line, if a household i at time / has a vector of assets, Ait, in every period, it is assumed that the 
household chooses consumption (ĉ ,) and investment (/„) in order to maximise its discounted stream of 
expected well-being. Carter and May (2001) use Bellman's equation to show the dynamic 
optimisation problem as follows: 




A,!+i > 0 
where J (Ajt) is the true value function for the underlying optimal problem and defines the maximal 
discounted stream of future livelihoods that household i can expect given a starting asset endowment of 
Ajt and optimal future behaviour. In choosing its current period consumption, cit, the household faces a 
trade-off between current {u(c^) and future well-being (J (A^,)). Included in this equation are the 
stochastic income shocks eiu and stochastic asset shocks, ©it that the household will also confront over 
time. F(») is a generalized earnings or livelihood function while P„ is the vector of given market prices 
at which all assets and entitlements can be sold. Since it is defined in terms of expected utility, the 
chronic poverty line, J_ is sensitive to the degree of transitory poverty risk that the household faces in 
the future. 
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Figure 3.5: Modelling Trajectories of Vulnerability 
Coping Strategy NJ -
u Sit, @<, 
Portfolio of Assets 
& Capabilities 
Asset Rich Hh 
Asset Poor H i 
Now the difference between the two households over time can be more clearly seen. 
Although initially depicted as starting from the same income level, the asset poor 
household actually lies below the dynamic asset poverty line, while the asset rich 
household lies above it. Since this line divides those asset combinations from which 
successful accumulation and escape from poverty is possible, from those 
combinations from which it is not, that is to say, where A < J , the asset poor 
household finds itself on a downward trajectory despite successfully coping with the 
negative income or asset shocks that it has encountered, while the asset rich 
household continues on a upward trajectory despite having experienced similar 
negative shocks. More importantly, the time taken to recover from the shock increases 
for the asset poor household, while the ability of the household to recover to its initial 
position declines. Using this approach, Carter and May (2001) are able to provide an 
alternative and dynamic analysis of the poverty typologies conventionally generated 
by the empirical literature that has used longitudinal or panel data to examine poverty. 
As already mentioned, studies using multiple observations on the well-being of a 
sample of households often distinguish between chronic and transitory poverty 
(Hulme and Shepherd, 2003). A household that is observed to be poor using a 
criterion such as the consumption poverty line shown in (1) above in each wave of 
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observation is said to be chronically poor. Households that move between poor and 
non-poor categories are labelled transitorily poor. 
In terms of Carter and May's (2001) analysis, an alternative conceptualisation is 
possible in which households can be divided between those that are structurally poor 
(with asset holdings below A), and those that are structurally non-poor (with asset 
holdings above A) irrespective of the consumption level at which the household is 
observed at a particular point in time. The structurally poor can in turn be subdivided 
between those that are caught in a poverty trap below A, unable to accumulate; and 
those that are not trapped, are able to accumulate and thus are eventually able to 
escape from poverty. Finally, at any point in time, households may be stochastically 
poor (such as a household with asset holding A" > A that that has received a shock, 
£'" < 0, and is likely to return to its expected livelihood level in time, c(Am) > c); or, 
stochastically non-poor (such as a household with asset level A" that receives an 
windfall, s" > 0, but that is also likely to return to its expected livelihood level of 
c(A") < c).36 The asset rich household at moment itx would be an example of the 
former situation. 
If this conceptualisation applies, different kinds of households could be 
inappropriately grouped together were the conventional chronic and transitory poverty 
concepts to be used, especially in short panels with observations at only two or three 
points in time. Included in the conventional transitory category will be households 
that were initially structurally poor but who have escaped structural poverty through 
effective asset accumulation. Also in this category will be households that were never 
structurally poor but who in one period were stochastically poor, as well as 
households that were structurally poor in all periods but who once were stochastically 
non-poor. Similarly, the conventional chronically poor category could include 
households caught in a poverty trap as well as those twice observed to be 
stochastically (but not structurally) poor. 
Distinguishing between these different types of chronic and transitory poverty is 
/ It should be noted that households would only be observed to be stochastically poor if they lack 
access to the capital and, or insurance markets needed to defend their living standards against such 
shocks (cf. Udry, 1994 as an example). 
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important for a variety of reasons. A society in which even structural poverty is 
transitory is clearly very different from a society in which large numbers of the poor 
are caught in a structural circumstance of persistent accumulation failure. The policy 
implications clearly also differ between the two circumstances. In one, time is an ally 
that eventually eliminates chronic poverty and interventions can be confined to 
reducing the time required to achieve this upward mobility, and social protection 
policies that alleviate the ill effects of transitory poverty. In the other, time merely 
oversees the reproduction of a chronically poor class and structural changes, such as 
asset redistribution or market reforms, may be required if poverty is ever to be 
eliminated. In analysing a hypothetical economy in which such class-based poverty is 
to be found, Figueroa (2006:4) describes such dramatic change as a foundational 
shock. Potentially South Africa's transition to democracy in 1994 may well have been 
such a society-wide shock. 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
A consensus that has emerged over the last decade sees poverty as generally being 
characterised by the inability of individuals, households, or entire communities, to 
command sufficient resources to satisfy a socially acceptable minimum standard of 
living. Poverty is thus characterised by the inability of individuals, households, or 
entire communities, to command sufficient resources to satisfy their basic needs. 
However, attention is being increasingly directed to notions of persistent or chronic 
poverty, and away from the static measurement of the number of households who fall 
below some threshold. 
Assets, livelihoods and asset based vulnerability have been put forward as a way of 
understanding these dynamics. Whether viewed through the language of Sen's 
entitlement approach, or through the more conventional approach of assets and 
livelihood tactics and activities as described in this chapter, measurement is difficult 
as it refers to potential circumstances rather than to concrete conditions, Nonetheless, 
understanding the different forms of poverty, and the characteristics of those who find 
themselves in these different positions, is of particular importance to policy makers 
concerned with the long term eradication of poverty. Finally, as a concept, 
vulnerability tends often to capture the concerns of the poor to a greater extent than 
other concepts concerned with the analysis of deprivation, as it speaks to the 
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prevailing insecurity of livelihoods and of the person. 
A differentiation analysis, suggested by the work of inter alia, Chayanov and Lenin, 
and in Africa, Cliffe, Murray and Spiegel, provides a hopeful direction for the 
analysis of livelihoods, assets and vulnerability, breaking away from the tendency to 
aggregate the experiences of those categorised as poor. Some work has already been 
undertaken in South Africa which has shown the promise that this mode of analysis 
offers. These themes will be returned to in the forthcoming chapters which will 
attempt to recast the analysis of poverty in post-apartheid South Africa in a way that 
is both dynamic and structural. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
One of our most daunting socio-economic issues is the great gap in development 
and income between people and communities. South Africa now has one of the 
most unequal distributions of income in the world; but still more disturbing are 
the millions of South Africans who have to make do with pitifully low incomes 
(Minister of Finance, BJ du Plessis, 1991 Budget Speech cited in Loots, 
1992:459). 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Despite the comparatively high level of institutional development in South Africa, an 
important adjunct of apartheid was the absence of credible and comprehensive data on 
the social and economic conditions facing the majority of the population. Research 
exercises such as the 1994 Carnegie Conference on poverty helped to shed light on 
the conditions in the former Homeland areas, but were based on small area-specific 
studies rather than on a national data-base. As a result, the policies of the newly 
elected government, including those concerned with poverty reduction, required a 
substantial new data gathering exercise. The previous regime of colonial and 
Nationalist governments had little interest in collecting information of this nature and, 
indeed, often suppressed data that depicted conditions of poverty and oppression. This 
took the form of both direct censorship and the neglect of data relating to important 
social indicators including vital registration, census data and living standards data. 
For example, between 1976 and 1994, official statistics excluded the 'TBVC states', 
the Homelands of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei that were given 
nominal independence by the South African government. This automatically 
excluded a large proportion of the poor from official statistics. While surveys 
continued to be undertaken in these areas, the commissioning and release of both 
reports and data were often subject to the whims of the Bantustan governments.37 
Various studies and data 'panel-beating' exercises, such as those undertaken by the 
Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA, 1987a, 1987b, 1991, 1994), tried to 
fill this information gap using imputations and local survey data, but it was not until 
the 1993 Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development (PSLSD) that a 
/ Once again the terminology is deliberate: Homeland is taken to refer to the geographic area, 
Bantustan to the political structures that administered these areas. 
90 
comprehensive household data base for development was created. Since then, a 
similar data gathering exercises have regularly been undertaken by Statistics South 
Africa (Stats SA) (the former Central Statistical Services) including an annual 
household survey, originally known as the October Household Survey (OHS) now the 
General Household Survey (GHS), a twice yearly Labour Force Survey (LFS) and an 
Income and Expenditure Survey (IES) in 1995, 2000 and 2005 which is now to be 
repeated every three years. Long-form censuses in 1996 and 2001 provide additional 
data, while two Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) have been conducted 
through the Department of Health. 
Despite their usefulness in other ways, cross-sectional studies such as these and the 
PSLSD are unable to address a variety of questions, particularly those concerning 
dynamic processes, important to policy researchers and practitioners. With this 
motivation, the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS) was undertaken in 
1998, and repeated in 2004. The objective of this chapter is to describe the 
methodologies used to develop alternative data sets for this purpose, including KIDS. 
These are the primary data used in this thesis. The advantages and limitations of 
using a longitudinal database compared to the more commonly available cross-
sectional data will be discussed. These provincial level data are supplemented by 
information collected for the South African Participatory Poverty Assessment (S A-
PPA) undertaken during 1995/6 (May, et ai, 1997) and by national data gathered as 
part of South Africa's official statistics system. The underlying approach and 
methodologies used in the former study are described. However, before doing so, the 
other data-sets available for poverty analysis in South Africa will be briefly reviewed 
starting with the PSLSD. 
4.2 DATA FOR POVERTY ANALYSIS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
4.2.1 PSLSD 1993 
The first South African national household survey, the PSLSD, was undertaken in the 
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last half of 1993 by a consortium of South African survey groups and universities 
under the leadership of the South African Labour and Development Research Unit 
(SALDRU) at the University of Cape Town (PSLSD, 1994).39 
The principal purpose of the survey ... was to collect hard statistical 
information about the conditions under which South Africans live in order 
to provide policy makers with the data required for planning strategies to 
implement such goals as those outlined in the Government of National 
Unity's Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). (PSLSD, 
1994: i) 
Similar to the Living Standards Measurement Surveys (LSMS) that have been 
undertaken by the World Bank in more than 100 developing countries (Grosh and 
Munoz, 1996; Deaton, 1997), the main instrument was a comprehensive household 
survey collecting a broad array of information on the socio-economic condition of 
households. Among other things, it included sections on household demographics, 
household environment, education, food and non-food expenditures, remittances, 
employment and income, agricultural activities, health and anthropometry (weights 
and heights of children aged six and under). In addition to the household 
questionnaire, a community questionnaire was administered in each cluster of the 
sample to collect information common to households in an area, such as school 
availability, health care facilities, and prices for various commodities. 
The 1993 sample was selected using a two-stage self-weighting design. In the first 
stage, clusters were chosen proportional to population size from census enumerator 
sub-districts (ESDs) from Census 1985 or approximate equivalents where these were 
not available. In the second stage, all households in each chosen cluster were 
enumerated and then a random sample of them selected (see PSLSD, 1994 for further 
details). 
An important component of the design, as with any household survey, was the 
definition of a household. To account for the complexity of the South African 
38/ The only other longitudinal household survey that predates the transition to democracy in South 
Africa of which I am aware is a small scale study in Nkandla (Ardington, 1983, 1988 and 1995). More 
recently the Cape Area Panel Survey (CAPS) collects data from households in the Western Cape at a 
more frequent interval than KIDS, and demographic surveillance sites have been established at Hlabisa 
in KwaZulu-Natal and Agincourt in Mpumulanga (Woolard and Leibbrandt, 2006:57). A small panel 
survey has also been undertaken near Bloemfontein in the Free State (Booysen et al, 2002). A National 
Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) is currently being planned for implementation in 2008. 
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situation with its history of residential restrictions and migrant labour, a two tiered 
definition for household members, resident or non-resident, was formulated based on 
time spent in residence. According to PSLSD (1994), resident household members, 
were defined as i) those who had lived "under this roof for more than 15 days of the 
last 30 days and (ii) when they are together they share food from a common source 
(i.e., they cook and eat together); and (iii) contribute to or share in, a common 
resource pool {i.e., they contribute to the household through wages and salaries or 
other cash and in-kind income or they may be benefiting from this income but not 
contributing to it, e.g., children, and other non-economically active people in the 
household)." The household was also defined to include non-resident members who 
were those that satisfied conditions ii) and iii) but who needed only to have lived 
"under this 'roof or within the same compound/homestead/stand at least 15 days out 
of the past year." Only information pertaining to the household roster was collected 
for these members (age, gender, relationship to head, education and so forth). Only 
limited information was collected from non-resident household members. 
The process of collecting these data and their subsequent analysis have been 
immensely useful in both the capacity strengthening of the South African policy 
research community and ultimately in guiding South African policies since the first 
national elections. The PSLSD has had an important role in guiding policy; for 
example, the allocation of state revenue between South Africa's nine provinces has 
drawn extensively on the data as have targeted poverty programmes such as the 
Community Based Public Works Programme (May and Rogerson, 2000:215). As with 
all such surveys of this magnitude, however, PSLSD is not without its problems and 
researchers must be aware of and acknowledge these. These are reviewed later in this 
chapter but see also, for example, Standing et al, (1996). 
On its own, the 1993 survey is then a good example of a cross-sectional survey, a 
single period representative survey, and continues to serve as a benchmark for such 
studies in South Africa. However, there are important limits to the policy research 
questions that can satisfactorily be dealt with using such data. 
/ Also referred to as the South African Integrated Household Survey (SAIHS), the South African 
Living Standards Measurement Survey (SA-LSMS), and the PSLSD/World Bank survey. 
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4.2.2 Official Statistics, 1994-2004 
The PSLDS helped initiate a full revision of South Africa statistical services, starting 
with a Presidential Project on social statistics established as a part of South Africa's 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). A task team was commissioned 
to redraft the Statistics Act which determines the structure, standards and governance 
of the statistical agency. Among other recommendations, this team also 
recommended that a more user-driven approach be adopted by the statistical agency, 
with greater accountability to an independent Statistics Council appointed by the 
Minister responsible. This led to wide ranging reforms of the former Central 
Statistical Services (CSS), and the emergence of a restructured agency, Statistics 
South Africa (Stats SA) in 1996. 
Of the many studies that are undertaken by Stats SA, the 2000 LFS, the matching data 
from the 2000 Income and Expenditure Survey (IES) that used the same sample, the 
various OHS data, and the 1996 Census have the most direct relevance for this thesis. 
The LFS/IES uses a sample of approximately 30 000 households and is designed to be 
generalisable at the magisterial district level. The OHS had a similar sample size and 
was undertaken from 1994 and was discontinued in 1999 when it was replaced by the 
GHS. The OHS 1998 survey is most frequently used in this thesis as a base against 
which to compare the second wave of the KIDS study. In this year, a sample of 20 
000 households was drawn in 2 000 enumerator areas (EAs) (that is 10 households per 
enumerator area). A two-stage sampling procedure was applied and the sample was 
stratified, clustered and selected to meet the requirements of probability sampling. 
The 1996 Population Census was used as a basis for the weighting and household 
weights were calculated by using the reciprocal of the inclusion probabilities. Unless 
otherwise stated estimates of the characteristics of the total population in this thesis 
are from the 1996 Census as a mid-point between the first two waves of the panel 
data. 
Turning to the census data, as with most of the other data collected during the later 
period of the apartheid regime, the Census's of 1985 and 1991 were deeply flawed. 
This was due to a combination of inadequate planning, design inefficiencies and poor 
implementation (Khalfani et al, 2005:15-17). The Censuses of 1996 and 2001 
attempted to rectify these problems, and, while not without controversy, offer perhaps 
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the best data available since the 1970 census. 
The results of the 1996 Census reveal that the South African population amounted to 
some 40.6 million, which was estimated to have increased to 43.3 million by 1999 
(Stats SA, 2001:13) while Census 2001 estimated a population of 44.8 million (Stats 
SA, 2003). In 1996, just less than 78 percent of the population were African, 9 
percent coloured, 2.6 percent Indian and 10.5 percent were white. Further, Census 
1996 suggests that the non-urban areas of South Africa had a population of some 18.7 
million people or 46.1 percent of the country's total population.41 The results of the 
1996 census imply that the proportion of South Africa's poor residing in the non-
urban areas was smaller than had been previously thought. Nonetheless, it seems that 
the absolute numbers of the rural population is not likely to shrink over the next 
decade and the overall trend remains a growth in the number of African non-urban 
households of about 1 percent per year. 
4.2.3 The South African Participatory Poverty Assessment 
The data above has been supplemented by information collected by the first 
participatory poverty assessment undertaken in South Africa, the 1996/7 South 
African Participatory Poverty Assessment (SA-PPA).42 The Participatory Rural 
Appraisal (PRA) methodology discussed in Chapter Three was used to formulate and 
answer a number of the research questions of relevance for this thesis. 
The objective of the SA-PPA was to provide a fuller and more integrated 
understanding of poverty from the perspective of those who are poor and to fill the 
gaps which a quantitative study such as the PSLDS cannot readily explain. In 
particular, the multi-dimensional experience of being poor, and the perceptions of 
those in this situation towards the causes and relief of their poverty could not be 
assessed from the available data in the PSLDS and the subsequent cross-sectional 
studies. In particular, the SA-PPA attempted to enhance, enrich and complement the 
40/ In line with most research on South Africa, the population group categorisation used in official 
statistics has been adopted in this thesis (Stats SA, 2001:9). 
/ With the introduction of municipalities throughout South Africa, the previous definition of 'urban' 
as areas in which there was a formal authority becomes redundant. Stats SA plan to make use of a 
population density definition for Census 2000 which will result in problems of comparability. This has 
not yet been released and thus these are the most recent figures for urban and non-urban areas. 
/ Some of the material used in this section has been taken from May et al, (1998) for which I was the 
lead author. 
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picture of poverty provided by other sources through focusing on a number of specific 
objectives. Firstly, the SA-PPA set out to explore local conceptions of poverty, 
vulnerability and relative well-being in poor urban and rural communities (as well as 
local understandings of the causes/determinants of those conditions). This includes 
the view of 'the poor' as well as the view of those who are delivery agents, policy 
makers and researchers. The SA-PPA also sought to draw out what people who 
described themselves as poor see as the most significant constraints that they face; 
how their understanding of these constraints determines their use of resources and 
services; and their perceptions of the most effective actions for poverty reduction 
which can be taken by i) individuals or families, ii) communities, iii) government 
agencies, iv) other institutions. Once again, this includes the view of those who are 
delivery agents, policy makers and researchers. The provision of information on the 
intra-household component of poverty including gender and generational aspects was 
another issue that was included. Finally, the SA-PPA hoped to provide information 
on dynamic dimensions of poverty and vulnerability which are of critical importance 
to the poor, and which are particularly suited to investigation through qualitative and 
participatory research methods. Examples of these include: intra-household aspects 
of poverty, including the survival strategies of the poor in relation to different types of 
risk/vulnerability including seasonal stress and various kinds of shocks; and time-
depth analyses through life-history constructions. 
The approach that was adopted by the SA-PPA reflected recognition of the wealth of 
experience that already existed in South Africa at the time of the study in terms of 
participatory forms of research and development. As such, it was decided that simply 
contracting researchers and research organisations to undertake research in pre-
determined areas would not be an appropriate approach. Instead, NGOs, CBOs and 
academics who had been involved in poverty research, and in 'on-the-ground' 
development initiatives, were invited to submit proposals for funding which would 
build on their existing work. 
Eventually, the SA-PPA included fifteen studies and involved some 45 researchers 
from 20 organisations. Work was undertaken with 25 communities, ten of which were 
located in KwaZulu-Natal, seven in the Eastern Cape and four in the Northern 
Province. The study covered sites in seven of the nine provinces of South Africa 
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excluding only Gauteng and the Free State. Judging the actual number of participants 
in the studies is difficult, since a large group does not necessarily imply that all who 
attended the workshops and meetings actually participated. Nonetheless a rough 
estimate suggests that the SA-PPA included about 1400 people. 
4.3 BUILDING PANEL DATA IN KWAZULU-NATAL 
4.3.1 The Case for Longitudinal Data 
Despite the dissatisfaction sometimes expressed about the pace of change in South 
Africa, it is clear that South Africa has undergone a dramatic economic, political and 
social transformation. Therefore, with increasing urgency, policy makers are keen to 
learn how South Africans have coped with these various changes, something the 
PSLSD survey alone cannot do. One way to learn about how South Africans are 
faring is to carry out another representative household survey on a new sample 
(namely a new cross-sectional survey). Provided the sample frame is current, this type 
of survey has the desirable property that it is representative of the overall population 
at the time of the survey. Current representativeness is especially important in a 
country whose population is growing and whose people are migrating, as appears to 
be the case in South Africa in recent years. This approach, referred to as repeated 
cross-sectional surveys, is adopted by Stats SA in the annual October Household 
Surveys (OHS) already discussed. Much has been learned from these surveys, with 
for example, Budlender (1999a) providing a useful update of South Africa's poverty 
profile based on the 1995 OHS and five-yearly IES conducted in same year. 
Leibbrandt and Woolard (1999) use two cross sections (PSLSD and 1995 IES) to 
compare different measures of poverty within and across time. Klasen and Woolard 
(2001) use several cross-sectional surveys to assess trends in unemployment in the 
1990s. By design, the samples used in these studies are representative 'snap-shots' of 
their respective time periods. Therefore, they can be used to analyse changes over 
time for indicators such as rates of poverty for the general population. 
Cross-sectional surveys cannot, however, answer a number of important dynamic 
questions. For example, while they can tell us whether poverty rates are decreasing, 
increasing or holding level, they cannot tell us about the fate of individual households 
over the period. Suppose cross-sectional surveys at two points in time reveal that the 
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poverty rate is the same in each period. This could be the result of the same 
households having been in poverty in 1993 and 1998. Alternatively, it may be that 
some households exited poverty over the period, while an equal number entered. As 
already discussed, such distinctions, missed by cross-sectional surveys, might be very 
important in determining an effective policy response which may differ for chronic 
(the first case) versus transitory (the latter) poverty (Chaudhuri and Ravallion, 1994). 
To better understand what is happening to individual households over time, or the 
dynamics of their situation, a different type of survey is required in which the same 
households interviewed in the first period are re-interviewed in the subsequent 
survey.43 Typically referred to as longitudinal or panel surveys, with this sort of 
information one can determine whether the same or different households are in 
poverty in the two periods and an examination of the processes underlying these 
transitions can be made. Several well-known panel data sets exist which have been 
used to analyse a range of issues. Selected examples include the determinants of 
income mobility using the Cote d'lvoire Living Standards Survey (Grooteart and 
Kanbur, 1995), access to rural assets using the International Crops Research Institute 
Semi-Arid Tropics Village Level Studies in India (Gaiha and Deolalikar, 1993) and 
the influence of family history on children's well-being using the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics in the United States of America (Brooks-Gunn et al, 1993). In a 
special edition of the Journal of Development Studies, Baulch and Hoddinott (2000) 
provide a useful review of further examples. 
In sum, an important advantage of longitudinal surveys is that they allow us to 
analyse the dynamic behaviour of individual households, something not possible with 
standard cross-sectional surveys. A second advantage is that in many econometric 
analyses, longitudinal data enable us to control for unobserved, time-invariant 
characteristics of households that may bias efforts to estimate causal relationships 
using cross-sectional data (May and Roberts, 2001:100). For example, observing or 
measuring a family's preferences and priorities for educating their children is difficult 
to achieve in a single-period survey. It is quite likely that families that put a high 
priority on education will work extra hard to obtain income needed to pay school fees. 
However, when cross-sectional data is used in an effort to discover the impact that 
43/ Part of this section is derived from May and Roberts (2001) for which I was the lead author. 
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family income has on education, it is likely biased results will be obtained because the 
families that are observed with the highest income may also be those who prioritise 
education the most. Estimates derived from such data will thus tend to overstate the 
impact that income transfers would have on educational decisions of families that give 
only an average priority to education. In contrast, with longitudinal data, panel data 
methods can be used to control for time invariant preferences along with other family 
characteristics and thereby obtain unbiased estimates of the impact of income on 
education. Numerous other examples relating to similar endogenous problems of 
choice are possible, including variables often taken as given, such as household size 
and composition as already discussed. 
Despite these advantages, it must be stressed that unlike cross-sectional surveys that 
are always representative samples for their particular point in time, longitudinal 
surveys, including the one described below, cease to be representative of the overall 
population after their first survey round. The representativeness of subsequent rounds 
is diminished further in rapidly changing countries and due to the sample attrition that 
inevitably occurs over time. Of equal concern are the problems associated with 
distinguishing real trends in the data from the noise produced by respondent, 
fieldworker and other sources of measurement error. Methods are being developed to 
assist with the identification of such error and some of these are discussed further in 
Appendix One. 
4.3.2 The KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Survey (KIDS) 1998 
With the aim of addressing research questions concerning the dynamics of poverty in 
South Africa, households surveyed by the PSLSD in KwaZulu-Natal province in 1993 
were re-surveyed from March to June, 1998, and again in March to August, 2004 by 
44/ This latter advantage must be balanced with an associated disadvantage that many estimators that 
take advantage of panel data's capacity to control for unobserved characteristics are quite sensitive to 
measurement error. 
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the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Survey (KIDS).45 The re-survey was directed 
by a research consortium including the University of Natal, the University of 
Wisconsin, the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and the 
International Food Policy Research Institute and the methodology has been detailed 
elsewhere (May et al, 2000; May et al, 2007). This section will thus summarise the 
major features of the study.46 
The choice of KwaZulu-Natal was in part the result of practical considerations 
including a confluence of research interests, resources, and the feasibility of locating 
the households interviewed in 1993. However, this approach is not without 
justification. Although generally cautious about the feasibility of maintaining 
rigorous panel data, Deaton (1995:1805) suggests that surveys based on such 
opportunism may well be the most promising line of research of this nature. 
In 1993, the KwaZulu-Natal portion of the PSLSD sample was representative at the 
province level, conditional on the accuracy of the 1985 census and other information 
used as the sampling frame, and contained 1558 households of all races located in 73 
sampling points or clusters, 23 in the former 'white' province of Natal and 50 in the 
former Homeland of KwaZulu. To ensure comparability, the 1998 household 
questionnaire largely followed the 1993 version, though there were some important 
changes. 7 One of these was a greater focus on individual (as opposed to household) 
ownership of assets and control over their use so that gender-differentiated analysis is 
possible. A second underlying change was an expanded emphasis on the set of 
individuals not living in the household but economically linked to it. Finally, four new 
sections were added including economic shocks (both positive and negative), social 
capital (including group membership, kin networks, civic engagement, and trust), 
assets brought to marriage, and household decision making. 
/ In 1998 financial support for the KIDS project was provided by the United States Agency for 
International Development (Office of Women in Development - Grant Number FAO-0100-G-00-5050-
00 Strengthening Development Policy through Gender Analysis); the BASIS/CRSP project at the 
University of Wisconsin-Madison, and a University Partnership Grant); the Ford Foundation; the 
National Research Foundation (NRF); and the Development Bank of Southern Africa. The assistance 
of S ALDRU must also be acknowledged. The third wave of KIDS undertaken in 2004 was funded by 
DFID, the Mellon Foundation, NRF; Norwegian Research Council and USAID. For the record, I was 
involved in data collection in 1993, one of the three project directors in 1998 and led the collection of a 
third wave of data in 2004. The latter data were released into the public domain in June, 2006. 
46/ Part of the section is derived from May et al (2000) for I was the lead author. 
47/ All three questionnaires are available at www.sds/ukzn.ac.za and so are not provided as appendices. 
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The household questionnaire was necessarily quite involved and to ensure data 
collection accuracy, survey enumerators were trained for over two weeks including 
practice interviewing on non-sample households. In the field, the questionnaire took 
close to three hours on average to complete, often requiring repeat visits in order to 
overcome respondent fatigue. To the extent possible, the new sections on economic 
shocks and social capital were replicated in 69 community level surveys. 
Given the various purposes for the study such as the analysis of income generation, 
child health, and so forth, the identification of 'main' decision-makers within 
households was very important to enable the collection of longitudinal data on them. 
In 1993, PSLSD recorded a head for each household. The head could be either a 
resident or a non-resident member of the household and was simply that person 
designated by the survey respondent to be the household head. The 1993 enumerator 
training manual offers no additional guidance or criteria for this designation. While in 
many instances it might be correct to assume that this 'self-declared household head' 
corresponds to a main decision-maker, given the cultural diversity and complexity of 
households in South Africa, this may be not always accurate. For example, in three 
generation households, the survey respondent might declare the eldest the head but an 
employed middle aged child is really the primary decision-maker. To capture some of 
these complexities, the research team felt an expansion on the self-declared concept 
was necessary. This was done in an ex-ante fashion, through analysis of the 1993 
data, and ex-post during the 1998 survey. 
These individuals who are likely to be key decision-makers are termed 'core' persons. 
A household member was designated ex-ante as a core person if he/she satisfied any 
of the following criteria: 
1) A self-declared head of household (from 1993) 
2) Spouse/partner of self-declared head of household (from 1993) 
3) Lived in a three generation household and all of the following were true: 
• Child, child-in-law, or niece/nephew of self-declared head 
• At least 30 years old 
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• Have at least one child living in household 
4) Spouse/partner of person satisfying criterion (3) 
Therefore all heads of households and spouses of heads are automatically included 
and in some three-generation households, adult children are included. The rationale 
behind this was to go beyond what might more conventionally be called heads of 
household. While the 1993 survey identified such an individual for each dwelling, 
analysis of this headship data revealed that the head was almost inevitably the oldest 
resident of the dwelling. While the decision-making power and social status of these 
individuals is doubtless real, the concern was that focussing solely on them would 
result in overlooking other relevant household decision-makers. This concern is 
supported by a number of studies of the problems associated with the 'head of 
household' concept in South Africa (Ardington and Lund, 1994; Budlender, 1999b) 
although Posel (2001) presents a convincing argument in favour of using self-declared 
headship. For the purposes of this thesis, three headship categories will be discussed: 
de facto male heads - the self-declared resident male head; de facto female head - the 
spouse of the self-declared migrant male head or a female designated as head when a 
female head was a migrant, and; dejure female head - the self-declared female head. 
Prior to beginning fieldwork, a list of the core persons in the household was identified 
using the criteria above. These people were to be tracked to their new dwelling units 
if they had moved. This designation was pre-printed on the household roster. This 
methodology should mean that fewer key decision makers in the household are 
missed than if only the self-declared heads were focused upon. In addition, guidelines 
were provided for designating new core persons to avoid missing other key decision 
makers in the household. 
Another important aspect of the 1998 re-survey is that, when possible, households 
which had moved were tracked, followed, and re-interviewed. While the tracking 
procedures were somewhat more involved the main elements were that core persons 
were to be followed if they had moved and were no longer regarded as members of 
the household.48 
/ See the KIDS 1998 field worker training manual for details which is also available at 
http://www.sds.ukzn.ac.za. 
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4.3.3 KIDS 20044y 
The third wave of data collection was undertaken in 2004. As before, the study is 
based upon the original 1993 household socio-economic questionnaire and includes 
the collection of anthropometric data on children. New modules include the 
administration of a literacy test to children aged 7-9 years, a module on employment 
histories and one on the Child Support Grant (CSG). In addition, several existing 
modules have been expanded or amended, including those on deaths in the household, 
on health and caring, on social capital, and on children. 
Using the same approach as in 1998, the strategy was to identify and survey the 
households of the core members of the original panel of households. Where core 
household members now live apart, all the households that they had joined or had 
established were followed up wherever feasible. Moreover, it was decided to refresh 
the panel by designating the adult children of core household members who have 
established their own households and now have children of their own 'next-
generation' cores and to survey their households as well. In addition, core members' 
children aged less than 18 years who are being cared for by other households were 
also tracked in order to investigate the welfare of foster children and increase the 
number of children on whom longitudinal information is available. In the survey 
documentation, these three groups of households are referred to as C (core), K (adult 
children of cores who have children and established their own households) and N 
(children aged less than 18 of cores who are being cared for by others). The 
questionnaires for the C and K households are similar, although the latter form 
includes questions about the parents of next-generation core members that had already 
been collected from the original core members in earlier waves. For the N group of 
households, the questionnaire covers only information on the household's 
composition and expenditure, the characteristics of the dwelling and the 
characteristics of the children themselves. The bulk of the analysis in this thesis 
confines itself to C households unless otherwise stated. 
As with the 1993 wave of data collection, the pilot study of the redesigned 
questionnaire was conducted in November, 2003 with PSLSD households from the 
Umzimkulu district of Eastern Cape and households in the Cato Manor settlement in 
49/ Part of the section is derived from May et al. (2007) for I was the lead author. 
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Durban . An improved community-level questionnaire was developed which 
collected information from key respondents by means of focus group discussions. To 
complement this information, geo-referenced data on the location of every household 
was collected using Global Position System (GPS) devices and a secondary data base 
compiled of existing geo-coded information, including access to services and 
facilities. Finally the qualitative component of the study was strengthened to include 
key informant interviews, focus group discussions and community and household 
case studies that combine ethnographic and structured interviewing techniques. 
A scan of eligible households was undertaken in February, 2004 prior to the main 
fieldwork. It involved visiting all households to be surveyed to gather information 
about household membership and migration, including households in the three 
clusters in which fabrication had been suspected. The scan found that 916 core 
persons could be located, 469 children of core persons had established their own 
households, and 242 foster children were living with other households. This gave a 
provisional count of 1713 households to be interviewed, 113 more than originally 
estimated. The scan located a number of households from the three suspect clusters 
and interviews were conducted with them in 2004. 
Unless otherwise referenced, all KIDS data in this thesis refers to 865 African and 
Indian core households in the PSLSD data base that were surveyed in 1993, 1998 and 
2004. The sample size of each table represents the number of households from this 
group for which information is available. In specific tables and figures, the 469 next 
generation households have been included in the analysis and are indicated as such. 
Unless indicated otherwise, the PSLSD data refer to all population groups in all 
provinces that were surveyed in 1993 and are weighted according to the 1991 Census. 
Also, unless indicated otherwise, all OHS'98 individual data has been weighted by the 
variable PERSWGT. In addition, unless stated otherwise, the white and coloured sub-
samples have been excluded from each data set to ensure comparability with the 
KIDS data. Finally, unless reported otherwise, differences between the three waves of 
KIDS are not statistically significant. 
4.3.4 Ethical Approval, Community Feedback and Data Collection 
Each wave of the study underwent ethical review and the fieldwork in 2004 was 
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approved by the ethics committees of all three universities involved with regard to 
issues such as confidentiality, anonymity, the right of refusal and signed informed 
consent. Respondents were asked in 1998 whether they were willing to be revisited. 
Only those that agreed were approached in 2004. Respondents were given the 
opportunity to withdraw from the interview at any point or to refuse to answer 
specific questions. An incentive was given to the respondent in each household 
irrespective of whether they participated, but always at the end of the interview. It 
included household cleaning products and food. Respondents were also given a user-
friendly, local language leaflet outlining the study and previous results. The 
interviewers' training included a session that dealt with ethical issues, including those 
that might arise in measuring the heights and weights of children and testing their 
literacy and numeracy. 
Permission to work in the survey areas was obtained in advance from the relevant 
administrative authorities (municipal offices and/or traditional leaders). They were 
provided with information packs that contained summaries of the results from the 
previous waves of data collection and also included development-related material 
sourced from government and NGOs. Enumerators carried identification, introduced 
themselves to respondents and provided letters of support from the research team's 
universities and the Department of Social Development. The questionnaire and an 
informed consent form were translated into isiZulu and back-translated into English, 
to ensure consistency of interpretation, and administered in the language of the 
respondent, either English or isiZulu. Approval was obtained from their legal 
guardian(s) for the participation of children under 14 years of age before any data 
collection took place. Oral consent was sought from children that were old enough to 
understand the request that was being made. 
Two weeks of intensive interviewer training was undertaken in March 2004. 
Fieldwork commenced immediately thereafter. During the fieldwork, check backs to 
households were undertaken by both the contracted survey company and 
independently by the research team. Measures adopted to ensure the collection of 
high-quality data include a ratio of one supervisor to four fieldworkers, a requirement 
to complete only an average of one interview each day, the collection and capturing of 
detailed administrative information concerning the interview and quality control 
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processes, and a comprehensive in-office quality control procedure. The 
questionnaire was completed over two visits for more than three quarters of the 
households: the average time for the first visit was two hours and that for the second 
visit was 1.2 hours, with an average total contact time of 2.8 hours per household. 
Some 90 percent of the interviews were conducted by the end of July 2004 and a 
preliminary version of the data was delivered to the data checking team in September 
for scrutiny. Review of these data identified a few systematic problems with the field 
procedures and further interviews were undertaken to improve the follow up of 
households that had moved between 1993 and 1998, between 1998 and 2004, or 
between the scan of eligible households and the actual field work in 2004. These 
interviews also collected full information on deaths in those households where all the 
core persons had died. Fieldwork was concluded on 10 January, 2005 and the data 
were placed into the public domain in June, 2006 after being cleaned. 
4.3.5 Attrition Rates in KIDS 
The extent and nature of sample attrition is a crucial question for analysis using 
longitudinal data as the impact of this might be be both systematic and difficult to 
detect. As discussed in May et al, (2000) and Maluccio (2000) analysing the 1993-98 
panel, any response rate less than 100 percent implies some sample bias as households 
that might remain in the sample may have different characteristics from those which 
do not. These might be characteristics that can be observed, unobserved or even 
unobservable by the researcher. In theory, three factors underlie the level of attrition 
in a panel study: the mobility of the target population, the success with which those 
who move are followed and interviewed, and the number of refusals. In practice, 
additional attrition may arise from other problems or errors in the fieldwork (both in 
earlier rounds and in the index one). A number of protocols were put in place to 
minimise attrition in the 1998 and 2004 re-surveys. 
The combination of core persons, of which there were often more than one in an 
original 1993 household, and tracking movers meant that it was possible for original 
households to split and for the split-offs to remain in the sample. In the field, for 36 
original 1993 households in the sample, two (or more) interviews were completed in 
1998. As a result, it is possible to analyse the sample as a panel of households 
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(ignoring or possibly recombining the split-off households) or as one of Core persons. 
As already mentioned, in total, the original PSLSD survey included 1558 African, 
Indian, coloured and white households in KwaZulu-Natal. Of these, 165 white and 
coloured households were excluded from the sample frame of KIDS due to the 
sampling biases that seemed likely given the small sample size and the distribution of 
the clusters that were sampled. This produced a target of 1393 households to be 
interviewed in 1998. Four households were confirmed to be extinct in that all 
household members found in 1993 had died. A further 216 households could not be 
located by KIDS in 1998, of which 164 were African, while 137 mostly African 
households were initially removed from the data set as these were suspected as having 
been fabricated either in 1993 or 1998. Careful checking of the data and of the field 
records suggested that this event was unique although three suspected clusters were 
removed pending further investigation. The third wave of KIDS undertaken in the 
first half of 2004 visited the clusters in which fabrication was suspected. Although 
attrition rates were high in these clusters, careful investigation in the field found valid 
reasons for this and no firm evidence of fabrication. These clusters have therefore 
been reinstated in the 2004 release of KIDS. 
Thirty six households had fragmented, splitting into two, and in three cases, three 
households. Thus an additional 42 households were surveyed that contained core 
household members. When the analysis uses the waves of data as cross-sections, these 
split-off households have been included and not re-combined unless specified 
otherwise. Finally, five outliers with very high monthly incomes compared to their 
monthly expenditures have also been excluded.50 
In 2004 tracking of the next generation was undertaken whether or not the parental 
core members were alive. Therefore, unlike in 1998, the household-level response rate 
in the third wave of KIDS incorporates 1993 'dynasties' where all the core members 
have disappeared or died but information was obtained on the households of children 
of core individuals who had established a new family (K group) or on core 
individuals' underage children who had been fostered out of the original household (N 
501 In three of these cases, the household had received a retrenchment package or inheritance, in the 
remaining two cases, members of the household were running shops and drawings from the business 
appears to have been confused with the turnover. The Household Identification numbers (HHID) of 
these cases were 1970120, 2030080, 2100070, 2280140 and 2140090. 
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group). 
Of the 1354 households interviewed in 1993, the second wave in 1998 found 1132. 
May et al. (2000) and Maluccio (2000) describe the response rate in 1998 in more 
detail. The third wave of the study interviewed 865 households containing core 
individuals. These core members originated in 760 of the original households or 
dynasties interviewed in 1993. The 865 core households represent 95 percent of such 
households initially identified as traceable in the scan. In 180 of the 760 dynasties that 
were traced, information was also collected on one or more next-generation 
households that had split off from the parental household. In addition, one or more 
households were surveyed containing children fostered out by 132 of the dynasties. 
However, interviewing next-generation households in 2004 (K and N groups) reduced 
the attrition of individuals but not of the dynasties themselves. 
Although KIDS 2004 failed to track any surviving core members, information was 
obtained on a further 81 of the 1132 dynasties contacted in 1998 by conducting an 
interview in one or more next-generation (K or N) households containing children of 
the core individuals. In almost 60 percent of these dynasties, the interviews 
established that all the core members of the original household had died and provided 
information on these deaths. This sub-set of the original households has become 
extinct according to the study's definitions, rather than having been lost to follow up. 
In total, 2004 data exist for 74 percent of the dynasties contacted in 1998 and 62 
percent of the eligible households interviewed in 1993. It is important to note that, 
although we only traced 841 dynasties, far more than 841 questionnaires were 
completed: in addition to the 105 additional core households generated by splits, the 
2004 wave obtained data on 49 extinct core households, 319 next-generation 
households (68 percent of those identified by the scan) and 193 households containing 
foster children (41 percent of those identified by the scan). The main reason for the 
high rate of attrition of foster children is that they are very mobile. The interviewers 
usually located the household identified in the scan as the child's home, but often 
found that the child either had never lived there or had already moved elsewhere. 
The attrition rate of 26 percent of dynasties between the second and third waves of the 
study is higher than that between 1993 and 1998. Aging of the core members and the 
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impact of HIV/AIDS on adult mortality suggest that one reason why a lower 
proportion of dynasties were tracked was that more core households had ceased to 
exist because the last core member died than in between the first two waves. Also, 
increasing levels of internal and external migration in South Africa may be making 
households more difficult to track. For comparison, the LSMS Cote d'lvoire panel 
survey in the late 1980s suffered more than 10 percent attrition in only one year 
(Grootaert and Kanbur, 1995) and the Peruvian (Lima) LSMS lost track of more than 
40 percent of the original sample after five years (Glewwe and Hall, 1998). On the 
other hand, the second wave of the Indonesian Family Life Survey successfully re-
interviewed more than 93 percent of the sample after four years (Thomas et ah, 1999). 
Most surveys of this type that are carried out in developing countries report low 
refusal rates. This is true in the KIDS survey: only eleven re-contacted households 
refused an interview. Many surveys in developing countries do not attempt to track 
movers. Had that strategy been followed, only 80 percent of the target households 
would have been re-interviewed. Put another way, the tracking procedures yielded a 
25 percent reduction in the level of attrition between the surveys. 
Re-interview rates were higher in urban areas, where 90 percent of the target 
households were re-contacted. In large metropolitan areas, a sub-set of the urban 
sample which are characterised by more permanent housing structures and street 
addresses, re-interview rates were highest. There was less success when re-
interviewing Indian households, over 20 percent of which had moved between the 
survey rounds. 
For more than one third of the households that were not re-interviewed, information 
collected verified the household had moved but was not detailed enough to allow 
tracking to a new residence. For the remaining households, however, there was 
simply no trace of the household, and no one approached in the community 
recognised the name of any household members when presented with the 1993 
household roster. Maluccio (2000) shows that it is important to distinguish between 
these two groups: those who are known to have moved and those who seemingly left 
no trace. While the loss of the former group may be regarded as attrition, the prospect 
that the latter group may represent bogus interviews has to be acknowledged as was 
found for at least two clusters of the KIDS clusters when a subsequent round of 
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qualitative data collection revealed that 36 households had been fabricated in both 
1993 and 1998. 
Overall, those not re-interviewed were significantly more likely to be Indian rather 
than African, have higher per capita income, higher per capita expenditure, more 
educated household heads, and more durable assets. Obviously these variables tend to 
be correlated, and the comparisons suggest that the attrition present in KIDS is non-
random (Maluccio, 2000). This fact, together with the limitations of the original 1993 
sampling frame and the criteria used to define core members, implies that the KIDS 
study is not a representative sample of the Africans and Indians living in KwaZulu-
Natal from 1998 onwards. In particular, it is likely to necessarily under-represent 
'younger' households formed since the first survey. While this is a downside of any 
panel study, the gains from a longitudinal dataset are considerable if analysed and 
interpreted with care. 
4.3.6 Quantitative/Qualitative KIDS 
In 2001, KIDS was supplemented by an in-depth study of a sub-sample comprising 50 
households. These households were purposively selected from seven of the KIDS 
sampling points according to their poverty status.51 Respondent households were 
identified which fell into four different dynamic poverty groups identified by Carter 
and May (2001): those that were poor in both periods (chronic poor); poor in 1993 but 
not in 1998 (got ahead); not poor in 1993 but poor in 1999 (fell behind) and not poor 
in both years (never poor). 
Taking advantage of the qualitative methodology, between four to six hours were 
spent in each household, usually split over several days. The interview was organised 
around the development of a Household Events Map with household members though 
which key events in the household could be identified over the period 1990 to 2001. 
This was supported by a semi-structured interview. 
4.3.7 Limitations of the PSLSD Data 
While considerable effort was made to ensure the integrity of the original PSLSD, the 
/ See Adato et al., (forthcoming) for a more detailed discussion of the methodology of the qualitative 
study. 
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subsequent KIDS and the SA-PPA, a number of problems with these different data 
must be recognised. The first of these relates to the spatial characteristics of the 
households that are included in the survey. More than a decade after the transition to 
democracy in South Africa, debate continues over the definition of urban and rural in 
South Africa. In the current policy debate, rural areas are defined by the Department 
of Land Affairs as ".. .the sparsely populated areas in which people farm or depend on 
natural resources, including the villages and small towns that are dispersed through 
these areas. In addition they include the large settlements in the former Bantustans 
created by the apartheid removals, which depend for their survival on migratory 
labour and remittances" (DLA, 1997:1). As noted earlier, Stats SA are currently 
reviewing the definition of urban and rural using a standard United Nations approach 
based on population density and urban functionality but have yet to release new 
guidelines. 
The PSLSD defined three area categories on the basis of Census 1985 with some 
adjustments taken from Census 1991. These area codes were: metropolitan, referring 
to the urban areas of Gauteng, Durban and Cape Town; urban referring to those areas 
which are proclaimed as urban in the Population Census; and non-urban, referring to 
the rest of South Africa. In terms of the data in focus, the distinction between rural 
and peri-urban settlements within the classification non-urban is not clearly drawn 
out. For example, an area such as Ezakheni in KwaZulu-Natal is included in the non-
urban classification, although it could be more appropriately considered to be a peri-
urban area, given its close proximity to the urban area of Ladysmith, its population 
density and its relatively well developed service infrastructure. This means that the 
non-urban data does not simply refer to rural communities, but also to areas which 
may be functionally described as being urban, even if their official status is rural. 
Secondly, there may be differences in the nature of service provision to peri-urban 
areas when compared to deep rural areas and the data may not give an accurate 
representation of conditions and needs in rural areas. For this reason, when referring 
to official statistics and to the KIDS data, in this thesis the term 'non-urban' is used to 
distinguish the earlier formal definition of Stats SA from functional definitions such 
as that provided by the Department of Land Affairs (DLA), while urban refers to the 
metropolitan and urban codes of PSLSD. 
I l l 
The population figures used in the sample design of the PSLSD were based upon the 
results of the 1985 Population Census, and then re-weighted to Census 1991. 
However the 1996 Census suggests that earlier Census data, and subsequent 
projections, have tended to over-estimate the size of the South African population 
(Khalfani et al, 2005:18). More importantly for this study, it seems possible that the 
number of poor people has been overestimated, since the size of the rural population 
and of the poorer provinces (such as the Limpopo Province) is smaller than expected. 
Conversely, measures such as disease incidence rates (including HIV/AIDS), crime 
rates and perhaps adult illiteracy may have been worse than previously thought. 
Another problem with the full PSLSD data concerns the small sample sizes in 
Western Cape, Gauteng and Northern Cape. This has had two implications, the first 
being that the results of the survey cannot be generalised to all of the nine provinces 
with any confidence. Consequently, in most instances the data is not analysed 
regionally in this report, although it is very likely that poverty profiles in South Africa 
will have a strong regional variation. It is important that this is borne in mind when 
considering regionally specific policy implications and for this reason the OHS data 
may be more reliable. However, this problem obviously does not affect the KwaZulu-
Natal based KIDS data. 
In addition to these specific problems, in some areas, and for some questions, there is 
a concern that the data has been poorly collected, coded and cleaned. The 
anthropometric data in the 1993 round of data collection is one area of concern. This 
has meant that analysis has had to be confined to more robust techniques, and that 
certain themes planned for analysis have had to be scrapped, chiefly an examination 
of the changing well-being of children as a window into poverty. These problems 
were addressed in 1998 and in the 2004 wave of KIDS. 
Despite this, a comparison of the data with similar studies undertaken in South Africa 
indicates similar results in a number of critical areas, including income, demographic 
composition and survival strategies. For example, while the mean household size of 
all African rural households found by the PSLSD was 5.2, smaller than that found by 
the 1992 KwaZulu Income and Expenditure Survey which reported a dejure 
household size of 7, and a de facto size of 6.2 (DRA, 1993a). Indeed, closer 
examination of the PSLSD data indicates a similar tendency for households in 
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KwaZulu-Natal to be larger than elsewhere in South Africa. 
Furthermore, mean incomes found by the PSLSD compare favourably to those found 
by other research. For example, this study reports a monthly income for African rural 
household of R811.82 in 1993, the 1992 KwaZulu-Natal study reports a monthly 
income of R788.31 in 1992 and the National Energy Study reports a monthly income 
of R796.15 in early 1993 (DRA, 1993a; DRA, 1993b). For these reasons, the PLSLD 
database extended into the KIDS panel study is seen as a useful and largely reliable 
primary resource for this research. 
4.3.8 Exclusion of Whites and Coloured Populations 
As mentioned, it was decided not to re-survey the white and coloured households in 
1998 or 2004. While there were minor advantages to retaining these groups, such as 
the maintenance of overall sample size and the value of sampling all ethnic groups in 
the province, in fact the sample size of these two sets of households was too small to 
permit comparative ethnic analyses. Moreover the households in these groups are 
entirely located in a small number of clusters (due to the general lack of spatial 
integration of the population), which appear to be non-representative at the ethnic 
group level. 
4.3.9 Problems relating to Income and Expenditure53 
As discussed in Chapter Three, an analysis of changes in money-metric well-being is 
confronted with the choice of indicator, in this case between the reported incomes and 
expenditure. A detailed discussion of the data is provided in Appendix One, and the 
findings support the views of many analysts of poverty data who agree that 
consumption is a more reliable and consistent indicator due to fluctuations in income 
over time and the tendency to under-report income (Deaton, 1997, Lipton and 
Ravallion, 1997). In the case of KIDS this problem will have been exacerbated by the 
change in the questionnaire just noted and the estimates of income and expenditure 
521 There were 112 white households totalling 295 individuals and 53 coloured households totalling 249 
individuals in 1993. As an example of the impact of the problems of sample size and representativity, 
at a 95 percent confidence level, the mean expenditure for Africans was between Rl 191.25 and R 
1284.92 while that for whites was between R3582.28 and R4475.27, a difference of 7 percent of the 
mean for Africans and 22 percent for whites. 
53/ Part of the section is derived from Agiiero et a., (2007). I was the lead author for the analysis that 
has been included. 
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have been a concern for many analysts using the first two waves of KIDS. 
While the expenditure data suggest an increase in poverty between 1993 and 1998, the 
income data show the reverse. As will be discussed in Chapter Five, using the three 
waves of data for core households only, Aguero et al, (2007: 6) report the headcount 
index of poverty (P°) using expenditure increased from 0.52 in 1993 to 0.57 in 1998, 
before falling to 0.47 in 2004, whereas when income is used, the headcount declines 
continuously from 1993. This suggests a complex pattern of under/over-reporting at 
least between 1993 and 1998: income may be under-reported at lower levels and over-
reported at levels closer to the poverty line or expenditure may be over-reported at 
lower levels and under-reported at levels closer to the poverty line. 
One concern arises from the fact that the 1998 and 2004 KIDS questionnaires were 
modified modestly in order to ensure more accurate reports of both earned and 
unearned income. For example, in the later surveys, prompts were used to encourage 
respondents to report income from economic activities, ".. .no matter how small or 
temporary." The agriculture module was also redesigned and more carefully 
implemented in the later survey periods. Another possible explanation for the 
discrepancy between the income and expenditure measures is that expenditures were 
over-reported in 1993. There is some basis for this possibility. The 1998 and 2004 
surveys collected all food expenditure data on a 30-day recall period. In contrast, the 
1993 survey allowed respondents to choose between seven-day and 30-day recall 
periods on a commodity-by-commodity basis. In an experimental test of the impact 
of recall period on expenditure reporting, Scott and Amenuvegbe (1990) found that 
shorter recall periods lead to higher reported expenditures (also see Tarozzi, 
forthcoming; Deaton and Grosh, 2000). While forcing a seven-day recall period on 
low frequency food purchases will logically lead to an over-reporting of these 
expenditures, it is important to recognize that the 1993 data used in the KIDS study 
allowed respondents to choose the recall period (a choice that did not exist in the 
Scott and Amenuvegbe experiment). 
Closer analysis of the KIDS 1993 data show that in fact the longer 30-day recall 
period was used by over 60 percent of respondents for 23 out of the 30 food 
commodity groupings. The only two commodities for which more than 60 percent of 
respondents used the 7-day recall period are milk and bread, two commodities that 
114 
probably really are purchased at high frequency. Deflating those food expenditures 
reported on a 7-day basis as suggested by the Scott and Amenuvegbe findings does 
reduce the extent to which expenditure declined between 1993 and 1998 but does not 
reverse the trend of increasing poverty. 
Another way to explore the reliability of the expenditure measure is to examine the 
behaviour of the food expenditure share. Within each period, the food share declines, 
as would be expected, as total expenditure increases. The food expenditure share also 
declines across years for all expenditure deciles, a somewhat surprising finding for the 
lowest three expenditure deciles as real total expenditures fell for each of those lowest 
deciles. Inspection of the South African Income and Expenditure Surveys for 1995 
and 2000 reveals a similar pattern. While a decline in food share as total expenditures 
fall stands at odds with the conventional wisdom, it may well accurately reflect the 
South African reality during this period. First, black communities became 
increasingly better served by public transport and by cheaper supermarkets over the 
1993 to 2004 period, suggesting that prices for food paid by poorer households may 
have declined even though national food prices increased at a somewhat higher rate 
than all commodities. In addition, and as discussed in Section 2 above, the end of 
apartheid permitted black families to obtain better (and more expensive) housing as 
well as better access to credit. The relaxation of this constraint on non-food 
expenditure would also predict a decline in the food share (as would the availability of 
new goods, such as cellular telephones), over the 1993 to 2004 period. 
In these circumstances, deciding which approach to poverty measurement is most 
believable is not immediately apparent. However a choice has had to be made for this 
thesis, and based on the discussion provided in Appendix Two, this thesis will 
therefore use monthly expenditure data from 1993 and the consumption (for food) 
plus expenditure (for non-food) data from 1995, adjusted for household size and 
composition, when measuring or predicting well-being. Unless otherwise specified, 
all amounts are expressed in 2000 prices adjusted as explained in Appendix Two. 
/ Several fresh fruit categories were also reported using the 7-day recall period in just over half the 
cases. 
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4.4 DECIDING ON A POVERTY LINE 
As the principle research question of this thesis is concerned with persistent poverty, 
and, in particular, the relation between assets and poverty, much of the analysis in this 
thesis relies up a threshold amount, which, as mentioned in Chapter Three, separates 
the poor from the non-poor. Choosing this threshold is not as simple in South Africa 
as would be the case in some countries since, in mid-2007 there was no official 
poverty line although this issue was under investigation by Stats SA and the National 
Treasury. 
South Africa actually has a long history with income measures of poverty, dating back 
to work undertaken on the Poverty Datum Line in the 1940s and the path breaking 
work of Hilstan Watts in Durban in the 1960s (Watts, 1967). Two widely used lines 
dating back to the apartheid era are the Household Subsistence Level (HSL) 
calculated by the Institute for Planning Research (IPR) and the Minimum Living 
Level (MLL) calculated by the Bureau for Market Research (BMR). Both measures 
use a standard if simple approach whereby a hypothetical minimum shopping basket 
is identified which will allow a minimum food energy intake to be satisfied. This is 
then valued in different areas, weighted by the size of the household, thereby allowing 
the calculation of a minimum household income that would permit the purchase of 
this shopping basket. Both measures have a second line, which is taken to include 
more that this minimum basket. While there is a slight difference in the income level 
that is set as the poverty line, in terms of methodology it seems difficult to distinguish 
any critical difference between the HSL and MLL when selecting a poverty line. 
These measures have had a somewhat chequered history, having been inappropriately 
used as a means whereby minimum wages have been set. While this is perhaps not 
problematic in itself, the poverty measures have been racially based, thereby implying 
acceptance of differential incomes favouring whites.55 Moreover, the poverty lines 
have been, and still are, available for purchase, restricting access to this information, 
rather than being a public good which is readily available. Nonetheless, poverty lines 
do provide a useful starting point from which the situation of the poor can be 
described, and as such, it is felt that is important to make use of one of the available 
/ The HSL has moved away from this definition, and their latest publications now define poverty lines 
for 'low income' households and Tow-middle income' households. 
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lines that take into account local diets, cost of living and locally accepted standards. 
Leibbrandt and Woolard (1999) present a useful comparison of alternative measures 
applied to different datasets. 
A choice had to be made for the purposes of this thesis, and as is motivated for in 
Chapter Five, I have decided to use a threshold proposed by Stats S A (2007b) in a 
discussion document as my preferred poverty threshold. A fuller explanation of the 
adjustments that have been made in thresholds previously used is presented in 
Appendix Two (Section 2.3) in order to calculate adult equivalence and take account 
of economies of scale as well as a discussion of the preferred poverty measure, the 
class of poverty measures developed by Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984). 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
The analysis of chronic poverty imposes special data requirements. While useful, 
cross-sectional surveys of the type undertaken by most national statistical agencies do 
not provide the type of information that is required. In South Africa, the university 
based KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS) does offer this opportunity. 
Although limited to one of South Africa's nine provinces, the study has gathered 
information from a region characterised by relatively high levels of poverty, from 
households located in both urban and rural areas, as well as in former Bantustan and 
white controlled districts. Although not representative of the population of KwaZulu-
Natal in 1998 or 2004 (and perhaps not even representative in 1993 given the 
problems of census taking in the apartheid era), attrition rates are within acceptable 
limits, although small, and perhaps poorer households are more likely to have been 
missed in the second wave of the survey. 
The period covered by KIDS, 1993-2004, is a particularly important period in South 
Africa. Besides the political transition from a non-democratic, segregated society, 
this is also a period in which the South African economy re-integrated with the global 
economy at a time when the Washington Consensus style of policies described in 
Chapter Two dominated. Dealing with the challenges of a new political system, an 
economy weakened by decades of protectionist policies, and a balance of payments 
crisis, the new government opted for a home-grown structural adjustment programme. 
Doing so constrained government's capacity to intervene for poverty reduction, and 
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allowed the poverty producing legacy of apartheid policies to continue to shape the 
experience of the poor. The data collected by KIDS opens a window on this period 




POVERTY AND DIFFERENTIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
When the boers arrived they killed the people's livestock in order to 
dispossess them. The boers said that they had bought the farms and now 
owned them and that the farm-workers were not allowed to own livestock. 
The people had fruit trees on their land, but people were sent with 
tractors to destroy the trees. If a farm-worker was too old or unable to 
work they were chased off the farm. Former farm-worker, participant in 
SA-PPA) 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the context, extent, distribution and nature of poverty in South 
Africa and in the study area, KwaZulu-Natal, in the years leading up to and following 
the first democratic election in 1994. A variety of data are used that have been 
gathered since the immediate pre-transition period of 1990-1994. The objective is to 
summarise the historical context within which poverty dynamics have taken place in 
South Africa, and to give an overview of the poverty profile within which the 
KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS) study should be sited. The 
quantitative analysis in this chapter makes use of the October Household Survey 
(OHS) of 1995 and 1998, the Income and Expenditure Survey (IES) of 1995 and 
2000, and the national data from the 1993 Project for Statistics on Living Standards 
and Development (PSLSD). Qualitative information from the 1996 Participatory 
Poverty Assessment (SA-PPA) is also included. 
5.2 POVERTY AMIDST PLENTY: THE APARTHEID LEGACY 
In common with many countries, the inability of many in South Africa to satisfy their 
essential needs while a minority enjoys extreme prosperity stems from diverse 
sources. However, the specificity of the South Africa situation has to be 
acknowledged in which four decades of apartheid legislation built on the earlier 
policies of the Colonial and Union government were directed at the extraction of 
cheap labour and racially based differentiation (Wolpe, 1972; Legassick, 1975; 
Terreblanche, 2002). The result of this institutionalised discrimination can be thought 
of as a process of state-driven underdevelopment that encompassed dispossession and 
exclusion for the majority of South Africans. Wilson and Ramphele (1989:204, 230) 
conclude that such policies of deliberate impoverishment distinguished the experience 
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and dynamics of poverty in South Africa. As such, apartheid, and the legislation and 
institutions through which this ideology was implemented, operated to produce 
poverty and extreme inequality. 
5.2.1 The Assault on the Poor 
Although once a subject of debate,56 it is now accepted (if sometimes forgotten) that 
the fundamental premise of apartheid was the extraction of cheap labour, initially for 
the mining industry, and later for all facets of the development of capitalism in South 
Africa. To achieve this goal, and to contain mounting resistance to the apartheid 
government, a wide range of institutions and legislation were introduced, many of 
which regulated the livelihoods available to the African population. However, the 
concept that separate land areas should be set aside for Africans in South Africa 
predates the founding of a modern economy in South Africa, and evolved from the 
policies followed by early white settler governments who set aside land initially 
known as 'native reserves' and later as Homelands. This was institutionally 
formalised by the Union Government in 1913 with the passing of the Land Act. At 
this time, it was never seriously envisaged that the African population should remain 
limited to the land that had been set aside for their use.57 However, with the victory 
of the National Party in 1948, the segregationist views of this party were translated 
into the policy of apartheid and a wide range of legislation was introduced between 
1949 and 1959 to balkanise South Africa into a number of ethnic based territories or 
Homelands each with some measure of nominal political independence. These 
culminated with the Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 that ushered in the 
Bantustans, one of which administered the 'self-governing' region of KwaZulu. 
Enforcing segregation meant that large numbers of people were forcibly removed 
from 'Black Spots' into the Homelands. This term referred to areas in which African 
households were living but were located in that part of South Africa designated for 
white residence. In some instances, these 'Spots' were found on commercial white 
owned farms, but in most cases, the Black Spots were freehold land for which the 
residents had been issued certificates of occupation by the colonial governments. An 
/ This debate is perhaps best encapsulated by a comparison of Hobart-Houghton (1964) and Wolpe, 
(1972). 
511 As evidenced by the Native Land Commission of 1916, the Economics and Wages Commission of 
1925 and the Native Economic Commission of 1932 (Nattrass, 1988). 
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estimated 475 000 people were removed from Black Spots between 1960 and 1983. 
In addition to forced removals, the introduction of 'Betterment Planning' during the 
1960s and 1970s led to many communities losing their access to land within the 
Homelands. Although Betterment Planning was put forward as a way in which 
previously dispersed residential patterns would be consolidated into residential, arable 
and grazing land, in many areas land was never reallocated after the consolidation 
process, housing stock was lost, and restrictions were placed on livestock ownership 
(Yawitch, 1981). 
The social conditions in the former Homeland areas of South Africa that resulted from 
these policies are widely known and have been documented by numerous researchers 
(cf, Simkins, 1984; Nattrass and May, 1986; Wilson and Ramphele, 1989 and the 
many papers prepared for the 1984 Carnegie Conference on Poverty). By 1993, 
almost 75 percent of those categorised as being poor were to be found in the rural 
areas while over 70 percent of rural African households existed in conditions which 
could be described as inadequate or intolerable in terms of their access to shelter, 
energy, water and sanitation (May et al., 1995). 
In describing the impact of 'apartheid's assault on the poor', Wilson and Ramphele 
(1989:204, 230) identified the broad strategies of deliberate impoverishment that 
distinguished the experience and dynamics of poverty in the apartheid-era South 
Africa during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. These included the impact of apartheid 
policy and legislation that stripped and eroded assets, especially human capital and 
land, distorted economic markets and social institutions through race and gender 
discrimination, and resulted in violence and destabilisation. Furthermore the 
opportunities available to individuals, households and communities were undermined 
through neglect, over-crowding, environmental degradation, the mismatch of 
resources and opportunities, discrimination and social exclusion. Finally, the role 
played by a disabling state also formed part of this experience, which included the 
behaviour and attitudes of government officials, the absence of information 
concerning rights, roles and responsibilities, and the lack of accountability by all 
levels of government (May et al, 1997). 
/ The reports produced at the time by the Surplus People's Project document this history (SPP, 1983). 
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This legacy of inequality and poverty shaped the nature of South Africa's economy 
and society at the time of the transition in 1994. It is not surprising therefore, that 
narrowing inequality, breaking down the barriers that hamper participation in the 
economy and reducing poverty have been a consistent theme of the democratic South 
African governments since this time. The Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) launched as the flagship programme of the first African National 
Congress (ANC) government singles out rural development as a central concern. 
Many policy statements of government departments have stressed the importance of 
reducing poverty, and considerable effort has focused upon the development of a 
range of policies including extending social protection, housing subsidies, a land 
reform programme, public works programmes and access to essential services. 
Broadly, a central thrust of government rhetoric has been to increase the access of the 
poor to those assets that were previously denied them, or, indeed, stripped from them 
in the past. 
5.2.2 Poverty in South Africa: 1990-199459 
As comprehensive information concerning levels of poverty and inequality was not 
collected by the apartheid government, the 1993 PSLDS study provides insight into 
conditions in South Africa immediately prior to the transition to democracy in 1994. 
Calculating a headcount ratio, this study found that almost half of the population, 
some 19 million people, were categorised as poor using a national consumption-based 
poverty line with over 60 percent of Africans being poor compared to just one percent 
of the white population (Klasen, 1997). The World Development Report of 2000 uses 
the same data to show that 11.5 percent of the South African population lived on less 
than PPP$1 per day, while 35.8 percent of the population lived on less than PPP$2 per 
day (World Bank, 2001a:64). At that time poverty rates in South Africa could thus be 
compared to countries such as Bolivia (11.3 percent), Colombia (11.0 percent) or 
Cote dTvoire (12.3 percent) in terms of the PPP$1 per day measure of poverty. 
An alternative approach that can be used to place South Africa's poverty and social 
deprivation in an international context is to compare indicators of social development 
in South Africa with countries with similar income levels. These indicators are useful 
591 Parts of this section are derived from Parts of this section are derived from Agiiero et al, (2007) and 
May and Woolard (2005). I was the lead author in each of these papers for the analysis reported here. 
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both for inter-country and inter-regional comparisons, as well as being a way to chart 
long-term trends. As Table 5.1 shows, immediately after the democratic election in 
1994, many of South Africa's socio-economic indicators compare poorly with those 
of other countries ranked as middle-income in terms of their per capita GDP. 
Table 5.1: Social Indicators from selected middle-income countries (1995) 
Index 
HDI Rank 
Life expectancy (years) 
Adult literacy 
Combined enrolment 
GDP per capita ($) 
HDI Value 
Population (2000) million 
< $2 PPP poverty line 
% pop using improved water 
% 1 yr old immunised 
against measles 
Infant Mortality 























































































Source: UNDP, 2002; World Bank, 2002 
All the countries to the right of South Africa in the table had a similar per capita GDP 
to South Africa, yet generally they performed far better on indicators such as life 
expectancy, infant mortality and adult illiteracy. For example, Algeria had a similar 
HDI rank, but had a per capita GDP that was almost half that of South Africa, while 
Turkey had a per capita GDP that was three quarters that of South Africa, it had a 
similar percentage of the population below the PPP$2 per day poverty line and ranked 
20 countries ahead of South Africa in terms of the HDI score. 
One explanation for these statistics lies in the long-standing levels of income and 
wealth inequality that have persisted in South Africa. As an example, in a creative 
attempt to deal with the problems of inadequate data during the apartheid era, 
McGrath (1984:56) analysed a mix of census and survey data from the mid 1970s to 
yield an estimated Gini coefficient for South Africa of 0.68. McGrath goes on to 
argue that an unequal distribution of wealth was an important determinant of this 
distribution of income. Using data from 1993, South Africa was described by the 
World Bank as among the world's most unequal economies using the PSLSD to 
estimate a Gini coefficient measuring 0.59, higher than all of the countries shown in 
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Table 5.1. 
This level of inequality reflected the racial divisions in South Africa and carries over 
to poverty outcomes as is shown in Table 5.2 for 1990 for selected social indicators 
when differentiated by race. 
Table 5.2: Comparison of Social Indicators by Race (1990) 
Social Indicator 
Male Life expectancy at birth 1990 
Female Life expectancy at birth 1990 
% of deaths 5 years and younger 



























Source: Health Systems Trust (1996). 
In all of the outcome indicators, the white population performed substantially better 
than did the other race groups. Both male and female life expectancy for whites 
exceeded that for Africans by almost a decade. The Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) is an 
especially useful social indicator with which to chart socio-economic progress and 
shows that the IMR for whites was 9 per 1000 in 1990, while that for the African 
population was 51 per 1000, on a par with Zimbabwe and Kenya. 
5.2.3 Poverty in South Africa: 1995-2000 
Despite a proliferation of poverty studies since 1994, South Africa has yet to develop 
either an official money-metric poverty line or some other indicator of deprivation 
and exclusion. A recent analysis of poverty by Stats SA uses a measure that appears 
to be based on a legal minimum income to qualify for certain subsidies such as a 
housing grant (Stats SA, 2000). The result is some uncertainty as to the extent and 
distribution of poverty and the subject of debate even within government. Moreover 
much of the data available are under-utilised while even simple descriptive statistics 
show variation between the different surveys that is more likely due to sampling or 
design error than to actual trends. Part of the explanation for this lies in differing 
interpretations of the most appropriate measure of well-being, as well as in different 
sampling, survey and analytical methodologies. However the quality of field work, 
data capture and subsequent quality control are all cause for concern. 
Notwithstanding these problems, a sense of South Africa's poverty profile during and 
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immediately after the period covered by the 1993-1998 KIDS study can be shown. At 
PPP$11 240 per annum in 2001, South Africa's per capita GDP corrected for 
purchasing power parity (PPP) placed it as one of the 50 wealthiest nations. However 
the strikingly poor social indicators of the country persisted as revealed by the Human 
Development Index. Figure 5.1 shows the HDI for South Africa between 1990 and 
2003, and reveals that these poor human development outcomes have persisted since 
1993 despite South Africa's political transition, and indeed worsened in the recent 
past. 
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Source: UNDP (2004; 2006) 
South Africa ranked 121st of 177 countries in terms of its HDI in 2004, down on its 
ranking of 93rd in 1992. Despite being among the 35 largest economies in the world, 
the country now has life expectancies among those of the 30 worst economies while 
projections of mortality suggest that these will deteriorate further as deaths from the 
AIDS epidemic increase (UNDP, 2004; Dorrington et al., 2001:25). As the UNDP 
(2004:28) notes, the number of people infected with HIV/AIDS reached 5.6 million in 
2001 and this figure continues to rise. As a result of this, and in the absence of an 
effective treatment campaign, South Africa is one of a handful of countries that has 
experienced a decline in the HDI since 1995. The HDI also continues to reveal 
significant spatial and racial differences within South Africa with the gap between the 
index of the poorest and richest provinces having widened (UNDP, 2004). 
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The Human Poverty Index (HPI) also showed a significant increase from 1995 to 
2001 for South Africa. The HPI in 1995 was 16.4 which had increased to 22.3 by 
2001, showing a worsening of human poverty (UNDP, 2004). 
Most attempts to measure poverty based on a minimum acceptable level of 
consumption have tended to confirm that the incidence of poverty has worsened since 
1994. As a starting point, Woolard and Leibbrandt (1999) adopt a range of thresholds 
to provide a rigorous analysis of poverty in South Africa in the period until 1995.60 
Using data from the 1995 IES, they conclude that some 40-50 percent of South 
Africans could still be categorised as poor in 1995, while 25 percent could be 
categorised as ultra-poor. They also found that the poverty rate was far higher in rural 
areas than in urban (65 percent of individuals compared to 22 percent) and 27 percent 
of rural dwellers were below half the poverty line, and thus were likely to also be 
chronically poor in the sense of being unable to escape poverty over time (Woolard 
and Leibbrandt, 1999:59-60). In line with other studies, the Eastern Cape emerged as 
the poorest province in South Africa, containing 27 percent of those likely to be 
chronically poor while KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo Province accounted for 19 and 
17 percent of the ultra-poor (living on below half of the poverty line) respectively. 
Also in 1995, the poverty gap, the measure of the depth of poverty, which can be used 
to show the amount needed annually to eliminate poverty through a perfectly targeted 
transfer to the poor, was about R15 billion per annum, or about 4 percent of GDP. In 
the case of the two poorest provinces, Eastern Cape and Limpopo Province, the 
poverty gap amounted to 11 percent and 21 percent of the provincial Gross 
Geographic Product (GGP) respectively (May et al, 2000). 
In collaboration with the World Bank, Stats SA has completed an ambitious exercise 
to link the results of the 1996 Population Census with income and expenditure data 
collected in 1995. In this first attempt by a government agency to map poverty, a 
poverty line of R800 per month per household has been used, while a Household 
Infrastructure Index constituted from eight variables has been calculated. The 
components of the index show access to facilities and services such as access to 
electricity, water, telephones, refuse removal, type of dwelling unit and monthly 
60/ For most of their analysis Woolard and Leibbrandt (1999:56) settle on the Household Subsistence 
Level and $1 a day 'International' line (R3509.00 and R2200 per annum per adult equivalence in 1995 
Rand). The latter may be thought of as the ultra-poverty line. 
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expenditure. A second index, the Household Circumstances Index is also calculated, 
constituted from three variables, unemployment, average household size and children 
under five years of age. This information is shown by province in Table 5.3. 













































































Source: Stats SA (2000:26, 76), based on 1995 IES and 1996 Population Census 
According to these data, KwaZulu-Natal was no longer among the poorest provinces 
in 1996, and had moved to the fourth wealthiest, at least in terms of the headcount 
ratio. To some extent, this change is due to the different methodologies used by Stats 
SA in this calculation in which income in kind is under-estimated. Specifically, this 
means that incomes in the Free State are likely to be understated as many of the large 
number of farm-workers in this province receive payment in food, shelter and 
services. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that after the Free State and the Limpopo 
Province, KwaZulu-Natal scores the lowest on a Household Infrastructure Index 
based on access to essential services and second lowest on the Household 
Circumstances Index, although mean expenditure in this province is 92 percent of the 
national average. 
Analysis using the 1996 Population Census data also suggests that inequality persisted 
throughout the first part of the 1990s and estimates the Gini coefficient for income to 
be as high as 0.68: worse than that of Brazil and of 33 other developing countries 
(Marais, 1998: 106). Expanding on this, Woolard and Leibbrandt (1999:22) show that 
six percent of South Africa's population accounted for over 40 percent of income in 
1995. 
Changes in the incidence and severity of poverty and inequality between 1995 and 
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2000 are less clear and have been the source of debate. Drawing on several of the 
large sample surveys collected by Stats SA between 1994 and 1998, Budlender (1999: 
93) was probably the first to suggest that both poverty and inequality had increased, a 
finding supported by an official publication using the results of the 2000 IES (Stats 
SA, 2002). Certainly much attention was given in the media to the observation that 
the average annual per capita income in 1995 was reported to be R12 135 adjusted to 
2000 prices, at first glance higher than the per capita income of Rl 1 755 per annum 
reported in 2000: a difference that is in fact not statistically different. 
Several attempts have been made to explore the changes in income or expenditure 
distribution depicted by the IES of 1995 and 2000. For example, May and Hunter 
(2005) use the expenditure data from the 2000 IES to show the continued high levels 
of inequality in South Africa. They report that the top decile in the distribution 
account for 49 percent of total expenditure compared to eight percent for the bottom 
four deciles, and conclude that there had been little change in inequality since 1993. 
This finding supports that of Fedderke et al., (2003: 16) when using expenditure data, 
although inequality is found to have increased when income data are used. Moreover, 
employing the standard Gini coefficient and Theil entropy measure, and unusually, 
Parato's a measure, they do find some evidence of increasing inequality among 
African households. This, they argue, hides a decrease in inequality among the bottom 
third of the income distribution and an increase in inequality among the middle third 
of the income distribution (Fedderke et al, 2003:19). Interestingly, the analysis of 
Parato's a measure led Fedderke et al., (2003: 22) to suggest that there may have 
been a redistribution of income from the higher income groups to those below, and to 
hint that South Africa's redistributive policies might have had some success in 
transferring income from the wealthiest portion of the population to the less well-off. 
Arguably in the boldest attempt to make use of the unadjusted IES data for the 
analysis of income distribution, van der Berg and Burger (2002:10-11) try to take 
account of shifts in social spending in terms of their impact on the distribution of 
income adjusted for non-cash transfers. Noting that per capita incomes of wealthier 
Africans had almost caught up with the white population, they calculate a Gini 
coefficient for South Africa of 0.66 for 2000, similar to most other studies including 
that of Fedderke et al, (2003). Turning their attention to the impact of social 
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spending, they show that social spending to the African population has increased from 
51 percent in the immediate transition period to 80 percent in 1997. When income is 
calculated to take account of South Africa's relatively progressive taxes and for the 
strongly progressive non-cash transfers that are made, they argue that the Gini 
coefficient can be re-estimated to 0.44. In particular, they conclude that fairly good 
targeting of old age pensions and disability grants have resulted in rural areas 
receiving an unusually fair share of social spending compared to the situation in many 
developing countries. However, they do not attempt to measure the impact that this 
social spending might have had on the well-being of the poor, noting that the quality 
of the service delivered substantially determines this. As an example, while 
inequalities in terms of inputs to education have narrowed, the outcomes in terms of 
education attainment have not (van der Berg and Burger, 2002:18). 
However many analysts have raised serious concerns with the quality of the data 
collected by the IES of 2000, pointing to methodological and weighting problems and 
evidence of sloppy fieldwork and data processing (Meth and Dias, 2004:61; Simkins, 
2004; van der Berg and Louw. 2003). This has complicated the preparation of a 
poverty profile for the 1995 to 2000 period since a variety of data cleaning and 
poverty measurement techniques have been adopted in attempts to resolve these 
problems. In additional, estimates have been produced that are based on incomes or 
expenditures, calculated for households, per capita and adult equivalents. 
In an initial and modest endeavour to manage data quality problems by removing 
outliers, van de Ruit and May use a PPP adjusted $ 1 a day poverty threshold and 
conclude that the poverty headcount had increased from 11.5 percent of households in 
the PSLDS of 1993 to 19.8 percent in 2000, about 8.9 million people (van der Ruit 
and May, 2003:23).61 Using the IES data but adopting a different methodology and 
poverty threshold, van der Berg and Louw (2003:18) calculate a headcount ratio of 
37.9 percent implying that the numbers in poverty reached 17 million people in 2000, 
an increase of 1.2 million people from 1995. 
Meth and Dias (2004) employ a mix of procedures to adjust for data problems and a 
mix of IES and OHS/GHS surveys to concur that the numbers of people who can be 
6V All of these analyses calculate poverty and inequality in terms of 'per capita' or 'per adult 
equivalent' scales, and include an adjustment to take account of household economies of scale. 
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categorised as poor had risen between 1995 and 2000. They find that the numbers of 
people in the lower of two expenditure groups identified as encompassing the 
potentially poor increased by about 2.9 million people between 1995 and 2000 while 
the numbers in the higher band increased by 1.4 million people (Meth and Dias, 
2004:63). Thus they calculate a headcount of 49.1 percent and estimate that there 
were 22 million people in poverty in 2002, an increase of at least 2.4 million from the 
1999 GHS when the same methodology is applied. Attempting to take account of 
transfers to the poor from government in the form of water, electricity, health care, 
housing, sanitation, education and transport, they amend this estimate to an increase 
of 2 million people (Meth and Dias, 2004:81).62 
May and Woolard (2005) use a version of the 2000 IES that was cleaned by Global 
Insight and subsequently by Woolard and then re-weighted by Simkins (as described 
in Simkins, 2004). They also make use of a poverty threshold proposed for South 
Africa known as the Household Subsistence Level (HSL) first developed in the 1980s 
which has the advantage that it was estimated separately for urban and rural areas. 
Their results are shown in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4: Poverty measures derived from IES (1995 & 2000) 
Headcount index (P°) 
Income Gap measure (P1) 









Source: May and Woolard (2005) calculations on IES 1995 and IES 2000 
Reporting the headcount, Poverty Gap, and the Sen Poverty Index for expenditure, 
May and Woolard (2005: 7) show an increase in the headcount from 32 percent of the 
households in 1995 to 49 percent in 2000, an increase in the Poverty Gap from 0.12 to 
0.22. The Sen Index is useful for revealing trends of convergence or divergence for 
those below the poverty line and shows increase from 0.24 to 0.39. In contrast to 
Fedderke et ah, (2003), this suggests an increase in inequality within the poor given 
that the Sen Index advances towards the Poverty Gap measure over time. 
/ Referred to as a social wage. 
63/ The Sen Poverty Index is the average of the headcount and the income-gap measures weighted by 
the Gini coefficient of the poor (Sen, 1992). If there were no income inequality among the poor, the 
Gini coefficient would be zero and the Sen Index would reduce to the income-gap measure. 
Conversely, if only one household among the poor had all the income, the Gini coefficient would be 
equal to one and the Sen Index would reduce to the headcount. 
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In what is probably the most thorough attempt to use the IES data to produce a 
poverty profile for South Africa, Hoogeveen and Ozler (2004:7) use methodologies to 
derive a cost-of-basic-needs poverty line in addition to the commonly used PPP$2 per 
day threshold.64 Using the latter and the expenditure data, they report a increase in the 
headcount ratio from 32 percent of South Africa's population in 1995 to 34 percent in 
2000, implying that 22.9m South Africans were living on less than PPP$2 per day in 
1995 rising to 25.2m in 2000, an increase of 2.3 million. They also show an increase 
in both the Poverty Gap index and the severity measure of poverty (0.11 to 0.13, and 
0.05 to 0.07 respectively (Hoogeveen and Ozler, 2004:32). However once again data 
problems dog this analysis, and as Fedderke et al, (2003:12) observe, these findings 
might be sensitive to the choice of data that are used and the methodologies that are 
adopted for data cleaning and measurement. 
Finally, and more directly related to the approach adopted by this thesis, Aliber 
(2001:33-40) uses official statistics and the KIDS panel data to distinguish a number 
of groups who can be described as being chronically poor and attempts to estimate the 
size of each. Based on Roberts' (2001) analysis of the KIDS, Aliber estimates that 
approximately 950 000 rural African households are chronically poor and estimates 
that another 50 000 rural coloured families are also in this category. Just under 770 
000 African female-headed households are estimated to live in chronic poverty and 
around 250 000 female-headed households of other races are thought to be in chronic 
poverty in addition to those that are among the rural poor. A further 38 000 disabled-
headed households are chronically poor. Aliber (2001:40) concludes that, in 2000, at 
least 18 to 24 percent of all households in South Africa were chronically poor or 
highly susceptible to chronic poverty, a total of some 2 million households or 10 
million people. By 2010, he suggests that AIDS may contribute to the chronic 
impoverishment of between 26 and 33 percent additional households, bringing the 
total share of chronically poor households to between 24 and 30 percent. 
Aliber's analysis begins to open up a discussion on different forms of poverty in 
general and chronic poverty in particular, but does not go into detail concerning 
poverty dynamics and the reasons for this persistent or chronic poverty. For this, the 
perceptions of the poor themselves may be a good way in which an appropriate 
64/ There are numerous versions of this paper which was first written around 1993. This appears to be 
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conceptualisation of chronic poverty in South Africa can be derived. 
5.2.4 Poverty in South Africa: 2000-2004 
Data for the period between 2000 and 2004 are limited, but some initial findings 
suggest that the poverty rate may be on the decline. Van der Berg et al., (2005) use 
data derived from the All Media and Products Survey (AMPS), a market research 
survey, to show a substantial decline in rate, depth and severity of money-metric 
poverty during the period 1995 to 2004. These same data also show consistently 
higher levels of inequality. Meth (2006) uses data from Stats SA's GHS and LFS to 
critique the results of the marketing survey. However, he concludes that it is likely 
that there has been a decline in the headcount poverty index, albeit one that is far 
more modest than that suggested by the marketing data. 
Reacting to results such as those just discussed the South African government has 
correctly argued that poverty is multi-dimensional, and that access to services has the 
effect both of improving the well-being of poor households, and also of reducing their 
exclusion or vulnerability to adverse relations of inclusion. Examining the trends in 
this, May and Woolard (2005) provide four indicators of service delivery for the years 
1995 and 2003 and compare changes in access by income group. The indicators that 
they use are the percentage of households with access to piped water (either inside 
their dwelling or on the stand), the percentage of households living in permanent 
structures, the percentage of households with electricity (from mains) and the 
percentage of children aged 7-17 enrolled in school. In the case of access to quality 
housing, all of the lower income groups have experienced marked improvements, 
with each expenditure group (except the very highest) experiencing an improvement 
of between 11 and 14 percentage points. In the case of access to electricity, the 
improvements have been enormous and the three lower expenditure groups have all 
benefited in a very similar pattern. Improvements in access to piped water have been 
somewhat less well targeted towards the very poor. Whereas access to piped water 
increased from 28 percent to 79 percent (an increase of 51 percentage points) for the 
expenditure group R800 to R2499, the increase was only 40 percentage points for the 
lowest income group R0-R399. Finally, in the case of school enrolments, the 
increases have been highest among the poorest groups. From perspective then of basic 
the most recent version. 
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service delivery, the gap between the poor and non-poor has narrowed in the post-
apartheid era although it must be cautioned that these data do not comment on the 
quality of the service, or on whether the supply of the service has been disconnected. 
A similar result concerning improved access to services is reported by Bhorat et al., 
(2004). 
From the perspective then of basic service delivery, the gap between the poor and 
non-poor has narrowed in the period up to 2004 although it must be cautioned that 
these data do not comment on the quality of the service, nor on whether the supply of 
the service has been disconnected. 
5.2.5 Perceptions of Poverty: 1996 
In comparison to the confusion that arises from use of official statistics and 
quantitative measurement, a surprisingly consistent view of poverty emerged from the 
South African Participatory Poverty Assessment (SA-PPA) conducted during 1995/6. 
Poverty was perceived by the approximately 1400 participants to encompass a 
number of key dimensions with income comprising only one dimension. Thus poverty 
was manifested by too little food, large numbers of children, inadequate and crowded 
shelter, and finally, exclusion from community self-help structures. In contrast, 
wealth is manifested by good housing and the ownership of appliances and the use of 
more efficient forms of energy. This is consistent with Sen's (1981) point that income 
is an input to well-being whereas commodities and capabilities are the critical outputs 
that people care about. 
Poverty was also seen to include alienation from the community whereby the poor are 
described as being isolated from the institutions of kinship and community. The 
elderly who were without care from younger family members are seen as poor, even if 
they have a state pension which provides an income that is relatively high by local 
standards. Similarly, young single mothers without the support of older kin or the 
fathers of their children were perceived to be poor. A major fear associated with 
HIV/AIDS is the fear of social isolation that would result for a household and 
individual if the knowledge of infection became public: "A person with AIDS suffers 
a lot because there will be no communication whatsoever because people will get 
afraid of him and he end up without friends" (May et al., 1996:114). This causes 
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many to hide the fact of infection thereby hampering efforts to bring the issue into the 
open and so to further public education. 
Participants also saw the inability to provide sufficient or good quality food for the 
family as an outcome of poverty. Households where children went hungry or were 
malnourished were seen as living in poverty. The poor were also perceived to live in 
overcrowded conditions and in homes in need of maintenance. Having too many 
children was seen as a cause of poverty, not only by parents, but by grandparents and 
other family members who had to assume responsibility for the care of children. The 
poor were described as lacking access to safe and efficient sources of energy. In rural 
communities, the poor, particularly women, walk long distances to gather firewood. 
In addition, women reported that wood collection increases their vulnerability to 
physical attack and sexual assault. Significantly, the poor perceived lack of 
employment opportunities, low wages and lack of job security as major contributing 
factors to their poverty. Finally many poor households were characterised by absent 
fathers or children living apart from their parents. As a result, households were split 
over a number of sites as a survival strategy (May, et ah, 1996:122) 
There were also strong generational and gender dimensions to the experience of 
poverty but in both cases these are frequently tied to other specific situations. For old 
people, for example, being the primary source of support (through the pension) for 
grandchildren when the parents are absent is a specific misfortune. Old people 
without pensions are also uniformly seen as poor. For women a state of single 
motherhood without access to support from older kin or husbands/fathers of their 
children is generally seen as denoting a state of poverty. Conflict between genders 
and across generations is a consequence of this. Finally, male misuse of resources is 
often blamed for a household's poverty which generally refers to alcohol and drug 
abuse, as well as wasting money on tobacco. 
5.2.6 Political and Macro-Economic Context 1994-2004 
The 1994 to 2004 period covered by the data used in this thesis overlaps the 
presidencies of Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki and a brief contextualisation is 
necessary before leaving this discussion. During this eventful period, the South 
African government's orientation toward addressing the problems of poverty and 
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inequality underwent some marked shifts, in language and emphases, if not in 
substance. The 1996 closure of the Office of the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RPD) signalled to some at least symbolic reduction in the priority given 
to improving the access of the majority of South Africans to adequate shelter, 
sanitation and education. While programmes to provide such social services continue 
to reside within relevant ministries, in this period the dominant acronym in South 
African public policy debate shifted from the RDP to the GEAR (Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution), the label attached to the government's 
macroeconomic stabilisation and structural adjustment framework. 
The macroeconomic environment obviously conditions the economic possibilities for 
individual households. During the 1960s the South African economy grew at some 
six percent per annum, while total employment grew by nearly three percent per 
annum, in line with population growth. However, by the late 1980s the real economy 
was shrinking, as was formal sector employment. This trend was briefly reversed 
after the country's first democratic elections, with sustained growth throughout 1995. 
But by the middle of 1998, economic growth fell to less than 0.5 percent per annum as 
is shown in Figure 5.2 and to -1.6 in per capita terms. 
Figure 5.2: Percentage Change in GDP and GDP per capita (1994-2004) 
Source: Stats SA (2007a) and own calculations. 
However, the subsequent period of KIDS sees a more favourable trend, with positive, 
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if at times weak per capita growth peaking to 4.5 percent in 2004 due to both the rate 
of expansion of the economy and slowing population growth. As a result, throughout 
much of the period between the first two waves of the KIDS survey, aggregate growth 
was scant, limiting the income earning opportunities for the majority of South 
Africa's population. In the second period, prospects for income earning activities may 
have improved at the same time as government expenditure on social welfare 
increased. 
According to the various Labour Force Surveys (LFS), formal employment declined 
by some 12 percent, or some 642,000 jobs, between 1993 and mid 1998 (CSS, 1994; 
Stats SA, 1998b; Stats SA, 2000). Job losses were highest in those sectors that 
largely employ unskilled labour, with the manufacturing sector suffering a 6 percent 
loss in jobs between 1993 to 1998, compared to 21 percent in construction and 27 
percent in mining (Stats SA, 1999, Stats SA, 2001 and CSS, 1994).65 This has been 
followed by a period of job creation, with the number of formally employed 
increasing by almost 2.5 million between 1998 and 2004, half of which took place in 
the formal non-agricultural sector (May and Meth, 2007; Stats SA, 2005). 
Turning to unemployment, Stats SA uses a narrow and an expanded definition of 
unemployment, both of which are internationally recognised. The narrow 'official' 
definition considers people within the economically active population as being 
unemployed if a) they did not work during the seven days prior to the interview; b) 
want to work and are available to start work within a week of the interview; and c) 
have taken active steps to look for work or to start some form of self-employment in 
the four weeks prior to the interview. 
The expanded definition of unemployment excludes criterion c) which means that it 
includes 'discouraged' work-seekers who are eager to work but who have so little 
expectation of finding work, or who lack the resources to move to the areas where 
jobs might be found, that they have not actively sought work in the past four weeks. 
/ Klasen and Woolard, (1999:27) have shown serious deficiencies with South African official 
statistics on employment trends, and draw attention to periods of job creation during the study period. 
Meth (2003) raises similar concerns about more recent statistics from the various LFSs. 
661 This restriction was not included in the OHS 1995 (Stats SAb, 2002:8) and thus creates difficulties 
in comparability with subsequent surveys. 
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Figure 5.3 provides both these unemployment rates during this period. 67 
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Source: OHS for 1994-1999, LFS for 2000-2004, all available at http://statssa.gov.za. 
Whichever definition is preferred, the picture that emerges is discouraging for most of 
the survey period. According to the narrow definition, 20.0 percent of the 
economically active population were unemployed in 1994 climbing to 25.2 percent in 
1998 before peaking at 30.4 percent in 2002. The expanded definition the figure 
shows unemployment rising from 31.5 percent to 41.5 percent. 
The South African government's response to the earlier period of poor economic 
performance has been constrained both by international economic trends as well as by 
inherited fiscal realities. The apartheid government left a total public debt of Rl 89.9 
billion of which foreign debt amounted to some R5.2 billion (SARB, 1996). Between 
1993 and 1998, some 6.7 percent of GDP, and 24 percent of the budget, was annually 
absorbed by interest on this debt. Further, in line with the conservative 
macroeconomic stance taken by the GEAR, government contained growth in public 
expenditure and reduced its public-sector borrowing requirement from 9.3 percent of 
GDP in 1993/4 to 3.4 percent in 1998/9 and just 1.5 percent in 2003/4. Despite this 
fiscally conservative stance, there was an increase in the share of total expenditure 
going to social services during both Mandela and Mbeki's presidencies. With a 
/ The unemployment rate is the number of unemployed divided by the economically active population 
multiplied by 100. 
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decrease in the budget share allocated to military expenditures, the social services 
share rose from 54 percent in 1994 to 59.9 percent of non-interest spending in 
1997/98 and 59.2 percent by 2003/4 (Ajam and Aron, 2007:773). Of this allocation, 
education has received the largest share followed by health, social security and 
housing (Hunter et al., 2003; Ajam and Aron, 2007). Of particular importance was the 
increase in social grants payments, with an increase in the number of beneficiaries 
from 2.9 million in 1994 to over 7.4 million people in 2004 (Manuel, 2004). 
Especially noteworthy was the introduction of a Child Support Grant (CSG) in 1998. 
In 2004, at the end of the period under investigation, the government unveiled the 
Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative - South Africa (AsgiSA) (Office of the 
President, 2004). The goals of AsgiSA are to halve poverty from about one third of 
households in 2004 to less than one-sixth of households by 2014; to halve 
unemployment from about 30 percent in 2004 to lower than 15 percent by 2014; and 
to stimulate the economy to expand at an average that is over 4.5 percent per annum 
until 2009 and then over six percent after 2010. To achieve this, the government has 
identified a number of interventions including infrastructure programmes, sector 
investment strategies, improvements in the provision of education and skills, support 
for the 'second economy' and interventions to support small, medium and micro-
enterprises (SMMEs). AsgiSA also maintains a focus on macro-economic stability 
and on institutional development in public administration issues and delivery. 
5.3 DIFFERENTIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Within this context of state sponsored poverty production, it is surprising that 
relatively few studies have attempted to empirically disaggregate South Africa's 
African population into identifiable groups based on livelihood strategies. An earlier 
attempt is that of Innes and O'Meara (1976) who identified five groups from survey 
data in the former Transkei bantustan based on their own estimations rather than any 
fro 
comprehensive data set. These groups comprised: 
• Non-farming households which made up 8.4 percent of all households in the 
Transkei; 
'/ The source of their data is not evident in the paper. 
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• Households who were able to feed their household in a good year which were a 
group of 23 percent of all households; 
• Households who could never produce enough to feed themselves comprising 60 
percent of all households; 
• Households who are able to sell a surplus which made up 8.4 percent of 
households; and finally, 
• A small group of 0.1 percent of households who were producing exclusively for 
the market. 
Bembridge (1990) attempted a similar breakdown also using household survey data 
from the former Transkei.69 He proposed four categories of rural households: 
• Resource poor households: Comprising about 31 percent of rural households in 
the rural areas of the former Transkei who have no arable land or grazing rights; 
• Smallholders: Comprising about 56 percent of rural households in the former 
Transkei who operate at and below subsistence levels, and who do not usually sell 
produce; 
• Progressive small-scale farmers: Comprising about 13 percent who adopt some 
technology and who sell produce and/or livestock some of the time, and, 
• Market-orientated commercial farmers: Comprising about 0.2 percent who make a 
living from farming. 
Building on an earlier rural typology undertaken in the Transkei and later in the 
KwaZulu Homeland, (May, 1987b; May and Rankin, 1991), May et ah, (1995) 
identify four broad social classes based upon an empirical classification.70 Noting 
that the groups identified were not intended to be mutually exclusive, and, indeed, that 
it is quite feasible that households may pass through different groups over a life-cycle, 
they drew out the following strata within these groups: 
69/ The sample size was 505 and collected in 1980 from selected sites in Transkei. The data were not 
collected in a drought year. 
101 The sample size was 3055 and collected as a regional Income and Expenditure Survey in 1992 from 
all 26 magisterial districts in KwaZulu-Natal. The data were collected during a drought year. 
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Rural Dwellers : This group comprised households who use land solely for 
residential purposes, that is they do not cultivate any land and do not have large 
livestock (cattle, horses, donkeys) or small livestock (goats, pigs, sheep). Two sub-
groups were identified: 
• Marginalised households: Likely to be households in direst poverty; ageing 
households; female headed households; households without a breadwinner; 
households where the major barrier to agricultural production is absolute poverty. 
This group was estimated to make up 15 percent of the rural population; 
• Urbanising households: Likely to be households with both husband and wife who 
are migrants; households in denser settlements which are near to major urban 
areas; households where the major barrier to agricultural production is lack of 
interest in agriculture as an economic tactic. This group was estimated to make up 
20 percent of the rural population. 
Rural Producers: Households who rely upon the land to provide a minor part of their 
subsistence needs make up these strata. These are households who are engaging in 
agricultural and/or pastoral tactics which supplement other economic activities. Three 
sub-groups were defined: 
• Peasantariat: Likely to be households where the 'breadwinner' is a migrant or 
commuter but maintain some form of agricultural activity; households who are 
engaged in a variety of tactics, in other words, not specialising in any one 
economic activity other than wage labour; households in which the major barrier 
to agricultural production is available labour time. This group was estimated to 
make up 45 percent of the rural population; 
• Micro-entrepreneurs: Likely to be households involved in hawking, trading and 
production tactics, which are able to source capital from wage-earning members; 
households with working adult sons, which have succeeded to some extent in 
penetrating market-based activities. Agriculture will be one of a mix of activities 
undertaken by these households who are estimated to make up 10 percent of the 
rural population; 
• Emerging farmers: Likely to be households with small herds of stock, both large 
140 
and small and/or are cultivating small plots of land; households showing some 
signs of specialising in a form of agricultural activity; households in which the 
head of the household has not/no longer migrates although remittances may be 
received from a relative; households where the major barrier to agricultural 
production is the lack of sufficient agricultural resources. This group is estimated 
to make up seven percent of the rural population. 
Farmers: Finally, there are households who use land as an important means of 
generating an income, that is, land usage complements other economic activities and 
could be a viable alternative. Two groups were identified: 
• Subsistence farmers: Likely to be households who have smaller plots of land but 
are farming efficiently and therefore able to produce for their own consumption; 
smaller households; households who are ageing but have land or livestock; 
households where the major barrier to agricultural production is the lack of more 
specialised resources and labour power. This group is estimated to make up one 
percent of the rural population; 
• Commercial farmers: Likely to be households with larger plots of land and/or 
larger herd sizes; households where the "breadwinner" is a full time farmer; 
households who are marketing their products; households where the major barrier 
to agricultural production is the lack of capital, specialised knowledge and 
markets. This group is estimated to make up two percent of the rural population. 
All of the studies above have their limitations. Besides being dated and 
geographically specific, the Innes and O Meara study is focused on an explanation of 
elites during the era of 'grand apartheid' and offers little explanatory value for a more 
generalised discussion of social class. While there are apparent similarities between 
the typologies of May and Bembridge, there is a profound difference in their 
approaches. Whereas May et al, (1995) refer to 'rural dwellers' implying not only the 
lack of resources, but also the functional dislocation of this group, Bembridge (1990) 
emphases that this group are 'resource poor' households. Again, while the group 
described by the former as the 'peasantariat', and the latter as 'smallholders', are 
almost identical in size, the intention of May's group is to draw attention to the nature 
of the group as the so-called 'awkward class' referred to by Bernstein (1979). For this 
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reason, Bembridge's typology can be seen as somewhat more benign than that of 
May's, insofar as it seeks no analytical explanation of its composition. 
Nonetheless, in addition to the dramatically changes in political and economic 
context, May's study has a number of important problems. The study is based on 
regionally specific income and expenditure data which was never intended for an 
entitlements based analysis and covers only the rural population. In consequence, 
many important issues cannot be explored, and in view of the specificities of the rural 
KwaZulu-Natal situation, the results of the study cannot be safely generalised. 
Moreover, the study fails to draw out the link between the tactics that are chosen for 
the typology, and endowments that are available to the household. As a result, it is 
difficult to discern if the social classes drawn out by May are indeed based on 
behaviours necessitated by the endowments available to the household, or are 
demographically determined in the classic Chayanovian sense. In addition, this 
approach stops short of linking the typology to an analysis of livelihood security, 
making policy recommendations difficult. 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
The data discussed in this chapter show the peculiar poverty profile of South Africa in 
the post-apartheid period, and of KwaZulu-Natal, the province in which the case study 
has been undertaken. Although some social indicators suggest improvement, 
especially since 2000, South Africa still lags behind countries of similar economic 
strength, and has experienced a decline in its HDI in recent years due to falling life 
expectancies, a result of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Triangulating information from the 
SA-PPA with the PSLSD data reveals a striking similarity between the subjective 
responses of the poor and results of objective measurement exercises using indicators 
such as income and caloric intake. Poor households suffer deprivation not only in 
terms of income, but also in terms of implications of their situation. As a result, a 
significant proportion of their budgets must be allocated towards the purchase of 
essential services, they experience overcrowding, economic dependency and low 
educational attainment. What is revealing about perceptions of the poor is that poverty 
is expressed in terms of the shared characteristics of different groups in communities, 
principally the way in which these groups go about generating their livelihoods and 
the constraints that they face in doing so. Taken together, the data confirm that the 
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post-transition government faced an enormous challenge in reducing poverty, and that 
high and probably increasing levels of poverty persisted for much of the period 
covered by the KIDS study. 
Irrespective of the dominant policy orientation, or shifts therein, a decade is relatively 
little time to resolve social problems of the magnitude measured by the 1993 PSLSD 
survey. Moreover, as Leibbrandt et at, (2001:1) argue, the data on social indicators 
and poverty in South Africa suggest an economy that remained ".. .highly inefficient 
in terms of converting economic resources into equitable social welfare outcomes" 
between 1993 and 1998, the period of the KIDS survey, whereby the country's 
relatively high GDP per capita did not result in reduced numbers of people in poverty 
or improved social indicators. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
ASSET-BASED POVERTY DYNAMICS IN KWAZULU-NATAL 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The discussion presented in Chapter Five provided a brief description of the extent 
and distribution of poverty and inequality in South Africa between 1990 and 2004, as 
well as qualitative information concerning the perceptions and experience of the poor 
collected in 1996/7. Earlier in Chapter Three, care was taken to define poverty as 
being more than having an income that is below some specified threshold amount. 
Although the description of poverty did attempt to broaden the scope of the poverty 
profile, this mode of analysis remains essentially static in nature. Importantly, it 
continues to look upon poverty as a deficiency, usually of income, that could be 
resolved by appropriately targeted transfers. This is in contrast to a poverty that is the 
outcome of social and economic structures: a poverty that is 'persistent' or in the 
language of some analysts; 'produced' and even 'perpetrated' (0yen, 2002). As such, 
poverty risks, however widely defined, reveal little of those factors which will lead to 
the production, reproduction and persistence of poverty. 
While the comparatively new literature on poverty transitions offers some solutions to 
this shortcoming through its focus on chronic versus transitory poverty, the analysis in 
this chapter argues that such analysis still does not identify those who are structurally 
mobile from those who may be caught in a poverty trap. The chapter returns to the 
'systems perspective' of poverty analysis discussed in Chapter Three (Section 4.1). 
As described in Chapter Three (Section 6), by merging elements of Sen's entitlement 
approach with the economic theory of the household in imperfect market 
environments (however these are produced), non-parametric estimates of the mapping 
between household endowments and poverty can be presented which reveal two new 
dimensions of the poverty problem. The first of these is the existence of an asset 
poverty line. This refers to those bundles of measurable endowments (or portions of 
the endowment space) that map into entitlements, which, for this thesis, are measured 
as levels of living below a consumption poverty line. The second dimension refers to 
patterns of constraints (reflected in the topography of an entitlement map) that limit 
the ability of those who are poor to accumulate and effectively utilise the assets and 
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endowments that they do have. In this way their situation becomes self-perpetuating, 
resulting in structurally persistent poverty. 
A sharper understanding of poverty along these dimensions promises to inform 
poverty reduction strategies focused on asset redistribution and accumulation. 
Related strategies would include those that seek to weaken constraints limiting the 
effectiveness with which the poor are able to use the assets and endowments they do 
possess, in other words, strategies that facilitate the entrepreneurship of the poor. 
Having developed and refined a new contribution to the analysis of persistent poverty, 
the chapter ends by providing an alternative typology based on a dynamic 
conceptualisation of structural poverty and examines some of the reasons why 
households may have experienced a change in their well-being. This will be used in 
Chapter Seven to explore the livelihood characteristics of those who fall into the 
different categories of this alternative approach to poverty dynamics. 
6.2 POVERTY IN KWAZULU-NATAL : EVIDENCE FROM KIDS 1993-
200471 
I will start by examining the extent, depth and severity of poverty of the households 
surveyed by KIDS using standard static money-metric measures and access to 
services. Although representative of the African and Indian populations of this 
province in 1993, it must be remembered that panel data are generally no longer 
representative of the population in subsequent waves of data collection. KIDS is no 
exception to this as is illustrated by Appendix One (Sections 1.1 and 1.2) that 
provides a comparison of basic demographic indicators using the middle wave of 
KIDS and the OHS of 1998. The aging profile of core households in the KIDS cohort 
is evident, along with larger household sizes reported in KIDS. The KIDS cohort is 
also less well educated and less likely to be employed. 
6.2.1 Incidence, Depth and Severity of Poverty in KIDS 
At the outset, it should be noted that the results in this section will differ from 
previously published work due to a number of refinements made to the data and the 
/ Parts of this section are derived from Aguero et a., I (2007), May et a., I (2007) and May and 
Woolard (2007). I was the lead author in each of these papers for the analysis reported here. 
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collection of the third wave of data. In particular, to allow comparison with the 
poverty profile provided in Chapter Five, I have chosen to make use of a poverty 
threshold developed by Stats SA rather than the poverty line based on the Household 
Subsistence Level (HSL) developed by the University of Port Elizabeth (IPR, 1993).72 
In calculating the revised measures, a household has been deemed poor if its monthly 
per-capita expenditure or income (inflated or deflated to 2000 prices) and 
represented as c_ in the subsequent discussion, fell below the poverty line (z) of R322 
per month per person suggested for South Africa by Hoogeveen and Ozler (2004).74 
The use of the Stats SA threshold has changed the magnitudes reported previously but 
not the trends. No comparable data are available from the OHS'98 as 
income/consumption data were not gathered by this survey, although as discussed in 
Chapter Five (Sections 2.3 and 2.4), comparison with the 2000 IES and various GHS 
data suggested a similar trend of increasing poverty during the immediate post-
apartheid period. In addition, as also discussed in Chapter Five (Section 2.4), there is 
evidence of a reduction in poverty in the 2000-2004 period. 
Also worth noting, the HSL for 1998 suggests that the cost of the fixed items 
(housing, fuel and transport) contained in the basket have risen more rapidly than the 
price index calculated for food items using the KIDS data. This is also suggested by 
the national CPIX data which also shows a higher index for price changes between 
1993 and 1998. As such, the adjustment for inflation using the national rate may 
understate the extent of poverty since the KIDS sample is drawn from the poorer 
segment of the population. 
Table 6.1 shows estimates of poverty for households surveyed in all three waves of 
121 The methodology of Stats SA's threshold is detailed in Hoogeveen and Ozler (2004) and in Stats SA 
(2007b). For comparison the methodology of the threshold previously used is provided in Appendix 
Two which include explanation of adjustments to the community-specific price index, equivalence 
scales and household economies-of-scale parameter. It should be noted that Hoogeveen and Ozler 
propose a per capita based threshold and do not make any adjustment for adult equivalence or 
household economies of scale. While these are significant shortcomings, I have chosen to opt for 
comparability with national statistics rather than adjusting the poverty line. While this will affect the 
scale of poverty and potentially the profile of those who are poor, the underlying poverty dynamics that 
are the focus of this thesis will be unaffected. 
73/ The deflators used were taken from the Consumer Price Index (CPIX) produced by Stats SA for 
the month in which field work commenced. These were 1.605 for 1993, 1.143 for 1998 and 0.812 for 
2004. 
74/ Hoogeveen and Ozler (2004:7) suggest several options and I have chosen to use their 'lower bound' 
estimate. 
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KIDS using the Pa class of poverty measures reviewed in Appendix Two (Section 
2.3). Two approaches have been adopted for the measurement of poverty: firstly using 
the reported expenditure (consumption in 1998 and 2004) on a basket of food and 
non-food items, and secondly using reported income from a range of sources 
including imputed income from home production. Although both approaches are 
used in the literature, expenditure/consumption-based reporting has tended to be 
preferred as it is argued that this approach is both less prone to under-reporting, and 
takes account of consumption-smoothing. 
































The headcount index of poverty (P ) using expenditure increased from 0.51 in 1993 to 
0.57 in 1998, before falling to 0.47 percent in 2004. When income is used, the 
headcount declines continuously from 1993. The poverty gap index (P1) increases 
from 0.20 to 0.26 and then declines to 0.22 using expenditure, but also declines 
continuously when income is used. Finally, the poverty severity index (P ) increases 
from 0.09 to 0.14 before recovering slightly to 0.12 using expenditure. The income-
based measure repeats this pattern and the trends between 1998 and 2004 are 
consistent in terms of both income and expenditure-based measures. 
The disparity between income and expenditure-based measures between 1993 and 
/1 have referred to the summed data from Sections 3 and 4 of the PSLDS and KIDS questionnaires 
(variable 'totexp' in all years) as expenditure/consumption. This is accurate since the questions differ 
between 1993 and the later waves. In 1993 respondents were asked about their expenditure: "I have a 
list of different kinds of food that people may have eaten during the past week or month. As I read each 
one, I'd like you to tell me whether or not it was bought or consumed in this household during the past 
month: What was the amount spent or quantity purchased in the last period? How much was received 
as a gift or as a payment/eaten from own production in the last period?" In 1998 and 2004 respondents 
were asked about their consumption: "I have a list of different kinds of food that people may have 
eaten in the past month. Was [...] eaten by this household in the past month? What was the value of 
[...] eaten from purchases/home consumption in the past month?" See Agiiero et a.,I (2007) for a 
discussion of the possible impact of this change and Scott and Amenuvegbe (1990) for an analysis of 
the impact of using different recall periods. In the forthcoming analysis I will refer only to expenditure 
when using this variable. 
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1998 is of concern, with P° increasing using expenditure, and declining using income, 
and P2 increasing for both income and expenditure for this period, with the income 
measure reporting more severe levels of poverty than expenditure. The discussion in 
Chapter Four (Section 3.9) provided some indication of the reasons for this disparity. 
In these circumstances, deciding which approach is most credible is not immediately 
apparent, and for the remainder of this section, I will present descriptive results using 
both perspectives. In Appendix Two (Section 2.1) I argue for the use of an 
expenditure based approach, suggesting that this measure produces results that are 
consistent with most other analyses of poverty undertaken in South Africa, is the 
preferred approach in the literature, and produces a better fit when regressed against 
household assets. For these reasons and for greater clarity, I will use only expenditure 
for the analysis of poverty dynamics. 
Turning to the characteristics of those who are poor, the Pa class of poverty measures 
have been disaggregated in Table 6.2 by location into non-urban and urban (towns 
and metropolitan) households. This table reports the persistent geographical 
concentration of poverty that exists within KwaZulu-Natal, similar to that found for 
South Africa as a whole. 






























































I As noted in Chapter Four (Section 2.1), due to the sample frame of the original sample, the official 
classification of areas used in the 1985, 1991 and 1996 censuses was followed by the first wave of 
KIDS in which non-urban refers to areas that were historically not in the demarcated municipal 
authorities. By and large this corresponds with rural settlements although there are important 
exceptions. In 2001, Stats SA indicated their intention of abandoning this definition in favour of a 
population density classification. The 2004 KIDS data have been released with a population density 
option (popden in the file population_ density 2001_public_release). For consistency with previous 
analysis and other studies, I have chosen to retain the original classification for this thesis. 
111 Chi square tests show that the headcounts for urban and non-urban areas are statistically different. 
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In all three years, the risk of being an expenditure poor household in a non-urban area 
is more than double that experienced by urban households. The headcount ratio shows 
that households in non-urban locations in the province experienced a considerable 
increase in the incidence of poverty in the intervening five years between the 1993 
and 1998 waves of data collection, before falling to below the 1993 level. The urban 
areas experienced a moderate increase in P between 1993 and 1998 which was also 
followed by a decline. The depth of poverty rose in the non-urban areas, although 
not in the urban, as did the severity of poverty. This implies that poverty did not only 
become more pervasive in non-urban areas, but that the severity of the poverty was 
deepening. In the urban areas, where there has been little change in the level of 
poverty, those that are poor became progressively less impoverished between 1993 
and 2004 with the average shortfall decreasing from 5 percent of the poverty line to 3 
percent. The income data broken down by urban/non-urban show much the same 
pattern as for the total, with a decreasing incidence of poverty between the first two 
waves followed by an increase. In income terms, non-urban poverty stood at a 
massive 79 percent of the population in 1993, and decreases continuously to 64 
percent by 2004, while the P for urban areas increases (surprisingly) between 1993 
and 1998, to above the level of the non-urban measure. This suggests a further 
explanation for the disparity between income and expenditure in 1993 and 1998: 
significant under-reporting of urban based incomes. 
Table 6.3 provides the same set of Pa measures broken down by the sex of the 
household head. 






















































































Almost all of the Pa values for income and expenditure-based measures are higher for 
dejure female-headed households than de facto male and female-headed households 
in all three years, in line with Klasen's (1997) finding for South Africa, as well as 
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with the majority of research in sub-Saharan Africa (cf. Lachaud, 1994; Haddad, 
1995).78 While most types of household have experienced a decrease in terms of their 
well-being between 1993 and 1998 followed by an improvement between 1998 and 
2004 as reflected by any of these expenditure-based measures, the decline in the 
fortunes of de facto female headed households between 1993 and 1998 is particularly 
striking for all of the poor. As before, when income is used, a consistent improvement 
in well-being over the 11 year period is found for all household types and all 
measures other than for P . Noteworthy is the extraordinarily high headcount for de 
facto female headed households when using an income-based measure with 71 
percent of these households recorded as being poor in 1998. 
6.2.2 Living Conditions 
Improvements in the delivery of services have been identified by Statss S A as an 
important achievement of the post-apartheid government (Stats SA, 2001). As is 
shown in Table 6.4, positive changes have consistently taken place in the access of the 
surveyed households to the set of services gathered in the PSLDS and subsequent 
waves of KIDS which can be defined as Living Conditions indicators. 








































The most notable progress is in electricity connections, which improved between 
1993 and 2004, from being available to 43 percent of the sample to 75 percent. This 
is followed by the percentage of the sampled households who live in formal housing, 
/ De facto female headship refers to households in which a non-resident male head was identified. Chi 
square tests show that the headcounts are statistically different for households with a dejure male head 
compared to those with de facto and dejure female heads. Foolishly, the KIDS research team decided 
to exclude this question in 2004 and I have imputed household headship for 2004 by assuming that, if 
alive, the reported head from 1998 will still hold this position. The data for 2004 thus exclude 
households in which the head had died between 1998 and 2004. Although not shown, Pa values for 
these households did not display any noteworthy variation from those of the total sample. 
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which increases from 67 percent to 85 percent of the sample. Improvements in 
access to piped water have been more modest, while the percentage of households 
with access to a toilet in the dwelling or on the stand inexplicably declines between 
1993 and 1998, perhaps due to definitional changes during fieldwork, before 
increasing to 86 percent of the sample. Finally, some progress has also been made in 
the percentage of households who report owning their house and in room density, 
measured as the median number of people per room. 
While the overall picture is quite positive, some caution is in order. Information was 
not gathered concerning whether utility connections were operative, or whether they 
had been shutoff. Also, home ownership may be less positive than it appears as the 
tenure rights involved may mean that the building cannot be sold nor used as 
collateral. Nonetheless, the picture suggested by the KIDS data concerning services is 
one of progress in a number of the key goals outlined by the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) in 1994. 
6.3 POVERTY TRANSITIONS: KIDS 1993-2004 
The extent and depth of poverty just shown uses conventional static money-metric 
instruments. This analysis treats the data as if they represented two cross-sectional 
surveys such as the OHS and IES data also described in the same chapter. The KIDS 
data can now be used to operationalise the dynamic model of poverty discussed in 
Chapter 3 (Section 6) in the context of KwaZulu-Natal. In this section, I begin by 
describing the data using cumulative distribution function (CDF) that allow inspection 
of changes in the entire distribution of well-being between 1993 and 1998 and by the 
transition matrix approach favoured by most analysts of panel data. The data can then 
be examined more broadly through a joint distribution frequency that maps mobility. 
Finally, I will modify and then apply the Carter/May typology of structural poverty 
for the period 1993-2004. 
6.3.1 Cumulative Distribution Functions 
Despite the relative sophistication of the Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (FGT) 
191 This section is derived from May et ah, (2007) for which I was the lead author and Agiiero et al, 
(2007) for which I was a joint author and contributed significantly to the analysis reported here. 
152 
measures, as noted in Chapter Three, the conclusions that are reached may still be 
affected by the choice of poverty line. A cumulative distribution function (CDF) 
resolves this problem by testing whether differing poverty lines are robust in that the 
poor are consistently identified and ranked whatever poverty line is used. If the 
CDF's of the indicators for different groups do not intersect, then one group can be 
definitively considered to be poorer than the other/s. 
Figure 6.1 provides this information for the three waves of KIDS showing the 
normalized per-capita expenditures for adult children and for the core or parent 
households from which they emerged. The figure uses a normalised real household 
expenditure measure, defined as total household expenditures, adjusted to 2000 
prices, and divided by the Hoogeveen and Ozler poverty line. Normalised 
expenditures equal to one thus indicate that household expenditures exactly equal the 
poverty line for the household; a measure of two indicates that household 
expenditures represent a level of well-being that is twice the poverty line, and so on. 
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The CDFs for the parents shows an increase in poverty from 1993 to 1998, and then a 
O l 
reversal of this trend from 1998 to 2004. First order dominance cannot be 
/ Only data on those adult children who still had at least one core parent alive in 2004 are used to 
create the figure. 
8V Statistically, the hypothesis that core households with adult children have the same expenditure 
distribution as all core households cannot be rejected based on Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. 
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concluded since it is apparent that the CDFs for the three years cross over. However, 
as noted by Jenkins and Lambert (1997), second order dominance can be shown since 
the data for 1998 lie to the left of those for 1993 until approximately twice the 
threshold. As a result, it is possible to conclude that households in 1998 are poorer 
than households in 1993 for all poverty lines up to twice the threshold that has been 
used. Likewise it is possible to conclude that households in 2004 are wealthier than 
households in 1998 for all poverty lines that exceed half the threshold used. 
However, as can be seen, the CDF for the next generation lies everywhere to the 
southeast of the 2004 CDF for the parents, indicating that the next generation is doing 
better than their parents. However, given that slightly more than half of the next 
generation adult children live with their parents, and have the same recorded living 
standard as their parents, Figure 6.2 suggests that the segment of the next generation 
that has established independent residences is likely doing even better than Figure 6.1 
would indicate. In order to explore this issue, Figure 6.2 compares the CDF for this 
group with the next generation sub-cohort that continues to live with their parents. As 
can be seen, the former group is much better off than the latter. 
Figure 6.2: Economic Weil-Being of the Next Generation 
0 2 4 6 
Normalized Per-Capita Expenditures (fraction of poverty line) 
There are several possible explanations for the differences between these two groups. 
First, it may be that adult children with independent residences are better educated 
and otherwise more successful economically. Alternatively, it could be that adult 
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children still at home have family responsibilities that keep them at home (to support 
parents or other needy family members). 
These results lend support to other findings from South Africa that the formation and 
splitting off of new households may sometimes be endogenous (Case and Deaton; 
1998; Klasen and Woolard, 2001). There is thus at least some evidence that the next 
generation, like their parents, is bifurcating into two distinct groups. Additional 
analysis of these data, especially concerning whether parents' status is transmitted to 
their children, is clearly required but is not the business of this thesis. 
6.3.2 A Transition Matrix Approach82 
The conventional transition matrix approach is the next step necessary to complete 
this analysis. Transition matrices, depicting the position of households interviewed in 
all three rounds in the income distribution over time, are a widely used and simple 
way to represent movement in and out of poverty. Table 6.5 shows the transition 
over the full 1993 to 2004 period, while Table 6.6 shows the changes between 1998 
and 2004. 
Each household in Table 6.5 is assigned to a row based on its 1993 normalised 
expenditure measure. Thus, the first row contains the 129 households whose 1993 
level of well-being was less than half the poverty line. In the second row are the 218 
households whose level of well-being was greater than half the poverty line but less 
than the poverty line. The other rows are defined similarly using the well-being limits 
shown in the table. 
82/ This section is derived from Agiiero et al, (2007) for which I was a joint author and contributed to 
the analysis reported here. 
83/ Examples include Grootaert and Kanbur (1995) in Cote d'lvoire, Glewwe and Hall (1998) in Peru 
and Roberts (2001) using the KIDS data. Chaudhuri and Ravallion (1994) is an example of an 
alternative approach using classification matrices. 
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Table 6.5: 1993 to 2004 Transition Matrix for Core KIDS Households (% of row) 
\ 2004 














































































































The columns of Table 6.5 are defined using households' 2004 level of normalised 
well-being, and thus permit us to see the fate of each household over the 1993 to 2004 
period. Looking across the first row, 38 percent of the households whose 1993 
standard of living was less than half the poverty line are just as poor in 2004. Another 
34 percent of these households have modestly higher standards of living in 2004 (still 
below the poverty line, but above half of it). The remaining 28 percent of these 
households now enjoy standards of living in excess of the poverty line. The main 
diagonal cells of the transition matrix are highlighted in bold and show the fraction of 
households in each row that have not changed their well-being category (for example, 
73.4 percent of households that had living standards in excess of 2.5 times the poverty 
line in 1993 were still above that level in 2004). 
Table 6.5 as a whole reveals several distinctive patterns of mobility, with more than 
60 percent of households that were poor in 1993 remaining poor in 2004. While there 
is some upward mobility amongst those who were initially poor, there is also 
substantial downward mobility (53 percent) amongst those just above the poverty line. 
These figures are consistent with the existence of a core group of persistently poor 
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people, surrounded by a somewhat smaller group of sometimes poor who move in and 
out of poverty over time, an argument made earlier by Carter and May (2001). The 
two expenditure groups just above the poverty line appear to be quite unstable. 
Roughly 40 to 45 percent of households that had expenditures between 1.0 and 1.5 
times the poverty line in 1993 enjoyed expenditures more than 1.5 times the poverty 
line in 2004. Another 40 percent or so of these households had fallen below the 
poverty line in 2004, with the remaining 10 to 15 percent holding onto those middle 
positions. This pattern of apparent bifurcation (with some households slipping to a 
low level equilibrium and others rising toward a high level equilibrium) is consistent 
with that identified by Adato et al, (2006) based on the 1993 to 1998 KIDS data 
supplemented with qualitative information from 2001. 
Consistent with studies of the earlier rounds of the KIDS data, those households who 
were well above the poverty line in 1993 largely maintained their positions or moved 
ahead over time. On average, households with expenditures more than 2.5 times the 
poverty line in 1993 experienced a 61 percent income growth over the 11 years of the 
study. Nearly 40 percent of the households that had expenditures in 1993 between 1.5 
and 2.5 times the poverty line moved ahead substantially over time and the mean 
expenditure of this group grew by a massive 160 percent. Again consistent with the 
findings by Adato et al. (2006), there is little downward mobility amongst these 
better-off groups. 
Not surprisingly, the combined effect of these mobility patterns is to increase income 
inequality, a finding consistent with those of Hoogeveen and Ozler (2005) and many 
others analysing South Africa's income distribution since 1995. Among the KIDS 
households, the Gini coefficient measure of inequality in the distribution of household 
expenditures has risen steadily from 0.42 in 1993, to 0.50 in 1998 and a remarkably 
high 0.57 by 2004. As discussed by Carter and May (2001) and in more detail by May 
et al, (2004), this increase in income inequality is neither surprising nor an 
unambiguously bad thing, although at some point high levels of inequality may affect 
economic growth rates and social stability. 
Table 6.6 displays a transition matrix using the core KIDS households for the more 
recent history of the KIDS households showing the 1998 to 2004 period. 
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Table 6.6: 1998 to 2004 Transition Matrix for Core KIDS Households (% of row) 











































































































In addition to the row percentages, the Table also provides a simple coding scheme 
that indicates how the 1998 to 2004 transitions differ from the 1993 to 1998 
transitions. As described elsewhere (May et al., 2000; Carter and May, 2001), the 
1993 to 1998 period saw substantial increases in poverty and slippages at the bottom 
end of the income distribution, with substantially more improvement at the top end. 
The 1998 to 2004 period saw some moderation in this trend. As can be seen, much 
less downward mobility occurs among the poorest households in the later period than 
during the 1993 to 1998 period. For example, while 24.7 percent of households that 
were just above the poverty line in 1998 had fallen below the poverty line in 2004, 
this fraction is more than ten percentage points lower than the corresponding 
transition figure over the 1993 to 1998 period (the figure from the 1993 to 1998 
transition matrix, not shown here, is 38 percent). More generally, downward mobility 
and chronic poverty rates for the three lowest well-being categories (while still high) 
/ Changes from the 1993 to 1998 transition matrix are indicated by '+'s ' and '- 's . ' An element which 
is between 2.5 and 5 percentage points lower is indicated by a '-'; between 5 and 10 percentage points 
lower by a '—'; and, greater than 10 percentage point decrease by a '—'. Similarly,'+' means between 
2.5 and 5 percentage higher;'++' between 5 and 10 percentage points higher; and '+++' more than 10 
percentage points higher. 
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are not as unfavourable as they were for the earlier sub-period of the KIDS study. 
The fourth well-being category (those households whose 1998 expenditures were 
between 125 percent and 150 percent of the poverty line) shows a mixed pattern, with 
some elements of downward mobility increasing and others decreasing. Finally, the 
pattern of upward mobility amongst the relatively well-off (already apparent in the 
1993 to 1998 period) has become even more pronounced during the more recent 
period.85 
Table 6.5 and Table 6.6 can be simplified and Table 6.7 records the percentage of 
households observed in all three waves broken down by the number of poverty spells 
that they have experienced, showing this information for expenditure and for income. 
Table 6.7: Poverty Spells for Core KIDS Households 
Poverty Status* 
'93-'98-'04 
P-P-P (Chronically Poor) 
P-P-N (Upwardly mobile?) 
P-N-P (Transitorily Poor) 
P-N-N (Upwardly mobile?) 
N-P-P (Downwardly mobile?) 
N-P-N (Transitorily Poor) 
N-N-P (Downwardly mobile?) 





















* P indicates Poor; N indicates Not-Poor 
n=867 
Using income data, individuals that were observed to be poor in all three waves form 
a somewhat lower proportion at 23 percent than when the expenditure data are used 
(27 percent). The reverse applied to the never poor group. Two groups can readily be 
thought of as being transitorily poor, those that experienced a single episode of either 
poverty or non-poverty in 1998, although it is always possible that this episode was in 
fact the result of measurement error. Two groups may well be upwardly/downwardly 
mobile in that they are observed to be poor/non-poor for one wave and are then 
observed as being non-poor/poor in the subsequent waves. Finally, it is difficult to 
/ The possibility of measurement error cannot be excluded. Glewwe (2005) proposes a methodology 
for uncovering the degree to which overall observed mobility is the result of measurement error. 
Following his method, Agiiero et al., (2007) find that measurement error in one or more of the waves 
accounts for at least 14 percent of all mobility and could account for as much as 60 percent of mobility 
between 1993 and 1998. This situation is less extreme for the 1993 to 2004 period as measurement 
error accounts for no more than 4 percent of mobility between 1998 and 2004. This is detailed in 
Appendix Two. 
159 
categorise the two remaining groups who are observed as poor/non-poor for two 
waves before being observed as non-poor/poor. This might depict upward/downward 
mobility, an episode of good or bad fortune or measurement error. This is where the 
usefulness of a matrix based approach becomes limited and alternatives must be 
sought. Nonetheless, and as is seen elsewhere in the world, it is possible to conclude 
that the poor includes a large group of households who cycle in and out of poverty 
(Bane and Ellwood, 1986; Ruggles and Williams, 1989). 
Taken together, the tables showing poverty dynamics present a picture of money-
metric mobility for the majority of the KIDS sample, some instances of those furthest 
below the poverty line able to improve their situation, if not to escape to a position 
above the line, but generally a deterioration in well-being between 1993 and 1998 as 
expressed by consumption, especially for those near to the poverty line and an 
improvement for all groups in the 1998 to 2004 period. Of course, because this is 
longitudinal data and neither the 1998 or the 2004 rounds are representative, however 
seductive, statements about overall poverty rates in KwaZulu-Natal cannot be made. 
In addition, the extent to which measurement error might be driving this result is also 
a concern. Nonetheless, this result provokes further investigation to ascertain whether 
these changes are simply the result of measurement errors in one or either of the 
surveys, a product of the money-metric approach that has been adopted or if they are 
both robust and can be explained using the theoretical tools developed in this chapter. 
6.3.3 Mobility and Mobility Tests 
The analysis in the prior section does not provide information about whether initially 
poor households have become systematically worse off over time, or whether the 
matrix has been generated by significant upward and downward mobility in which 
initially poor and non-poor households have swapped places in the income 
distribution. As a first window into this question of mobility, Carter and May (2001) 
extend the visualisation offered by the CDF already shown to graphically portray the 
estimated joint distribution of well-being (expenditures divided by subsistence needs) 
using the KIDS data for 1993 - 1998 and May et al, (2007) update this to 2004. 
Figure 6.3 provides these contour graphs showing the joint distribution of well-being 
for two of the pair-wise comparisons that are possible ('93 with '98; '93 with '04). 
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These graphs may be thought of as mobility planes, and as with the transition matrix, 
the axes refer to a normalised expenditure measure. In this instance, the x-axis uses a 
logarithmic scale to display a household's 1993 consumption as a percentage of its 
subsistence needs. Prior to estimating the joint distribution of well-being, May et al 
(2007) rescaled the data by taking the natural logarithm of the expenditure per-capita 
measures used in the prior analysis.86 The spread of the contours reflects the 
distribution of well-being. 
Figure 6.3: Joint Distribution of Weil-Being - 1993,1998, 2004 
In addition to rendering the data in a visually useful fashion, Carter and May note 
that: 
.. .estimation of the joint density removes noise from the data and 
use the LEP non-parametric kernel estimator with an optimal 
bandwidth. The greater the height of the estimated surface over a 
portion of the mobility plane, the greater is the estimated probability 
that a family occupies that portion of the mobility space (Carter and 
May, 2001:1996). 
/ As has often been noted, income distribution is approximately log-normally distributed and taking 
the logs, as is done here, re-scales the data so that the non-parametric kernel estimator can adequately 
represent the shape of the joint distribution. Because of this rescaling, a household whose per-capita 
expenditures exactly equal the poverty line will have a well-being value of zero. Positive values 
indicate well-being levels above the poverty line, negative values signal living standards below the 
poverty line. The southeast (or bottom left) quadrant in the figure thus contains households who are 
twice poor, and who might be thought of as being chronically poor in the manner described by Hulme 
and Shepherd (2003). The top left and bottom right quadrants are the transitory poor, while the top 
right are the never poor. Finally, note that the 45-degree line drawn across the figure represents 
positions of no change. A position above the 45-degree line represents upward mobility, while 
positions below the line show downward mobility. 
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The overall picture is that the 1998-2004 transition undid some of the downward 
movement seen in the 1993-1998 transition and documented by Carter and May 
(2001). In contrast to the 1993 to 1998 period, the mode of 1993-2004 joint 
distribution lies to the northwest of the 45° line and the distribution is more 
symmetric, suggesting that there has been an improvement in upward mobility for 
those close to the poverty line. Nonetheless, there is still plenty of spread indicating 
downward mobility and transitory poverty for many, as well as widening inequality. 
Also apparent from Figure 6.3 is that a large clump of initially poor households have 
either held steady or fallen behind during the 11 year period. To return to the 
language of conventional poverty dynamics analysis, these households are chronically 
poor. Upward mobility appears concentrated among households that were initially 
better off, and a smaller but important clump of households can be seen to be pulling 
away from the immobility line. Together these two observations suggest that a 
pattern of class-based mobility underlies the shift in the cumulative distribution of 
income shown in Figure 6.1 as the probability of getting ahead is correlated positively 
with initial income level. 
While the estimated joint distribution of well-being permits the full pattern of 
mobility to be seen, it does not easily permit simple tests to be undertaken that will 
determine the degree to which the visually distinct patterns of mobility across initial 
income classes are in fact statistically significantly different from each other. 
However, to return to the transition matrix given in Table 6.5 and Table 6.6, mobility 
information is provided in the form of the percentage of households in each 1993 
well-being class (given by the rows of the table) that was observed in the 1998 well-
being classes (the columns of the table). Following Hout (1983), Carter and May 
(2001) then examine whether these observed transition frequencies between 1993 and 
1998 are sufficiently different from what would be expected under various models of 
homogenous or class-independent mobility that models can be rejected. The simplest 
such model is one of perfect mobility in which a household's destination in the 1998 
income distribution is independent of its 1993 starting position. Perfect or class-
independent mobility is rejected as the/?-value for the L statistic is less than 0.0001. 
Rejection of this model of perfect mobility is not, however, especially surprising. It is 
quite likely that households will tend to maintain their initial position due to inertia 
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rather than exhibiting upwards or downwards mobility. Pursuing this Carter and May 
(2001) go on to to test a range of hypotheses and conclude that their results 
consistently reject the restrictions of increasingly less-restricted models that ask 
whether there are any common mobility patterns that cut across classes. Even the 
most general model tested (the 'Quasi-Diagonals' model in Hout's language) is 
rejected at the 5 percent level, giving a clear indication that the mobility patterns are 
heterogeneous across income classes. Not only is the 1993 livelihood position 
significantly related to 1998 income position, but as suggested by Table 6.5, the 
upward and downward mobility patterns are highly different across initial income 
classes. Unable to statistically accept any of the restrictions implied by commonly 
used mobility models, the observed transition matrix frequencies may be used as the 
best estimates of the mobility pattern. 
The observed shift in the CDF seen in Figure 6.1 between 1993 and 1998 is thus the 
product of a relatively large group of chronically poor and a process of bifurcation 
among those just above the poverty line in 1993, with just over half that group falling 
behind, and the others holding steady or moving ahead. As a final test, Carter and 
May (2001) examine the longer run implications of this class-based mobility pattern 
under the assumption that income distribution between 1993 and 1998 follows a 
stationary Markov process. Once again the data give clear evidence of a pattern of 
downward mobility. These tests then give some reassurance that a substantial part of 
the mobility observed in the transition matrixes presented earlier is in fact real 
changes in well-being and not simply due to the rather precarious endeavour of data 
collection from households using quantitative instruments. 
6.4 MEASURING DYNAMIC POVERTY IN KWAZULU-NATAL 
6.4.1 Applying the Dynamic Poverty Model 1993-1998 
While the combination of the transition matrices in Table 6.5 and Table 6.6, the 
poverty spells shown in Table 6.7 and the mobility planes in Figure 6.3, provides 
information on the incidence of chronic versus transitory poverty, and on mobility 
patterns across a well-being distribution, it is still not possible to determine whether 
the mobility of the transitorily poor is the result of successful accumulation, or 
whether this is simply driven by stochastic factors. More is still needed, and as a 
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point of departure, I will first summarise Carter and May's (2001) analysis of the 
stochastic and structural factors that shape poverty transitions between 1993 and 1998 
and thereby separate the stochastically poor from the structurally poor. I will then 
modify and extend this analysis to include the 2004 wave of data collection. 
Underpinning Carter and May's empirical analysis is their treatment of the shocks 
experienced by households over time. As already alluded to above, two types of 
shocks can be related to mobility and poverty transitions. Firstly, those that impact on 
the income stream that is derived from household assets which may be defined as Sit. 
Examples of such income shocks may be an unexpected bad harvest due to drought or 
additional income from a business due to unexpectedly higher prices. To emphasise 
that these shocks refer to occasions when the use of available assets does not lead to 
the anticipated outcome, the language of Sen's entitlement literature is evoked and 
these income shocks are thus termed 'entitlement failures' when they are negative and 
'entitlement windfalls' when positive. The second type of shock occurs when the 
household experiences an unexpected, permanent reduction (or increase) in its asset 
base which may be defined as &it. Examples here are when a wage earner suddenly 
dies; a fire destroys a business, or a friend, family member or government abandons 
or reneges on a longstanding remittance or other financial transfer. A positive 
example might be an unexpected transfer of land rights or some other asset. These 
asset shocks will be called 'endowment losses' and 'endowment windfalls' to draw 
attention to their permanent and structural impact. 
By estimating the livelihood function, or expected well-being, cu (Alt), Carter and 
May (2001) recast Equation 2 to obtain an estimate of entitlement shocks, sit: 
(6) sit=cu-c{Au). 
However, as before, these estimated shocks will contain measurement and other 
random errors, as well as genuine shocks experienced by the household. In general, 
the less precise the estimate of cu (Ait), the larger will be the estimate of sit 
irrespective of the magnitude of shocks experienced by the household. To control for 
the precision of the underlying estimation of cit (Ait), Carter and May (2001) checked 
each household to see whether the following hypotheses for each year of the data can 
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be rejected: 
Household is expected to be poor if reject Hypothesis i: cu > HSLit 
Household is expected to be non-poor if reject Hypothesis2: cit < HSLjt. 
A household that is observed to be poor, but for whom the hypothesis that they are 
expected to be poor can be rejected, is said have suffered an entitlement shock or to 
be stochastically poor. Similarly, a household that is observed to be non-poor, but for 
whom the hypothesis that they are expected to be non-poor can rejected is said to 
have enjoyed an entitlement windfall and said to be stochastically non-poor. 
By using stringent criteria requiring that confidence band around the estimate of cu 
lies completely above the HSL, it becomes possible to say that an observed poor 
household is stochastically poor, and if not, to deduce that the household is instead 
structurally poor and lacking the assets necessary to generate cit > HSLit. 
As detailed in Carter and May (1999:15), there are a number of reasons why cu{Ait) 
should depart from strict linearity or asset additivity including financial constraints on 
the effective use of other assets and missing or poorly function markets. Following on 
the methodological suggestion of that paper, flexibly local regression methods were 
employed to derive an 80 percent confidence interval estimate cit (Au) for each time 
period.89 The 80 percent interval estimate allows the above (one-sided) hypotheses to 
be tested at the 10 percent significance level. Hence, there will be a 10 percent (Type 
I error) probability that any household that is deemed to be stochastically poor is not. 
To measure endowment losses or windfalls, in other words, a permanent reduction (or 
increase) in available assets, ©it, the KIDS survey queried all respondents about the 
/ Recall that Carter and May (2001) make use of the Household Subsistence Level (HSL) for their 
analysis. 
88/ Clearly there could be other observed poor households (including those with expected well-being in 
excess of their poverty line) that fail to be classified as stochastically poor under this statistically 
conservative definition of entitlement failure. 
89/ As Carter and May (2001) document, explanatory variables used in the local regression analysis are 
educated labour, uneducated labour, productive capital, and transfer income. In their analysis, social 
capital was not included due to the difficulty of measuring this asset in an already complex task. 
Household durables (furniture, vehicles and so forth are also not included). The model controlled for 
the expenditure requirement of the household and a non-urban/urban dummy variable. See Cleveland et 
al, (1988) for details on local regression methods. 
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economic shocks experienced over the 1993-2004 period. For each shock, 
information was solicited to measure its economic costs (gain). In the case of the 
theft or destruction of a physical asset, respondents were asked to supply the (asset) 
value of the item lost. When a wage earner was permanently disabled, a social 
welfare payment eliminated, or a source of remittance cut off, respondents were asked 
to report the resulting decrease in monthly income. ° A present value calculation over 
a twenty-year time horizon using a five percent real discount rate was then utilised to 
approximate the asset value of the lost endowment. In principle, this present value 
formulation makes the loss of human capital or of a remittance comparable to the loss 
of non-human income earning assets. 
Using data on assets and shocks, Carter and May (2001) then use the model to 
generate a structural poverty typology. The first group of households are those that 
experienced dual failures. These are households whose assets are such that they are 
expected to be above the poverty line in both periods but which have experienced 
entitlement failures in periods during which data were collected and, subject to 
measurement error, would be observed as being chronically poor. In contrast, 
structurally poor households are those which are both observed to be poor in both 
periods and which do not have sufficient assets with which incomes can be generated 
to ensure that they would not be poor. They too would be observed to be chronically 
poor. Stochastically upward households are those that are observed to be poor in the 
first period, and then non-poor in the second period due to entitlement windfalls, but 
which still lack the assets to generate sufficient income to be non-poor. These 
households would be observed to be transitory poor. 
Structurally upward households are those that are observed to be poor in the first 
period, and then non-poor in the second period, and who have accumulated the assets 
required to generate sufficient income to be non-poor. Stochastically downwards 
households are those that are observed to be non-poor in the first period, and then 
poor in the second period due to entitlement failure, but which have the assets to 
generate sufficient income to be non-poor in both periods. These households would 
also be observed to be transitorily poor. 
/ Only when there was evidence of a permanent loss of the income stream was a shock considered an 
endowment loss. 
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Structurally downward households are those that are observed to be non-poor in the 
first period, and then poor in the second period, and which have experienced 
endowment shocks, thereby losing assets, and as a result can no longer generate 
sufficient income to be non-poor. Once again, these households would be observed to 
be transitorily poor. Finally, the never poor are both structurally non-poor and are 
those who are observed to be non-poor in both periods. 
The approach adapted by Carter and May allowed the KIDS sample to be categorised 
into the seven groups for the period 1993 to 1998 as is shown in Table 6.8. 
Table 6.8: Structural Poverty Classes for Core KIDS Households (1993-1998) 


















As with the transition matrix, just under half of the households surveyed by KIDS can 
be categorised as never poor while a further 1.4 percent suffered dual entitlement 
failures and 2.6 percent suffered an entitlement failure in the period prior to the 
second wave of the survey. Thus approximately 54 percent of households owned 
sufficiently assets to be structurally not-poor. However, just over 16 percent of 
households were structurally poor and were caught in a poverty trap, while 4.4 
percent of households lacked assets, but had experienced a windfall and as a result 
were categorised as stochastically upward. Just under 4 percent of the sample could 
be described as structurally upward, meaning that although they had not escaped 
poverty, they had accumulated assets and were on a upward trajectory, that given 
sufficient time, would permit such escape. 
6.4.2 Applying the Dynamic Poverty Model: 1993-200491 
In order to apply this approach to the three waves of KIDS, the starting point is to 
9V This section is derived from May and Woolard (2007) for which I was a co-author. I was solely 
responsible for the analysis that is presented. 
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estimate the predicted well-being of households based upon their asset portfolio. For 
this, the log of the standardised poverty scores was regressed to yield a predicted 
asset-based score. This livelihood function used the value of productive assets (land, 
housing and equipment), the mean years of education of resident and non-resident 
adult members of the household (20 years of age and above), the value of all transfers 
to the household (government grants, private pension, maintenance payments and 
remittances) and the interacted value of each of these assets. 92 
The model controlled for the total subsistence needs of the household measured in 
terms of number of household members weighted by the per capita poverty threshold, 
and a rural variable derived from population density as reported in the 2001 
Population Census. The results are shown in Table 6.9. 
Table 6.9: Predicted Poverty Score for core KIDS Households (1993-2004) 
Dependent Variable: logpov 
(Constant) 
Subsistence need of hh 
Mean education of hh members 
Value of productive assets 
Value of transfer income 
Rural dummy variable 
Members educ x prod, assets 
Transfers x prod, capital 
Members educ x transfer 


















































n=812, ** 99percent, * 95percent 
All models are statistically significant with the expected signs and have a reasonable 
fit (adjusted R2 around 0.5). Mean education of household members emerges as 
having the strongest (positive) impact which appears to have increased over time. 
Interestingly, the interaction of education and productive capital has a significant, 
although weak, positive impact in all years. 
/ Carter and May (2001) used the number of educated and uneducated labour units, non-urban/urban 
dummy variable, productive capital, transfer income, and the number of adult equivalent consumers as 
explanatory variables in a local regression analysis. 
93/ As already noted, there currently is no definition of rural and urban in South Africa. In extending 
our earlier analysis to 2004, I have chosen to classify enumerator areas with a population density of 
less than 750 people per square kilometre as being rural. A similar result is found if the original PSLDS 
variable (metro) is used. 
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To deal with both the problems of measurement error and stochastic events, an 80 
percent confidence interval estimate for expected mean consumption, cit (Au), has 
been derived for each time period. By using stringent criteria requiring that the 
confidence band around the estimate of cit lies completely above the poverty 
threshold (the horizontal line z), it becomes possible to say that an observed poor 
household is stochastically poor, and, if not, to deduce that the household is instead 
structurally poor and lacking the assets necessary to generate cit > c ,
94 
The distribution of the log of the 80 percent confidence interval around the predicted 
poverty score is depicted in Figure 6.4 which shows the upper and lower limits of the 
score. Immediately apparent from this is the change in structural poverty for the 1993-
1998 and 1998-2004 periods. The predicted poverty score for values below 0 (that is a 
score equal to the needs of the household) in 1993 lies well above those for 1998, 
indicating that structural poverty has increased. In the subsequent period, there has 
been a reduction in structural poverty with the 2004 scores lying clearly above the 
1998 values. This reveals that in contrast to 1993-1998 structural poverty has declined 
for a large part of the KIDS' sample in the 1998-2004 period, a similar finding to that 
noted earlier in this chapter in respect of reported expenditure levels. 
/ Clearly there could be other observed poor households (including those with expected well-being in 
excess of their poverty threshold) that fail to be classified as stochastically poor under this statistically 
conservative definition of entitlement failure. Also to be noted, some additional data cleaning has taken 
place. In addition to the outliers already identified by this thesis, inspection of the Cook's Distance 
statistic identified an additional outlier (HHID 6510190) which was exerting undue influence on the 
coefficients. This case was assigned missing for the purposes of this analysis. The model has been 
revised and now includes a simple social capital measure (number of groups belonged to), and in line 
with the goals of the thesis, following Beegle et at., (2006), a number of life cycle variables have been 
included in the model (square of the age of the head; ratio of adults 44-55 years and a dummy variable 
for being a two generation household). Household durables remain excluded as the causality of these 
items is likely to operate in both directions. In addition I have not used the flexible LOESS procedure 
followed by Carter and May (2001) to set the confidence intervals, opting instead for a more 
conventional OLS approach. The implication is that the standard errors are derived from the full 
sample rather than from a nearby cluster of households with similar predicted consumption. As a result 
the confidence interval will be wider than that used by Carter and May (2001) and the criteria for 
structural poverty/non-poverty more stringent. As a result, a greater proportion of households will be 
classified into the stochastically poor categories. 
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Figure 6.4: Cumulative Distribution of Predicted Poverty Intervals, 1993-2004 
n=812 
Figure 6.4 reveals that in 1993 the upper limit of the predicted poverty scores was 
below the poverty threshold for 37.3 percent of the households surveyed in all three 
waves compared with 44.5 percent in 1998 and again 37.3 percent in 2004. For 35.7 
percent of households, the lower limit of the predicted poverty score was above the 
poverty threshold in 1993, compared with 31.2 percent in 1998 and 32.9 in 2004. The 
predicted values of the remaining households could not be classified in this manner 
using the 80 percent confidence intervals that I have chosen. 
It now becomes possible to recreate the poverty classes reported in Carter and May 
(2001) and thus to establish whether their description of structural poverty can still be 
applied to the KIDS sample, and if so, whether the trends of structural poverty 
observed for the 1993-1998 period have changed. Some modifications to the original 
analysis are necessary. Firstly, Carter and May confine their attention to households 
who were observed to be below the poverty threshold in either 1993 or 1998. Since 
the three waves of data open up the possibility that additional households may have 
become poor over time, I broaden this analysis and include all households when 
testing for stochastic poverty. This means that some households previously 
categorised as never poor will be re-categorised into one of the poverty classes. 
Secondly, Carter and May's principal concern was to distinguish the structurally poor 
from those who experienced mobility between the first two waves of KIDS. While 
this is interesting, I wish also to take account of measurement error. This means that I 
will reject either the hypothesis for some households that they are expected to be poor 
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or that they are expected to be non-poor, and will classify their initial position in 1993 
as being stochastically poor/non-poor. Finally, since I have three data points I am able 
to reassign some households from being transitorily poor to their 'true' position if 
they were stochastically poor/non-poor in one of the first two waves. 
Table 6.10 reproduces Carter and May's (2001) findings for the 1993-1998 and 1998-
2004 periods for the households that were interviewed in all three waves with the 
methodological adjustments that have been described, and the inclusion of the new 
shocks experienced in the 1998-2004 period. 
Table 6.10: Structural Poverty Classes of Core KIDS Households ('93/98; 98/04) 
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Poor 
39.9% Chronically Poor, of which: 
• 8.9% had experienced dual entitlement 
failures 
• Structurally Poor < 91% 
17.2% Fell Behind, of which: 
• 50.7% Stochastically non-poor in 1998 
• Structurally downward <49.3%, of which 
60.5% had experienced entitlement failures 
Non-Poor 
11.0% Got Ahead, of which: 
• 52.2% Stochastically poor in 1993 
• Structurally mobile < 47.8% 
31.9% Never Poor, of which: 
• 7.8% had benefited from dual windfalls 
















38.3% Chronically Poor, of which: 
• 8.6% had experienced dual entitlement 
failures 
• Structurally Poor < 91 % 
9.2% Fell Behind, of which: 
• 51.9% Stochastically non-poor in 1998 
• Structurally downward <49.1%, of which 
65.7% had experienced entitlement failures 
Non-Poor 
19.0% Got Ahead, of which: 
• 52.4% Stochastically poor in 1998 
• Structurally mobile < 47.6% 
33.3% Never Poor, of which; 
• 11.5% had benefited from dual windfalls 
• Structurally never poor < 89.5% 
n=812 
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As with Carter and May (2001), Table 6.10 permits upper and lower bounds to be 
placed on the degree of structural and stochastic poverty. For the 1993 to 1998 period, 
the results are broadly similar to the 2001 paper: to find otherwise would have been a 
cause for concern. For 8.9 percent of the chronically poor, the hypothesis that they 
were structurally poor in both periods can be rejected, meaning that they are likely to 
have suffered dual entitlement failures. This defines an upper bound estimate of 91 
percent of the chronically poor who are actually structurally poor. Looking at the 
households that moved from poor to non-poor status between 1993 and 1998,1 find 
that over half (52 percent) received entitlement shocks in 1993 (that is, I could reject 
the hypothesis that they were expected to be poor in 1993). The upward mobility of 
this group can thus be inferred to be a regression to their expected level of livelihood. 
This places an upper bound of 47.8 percent on the number of the upwardly mobile 
who escaped poverty though accumulation. Finally, 17.2 percent of households fell 
behind of which 50.7 percent had suffered a 1998 entitlement failure since I could 
reject the hypothesis that their expected level of well-being was below their poverty 
threshold. The other 49.3 of these households are potentially structurally downward. 
The patterns for the 1998 to 2004 period are similar, although with some promising 
differences. There is a modest decline in structural poverty, a stronger decline in the 
percentage of households that fell behind and an increase in the percentage of 
households that got ahead. The observed patterns of declining poverty discussed 
earlier appear then to be underpinned by structural improvements to assets and to the 
returns that can be achieved with these assets. 
A final consideration is the poverty dynamics over the entire eleven year period of 
KIDS. This is shown in Table 6.11. 
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27.9% Chronically Poor, of which: 
13% had experienced multiple entitlement 
failures 
7% had experienced entitlement failures 
Structurally Poor < 80% 
15.6% Fell Behind, of which: 
33% had experienced entitlement windfalls 
in a earlier period 
41% had experience entitlement failures 
Structurally downward < 26% 
19.1% Got Ahead, of which: 
30% had experienced entitlement failures in 
an earlier period 
56% had experienced entitlement windfalls 
Structurally upward < 14% 
26.7% Never Poor, of which: 
11% had benefited from multiple entitlement 
windfalls 
8% had experienced endowment losses which 
were offset by entitlement windfalls 
Structurally never poor < 81% 
10.7% were Transitorily Mobile, of which: 
30% had experienced entitlement shocks 
16% had experienced entitlement windfalls Transitorily 
poor < 52% 
n=812 
The patterns remain consistent giving reassurance that the long-term position is one in 
which upper bounds of approximately 28 percent of the KIDS households were 
chronically poor, 27 percent never poor, 19 percent moving upward and 16 percent 
were moving downward. The remaining 11 percent can be said to have experienced 
forms of transitory poverty. Changes in their poverty status arise from either short-
term windfalls or shocks, or from measurement error. 
With these adjustments and new data, and reassigning households to their structural 
class (rather than where they are observed), the earlier findings of Carter and May 
(2001) shown in Table 6.8 can be compared to the longer term image shown in Table 
6.12. 
Table 6.12: Comparison of Structural Poverty Class Classifications 




























































The third wave of data reveals that Carter and May correctly predicted the structural 
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poverty classes for some 76 percent of the structurally poor and for 60 percent of the 
structurally not-poor groups. The later result is not surprising since their analysis did 
not investigate the underlying asset base of the never poor and thus could not identify 
those households that had experienced multiple entitlement windfalls. Unfortunately 
these data reveal that the majority of those identified as structurally upward in the 
2001 analysis had been unable to escape poverty by 2004. The data also show that 80 
percent of those observed to be poor in all three waves (conventionally reported as the 
chronically poor) are found to be structurally poor. 
6.4.3 Qualitative Support for Asset-Based Poverty Dynamics 
The discussion so far suggests that Carter and May's (2001) categorisation appears to 
have both empirical and theoretical foundation. A final concern is whether 
experiences of endowment loss and entitlement failure are also borne out by 
qualitative research. The SA-PPA is a useful source of information given that the 
information was collected in 1996/7 at a mid-point between the 1993 and 1998 waves 
of KIDS. 
A Wealth Ranking exercise carried out on a Social Map provides an interesting 
starting point. This gave relative proportions of people belonging to the different 
strata in the community and criteria for placing households in the different groups 
(May, et ai, 1997: 41). This exercise found that: 
• Of the 76 houses drawn on the map 50 percent (38) were classified in the poor 
category. Criteria included: no-one working for cash, doing cheap labour, the 
household head living alone (especially women with no husbands), ill health, 
mental illness, pensioner, no parents and farmworkers;95 
• 30 percent (21) were placed in the average category. These were households 
where members were waged workers (for example teacher, policeman, nurse, 
workers in Durban) or derived an income from farming, or owning a spaza 
shop or a taxi. In many cases there was more than one member having a 
regular job; 
95 / It will be recalled that extensive quantitative research has produced an almost identical result, see: 
ANC (1995), May e?a/., (1995). 
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• 20 percent (17) were classified as rich. Some of these households ran more 
than one business (for example shops, taxis, tractors, traditional healer) while 
others had a number of members in salaried work. 
With the exception of health and housing, assets are not explicitly singled out as a 
characteristic of being poor. However a more careful reading of this Wealth Ranking 
shows that education, land and livestock, financial capital, legal claims and networks 
are all implicit in the activities that are mentioned. 
Starting with access to human capital, as the Asset Map in Chapter Three suggested, 
two readily identifiable aspects in the SA-PPA relate to education and health. Priority 
Ranking exercises in many of the communities which participated in the studies for 
the PPA consistently listed education as a main concern for the poor. Two dimensions 
were identified: access to basic schooling for children; skills training for adults that 
would improve their access to opportunities for employment and income generation 
(May et al., 1997: 57). However, even in poorly resourced communities, education 
was judged in terms of its relevance as well as by issues of access and quality, and 
that relevance is seen primarily in terms of the likelihood of eventual access to 
employment (May et al, 1997: 58). 
Gender differences were introduced to human capital accumulation as in some cases it 
was suggested that education might not necessarily be given the same priority for 
female children as for male children. Teenage pregnancy, sexual harassment at 
school and early marriage were reported by participants in the SA-PPA as frequent 
factors contributing to girls' failure to continue education. In some more traditional 
communities, mothers themselves were said to be prejudiced in terms of furthering 
the education of girls because it was seen not to be a worthwhile investment to 
educate the female child who ends up marrying into another household (May et al, 
1997: 61). This might means that in the event of a shock, girls may be more at risk of 
being taken out of school than boys as a coping strategy. Although this was not 
observed in a quantitative study undertaken in KwaZulu-Natal in 2000, Hunter and 
May (2002: 16) are able confirm the impact of pregnancy. 
Financial constraints and the costs of education were reported by the SA-PPA to be a 
barrier to human capital accumulation (May et al 1997: 58). A finding is reported in a 
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national survey of 15 to 30 year olds who had left school earlier than they would have 
liked. This study showed that 57 percent of young men and 46 percent of young 
women claimed that they had been forced to abandon their education for financial 
reasons (Everatt and Jennings, 1995). In the SA-PPA it was noted that families in the 
study were not able to sustain expenditure beyond that required for food items and 
that requirements for additional expenditure on annual school fees and uniform costs 
comes at a considerable social cost and adds to existing household poverty. A similar 
trend is picked up by a detailed study of a rural community in the Eastern Cape, 
Sogaula et al, (2002) which reports that 54 percent of the surveyed children who had 
stopped schooling ascribed the reason for this to lack money with which to pay for 
school fees and uniforms. 
Illustrations of ill health were frequently reported in the SA-PPA. May et al, (1997: 
51) refer to studies in which a woman discussed the health of her family between 
1984 and 1995. During this 10 year period, her brother-in-law died from an asthma 
attack, her sister-in-law died during an operation, her mother-in-law died of a stroke, 
her fourth child "...grew with difficulty,- there was no milk", her husband was killed 
by gangsters and her father died. All of the other women in this study reported that 
they or members of their family suffered from ill health. 
Arduous work is also well illustrated, and was often reported to have lead to ill health. 
Once again the life histories gathered by the SA-PPA provide useful material. The 
husband of Mrs. Mkhize was earning R125 per month for farm work in 1979, before 
leaving work because he became ill. Mrs Mbongwe's foster child broke his leg in an 
accident in the mines and in the case of Mrs. Sikhakhane, her husband first broke his 
arm on his farm job, and was later killed when a tractor fell on him. Such health 
shocks were given as a reason for the loss of other household assets. As an example, 
as a rural father narrated: "My child broke his leg and had to go to hospital. I sold my 
three cows to pay for transport and treatment. Now I have nothing" (May, et al, 
1997: 62). 
Housing was an important concern in both rural and urban communities involved in 
/ Mrs Mpanza: "husband's feet swelled up"; Mrs Mbongwe: "daughter died at two, son died at 42, 
foster child mentally disturbed"; Mrs. Sikhakhane "two children passed away"; Mrs Mkhize "twins 
died after a home delivery". The names of all participants in the SA-PPA were changed. 
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the SA-PPA (May et ah, 1997: 71). However, from the perspective of the poor, 
proper housing is not simply to be seen to comprise walls and roofing, and a far 
broader view was expressed. Further to the importance of providing access to 
services and facilities (including water, electricity, transport, educational and health 
facilities), people identified security of tenure, and the ability to use the building as a 
way of generating an income. 
Cattle have also been very important in South Africa as collateral, sacrifices in rituals, 
retirement plans, and as a means of rural saving (Schmidt, 1992) as well as for 
draught power, the provision of food (Sharp and Spiegel 1985); energy, fertiliser and 
building material (May, 1992). The sale of livestock is also prevalent during drought 
situations and acts as a form of insurance to poor households (Wilson and Ramphele 
1989). However, this puts households in a precarious economic position in the long 
term by affecting their ability to generate a secure livelihood. Access to traditional 
lines of credit may also collapse as the collateral offered by livestock disappears. 
Access to productive land and access to larger plots were also described as important 
and desirable assets, at least in areas with higher agricultural potential such as 
KwaZulu-Natal (May etal, 1997:101). 
Formal financial institutions were scarce in both urban and rural poor communities in 
1993, the formal institutions that are available are mostly inappropriate to the 
financial requirements of the poor. Even in the case of informal financial markets 
such as stokvels, the SA-PPA poor may be unable to participate because they cannot 
afford the joining or participation fee (May et ah, 1997: 65). Such barriers were a 
critical constraint for the very poor as community based rotating credit organisations 
are a source of food security for a large numbers of households. This would also 
impact on participation in buying-clubs which has also been documented by 
Tshabalala (1994). In these a number of families club together to buy food and other 
goods in bulk and then divide it amongst themselves to save money. Financial 
services for the marginally better off are also an important need which is not being 
fulfilled. Farmers in the SA-PPA indicated that they lack the financial resources to 
purchase agricultural inputs. These included items such as fertilisers, seeds and 
pesticides, with the hiring of tractors to plough land singled out as being particularly 
important. Even here, the high charges associated with using a hired tractor service 
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were in part linked to the inability of the tractor owners to be able to afford the 
maintenance of their equipment (May et al, 1997: 101). 
The SA-PPA confirmed that the theme of isolation or exclusion from social and 
political institutions is viewed as an important part of the experience of poverty in 
South Africa while the lack of access to legal rights and to justice was also frequently 
mentioned. This provides some support for the notion of social networks as a form of 
capital. At an individual level, other qualitative research in KwaZulu-Natal reported 
by Cross et al., (1998) found an important role for social capital, particularly in 
household responses to economic shocks. For example, individuals frequently used 
their networks to access capital both for consumption smoothing as well as for 
investment such as the start up of small income generation projects. Earlier work by 
Sharp and Spiegel (1985) also illustrates the importance of the social networks that 
are used for mutual support as a survival claiming strategy. They also note that these 
networks depend to a large extent upon access to a reliable income source, and that 
the loss of such an income can also result in the erosion of social support networks. 
As the writers observe, people cannot expect too much of their relationships with their 
neighbours, because the long-term commitment of generalised reciprocity cannot exist 
under conditions of uncertain wage labour markets, and dispossession from 
agricultural resources. Social support is also threatened in areas in which local 
productive resources and opportunities are scarce. Together with the history of forced 
resettlement, high levels of migration and extreme poverty, violence completes the 
undermining of social cohesion in South African communities observed by many 
South African researchers during the 1980s (Sharp and Speigel,1985; Simon, 1991, 
Wilson and Ramphele, 1989). Many communities are divided and have little 
commonality in terms of needs and aspirations, a social context which elsewhere has 
be described as being bereft of stocks of social capital (Moser and Holland, 1997:41). 
Moving on to issues relating to vulnerability, shocks were also frequently discussed 
by participants in the SA-PPA. Although less frequent during the period of the first 
two waves of the KIDS panel which predate the impact of AIDS found in the third 
wave of the survey, the death of family members appears to be one of the more severe 
shocks which rapidly tumbles vulnerable households into poverty (May et al., 1997; 
Carter et al., 2007). A concern already emerging during this period is that besides the 
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shock impact, the AIDS epidemic has introduced a new long term trend of 
impoverishment and she argues that one of the principal effects of AIDS at an 
individual level is that the household of the victim will become poorer. This is due to 
high expenditure on travelling costs, admission fees, fees for healers, clinic fees and 
funeral expenses (as well as the loss of labour from the sufferer and the carers). There 
are also specific links between gender, shocks and the impact of AIDS. 
Reflecting on these events, May et al, (1997:32) suggest that shocks serve to entrench 
a culture of poverty consisting of fatalism, despondency and powerlessness in the face 
of apparently random negative events. An additional impact of shocks relates to the 
formation and fragmentation of the households already mentioned. May et al, (1997: 
32) suggest that tensions and cleavages within households and communities become 
more intense in the face of shocks leading to a tendency for households and 
communities to fragment, and for individuals to seek other places in which to live. 
Largely, this is due to the differential impact of shocks on the members of the 
household, each of whom adopt their own way of coping. 
In terms of entitlement failure, drought is probably the most common shock to the 
livelihoods of rural households in sub-Saharan Africa, and despite its level of 
urbanisation, South Africa is no exception to this. Numerous participants in the SA-
PPA referred to the impact of drought as a reason for declining livelihood prospects 
(May et al, 1997:32). Seasonal stress more generally has long been recognised as a 
feature of the livelihoods of the rural poor in many contexts (Jiggins, 1986; Swift 
1989). An assumption has prevailed in South Africa, however, that due to the 
relatively smaller statistical importance of own account agriculture, even for the rural 
poor, this would be less the case. The material from the SA-PPA, however, indicates 
that seasonality is a major issue for the rural poor in all areas where these studies were 
carried out. 
Finally, turning to economic reasons for entitlement failures, access to markets at 
which home-produced commodities could be sold was one area expressed by many 
participants as a need. The cost and availability of transport to markets emerged as a 
specific barrier. As an example from a KIDS' district in KwaZulu-Natal, participants 
in a community garden in Hlabisa indicated that while they would have liked to sell 
surplus production, the nearest urban market required a 30 minute bus ride (May et 
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al., 1997:111). Access to information also emerged as a barrier to development 
whereby SA-PPA, participants said that: ".. .they are determined to help themselves 
but didn't know how", while others participants expanded by saying: "We don't 
know what we can ask for, we don't know who to ask, and we don't know how to 
ask" (May e? a/., 1997: 111). 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter further developed the concept of asset-based dynamic measurement of 
poverty and has put forward a new typology of poverty. Assessing the components of 
this approach (entitlement failure, entitlement windfalls, endowment windfall and 
endowment loss), the chapter argues that the dynamic approach provides a better fit of 
the events encountered by the surveyed households over time than does the 
conventional transition matrix approach used by most analysts of chronic poverty. 
Instead, seven groups of household have been identified according to their structural 
position as determined by the changes in assets and consumption-based well-being 
that the household has experienced between 1993 and 1998. Four of these groups 
represent structural positions: the structurally poor; the structurally upward; the 
structurally downward and the never poor. Three are transitory positions dependent 
upon bad or good fortune between 1993 and 2004. These are the dual failures 
(unlucky in two or more years); stochastically upward (fortunate in 1998 or 2005); 
and the stochastically downward (fortunate in 1993). 
Comparing the data reported by the KIDS respondents with information from the SA-
PPA undertaken between the two waves of KIDS provides useful corroborating 
evidence. Participates in the SA-PPA provide commentary on job losses, the death 
and illness of household members, theft and destruction of property, and in each case, 
link these shocks to permanent declines in income. Education is perceived as an 
important route out of poverty, while access to land provides a buffer against 
misfortune, unreliable remittances from migrants and job loss. Access to finance is 
also identified as an important constraint. How these assets are translated into a source 
of livelihood will be the focus of the final empirical chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DIVERSIFICATION AND DIFFERENTIATION IN KWAZULU-NATAL 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
A more detailed analysis of livelihoods than that provided in Chapter Six is required if 
we are to use this approach to understand the South African experience of chronic 
poverty and differentiation. The questions addressed in this chapter are thus: what are 
the different asset portfolios controlled by households in the KIDS cohort; what are 
the bundles of livelihood activities undertaken by individuals and households when 
using their assets; what are the returns that households achieve when implementing 
this strategy; what shocks do they encounter; and finally, do these strategies result in 
shared pathways of accumulation/dispossession that are derived from differential 
livelihood opportunities? 
7.2 MEASURING LIVELIHOODS AND DIVERSIFICATION 
7.2.1 Assets 
As was proposed in Chapter Three (Section 4.3), the well-being of poor households is 
shaped by their ability to diversify assets and livelihood strategies. Using the KIDS 
data, this section begins the measurement of this diversification and will examine the 
changing incidence of the ownership and value of assets identified in the Asset 
Portfolio developed in Chapter Three (Section 4.2). The portfolio identified five broad 
categories of assets: human capital and capabilities; social, legal and political capital; 
natural resources; productive capital and financial capital. Each of these broad groups 
was further broken into specific assets that potentially could be used by individuals 
and households when assembling a livelihood strategy. 
KIDS collected information on the ownership and use of only some of these assets. 
Furthermore, in many instances, actually measuring the assets that were listed is 
complex and easily subject to measurement error. As an example, the measurement of 
social capital remains an imprecise and disputed 'science', while the value of 
common property is also difficult to allocate between households who may enjoy 
differential access to such property. In addition, most poor households manage a 
complex portfolio of assets that might include private and communal land, 
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individually owned and shared livestock, skilled and unskilled labour, monetary and 
other forms of savings including food stocks and household durables, and finally 
social networks of kin and neighbours. Finally some assets may be embedded in the 
unobservable characteristics of individuals such as their entrepreneurship, skill or 
ability to cope. The analysis presented here is, then, an incomplete view of the 
complex livelihood strategies that actually take place. 
Table 7.1 shows the percentage of the households surveyed in each of the three waves 
of KIDS that had access to those assets that can be identified and measured. 
Table 7.1: Access to Assets 
Assets 
Human Capital 
Skilled Labour (Std 8 and above)97 
Social, Legal and Political Capital98 
Membership of a group 
Person of pensionable age99 
Adult migrant family member100 
Natural Capital 
Land for cultivation 
Access to private grazing land 
Physical Capital 
Livestock (incl. poultry) 
Agricultural Equipment 
Other Productive Equipment 
Permanent House (Brick or block)101 
Piped water connection 
Electricity connection 
Financial Capital 
Savings in a bank or elsewhere 















































I Skilled labour refers to a person in the economically active age group (16-63) listed as a household 
member although not necessarily resident for at least 15 days out of the previous 30 days. 
98/ The direction of causality is a concern: belonging to groups might provide opportunities to increase 
income, or, greater membership of groups might require greater income. Following our previous work 
on social capital using the KIDS data, group membership is assumed to be a potential resource to 
households (Maluccio et al., 2000). This information was gathered only in 1998 and 2004. Membership 
for 1993 was obtained through a retrospective question. The memory and identity of the respondent is 
potentially a source of error and these figures may be understated. 
99/ Age eligibility for an Old Age Pension (OAP) grant was 60 for women and 64 for men during the 
period covered by KIDS. The OAP is a means tested non-contributory grant that has been found to 
make a significant contribution to household well-being (Case and Deaton, 1998). The Child Support 
Grant (CSG) introduced in 1998 potentially adds a new asset: an eligible child. I have not included 
these children as an asset to the household assuming that the grant is equal to their subsistence needs. 
100/ Adult migrants refer to a person 16-63 years of age that is regarded as a family member, but who 
spent more than 15 days out of the previous month away from the homestead. 
1 V In 1993 and 2004 the type of dwelling unit was recorded. In 1998 only the building material of the 
walls were recorded. In this year, dwellings with brick or block walls have been designated as formal. 
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The data show an improvement in ownership in almost all categories of asset with 
declines experienced only in access to private grazing land and the indicators used for 
social, legal and political capital. Educated labour saw an increase from 61 percent of 
households containing someone who had completed Standard 8 or higher in 1993 to 
89 percent by 2004. Group membership saw a noteworthy increase from 60 percent 
of households in 1993 to 74 percent in 1998, falling back to 54 percent in 2004. 
Although the 1993 figure is derived from a retrospective question in 1998, there is no 
reason to ascribe the change between 1998 and 2004 to a change in methodology. To 
the extent that group membership represents a form of social capital, this suggests an 
undermining of this resource in the more recent period. 
Just fewer than 40 percent of the households surveyed in 1993 had access to a plot of 
land for the cultivation of crops in 1993, increasing to 52 percent in 1998 and 56 
percent in 2004. Furthermore, average land size for these households increased from 
around one hectare in 1993 and 1998 to 2.7 ha. in 2004. A transition matrix of asset 
ownership (not shown) reveals that although just 25 percent of the resurveyed 
households did not have access to land in any wave, 22 percent had land in all three, 9 
percent had lost access to land after 1998, while 14 percent gained land in 1998 and a 
further 15 percent gained land by 2004. Land, at least in KwaZulu-Natal, seems to be 
an asset that is being accumulated by the KIDS cohort as they age 
A similar pattern of broadening access to agricultural assets is found with respect to 
the ownership of livestock, with some 34 percent of the KIDS households owning 
livestock in 1993 with an average holding of 2.9 livestock units (LSU) valued at 
approximately R4700 in 2000 prices.102 This increases to just less than 40 percent of 
households in 1998 with the average herd size also increasing to 3.2 LSU, and to 45 
percent of households by 2004 although with a smaller mean holding of 2.0 LSU. 
Even with this increase, the incidence of livestock ownership is substantially lower 
than that reported by studies undertaken in KwaZulu-Natal during the 1970s and early 
1980s. For example, Erskine, (1982:1) reports that 64 percent of African households 
in Natal and the former Homeland of KwaZulu owned livestock in 1965, and using 
l02/ The livestock unit (LSU) is a standardized animal unit obtained by multiplying total number of 
animals with conversion factors that take into account "feed requirements" for the animal. Although 
several alternative factors are available, this thesis makes use of the Food and Agricultural 
Organisation's (FAO) conversion factors for South Africa available at 
http://www.fao.org/es/ess/os/envi indi/annex2.asp and provided in Appendix Two. 
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data from five districts of KwaZulu between 1983 and 1986, May (1987b:5) reports 
that 60 percent of households owned livestock. While increasing urbanisation will be 
a major explanation for this trend in some areas, drought conditions, the population 
expansion in dense rural settlements that did not have access to grazing land and the 
absence of economic opportunity due to apartheid and subsequent policies are also 
likely to have contributed. 
Ownership of agricultural and other productive equipment is initially limited to 28 
and 15 percent of the surveyed households respectively in 1993, increasing to 62 
percent of households by 2004 in the case of agricultural equipment and 17 percent in 
the case of non-agricultural equipment. Just under a quarter of households had a 
person of pensionable age in 1993, increasing to 37 percent by 2004, while about 40 
percent had a member of the household who was a migrant in another area in 1993 
declining to 32 percent by 2004. These changes are likely to be a reflection of life-
course changes as suggested by the age-sex pyramids in Appendix One. 
Although also considered to be basic services, as Moser (1998a) argues, housing and 
the services available in houses are important assets, especially for poor households 
who often make use of the house as a site of productive activity. Improvements in 
housing assets are shown using the percentage of households living in permanent 
structures that have brick or block walls, having access to piped water and having an 
electricity connection. As already noted in Chapter Five (Section 2.4), there has been 
a modest improvement, with the increase in the incidence of electricity connections 
being more noteworthy than the other indicators. Permanent housing is significantly 
more frequent in 2004 in comparison to the previous years. 
Lastly, the percentage of households reporting savings in a bank account shows a 
remarkable increase from just 24 percent in 1993 to 61 percent in 1998 with a decline 
to 41 percent in 2004. It is possible that this decline is attributable to the aging 
population contained within KIDS, and indeed access to bank accounts was more 
frequently reported by the next generation households. However it is also likely that 
the respondents had become more wary of divulging financial information by 2004 
and that this is an under-estimate of the incidence of access to savings facilities. 
Valuing these assets is obviously complex. As an example, what value should be 
184 
placed on an uneducated person that, as Carter and May (1999) demonstrate, may 
have a economic return below that person's subsistence requirement, but who might 
be undertaking valuable unpaid work in the household? What value should be 
attached to access to irrigated land, but not to a pump with which to distribute the 
water? And finally, how are groups to be valued when membership might be both the 
outcome of, and a reason for, financial prosperity? 
I have opted to adopt three conventional strategies to deal with these problems. First, 
respondents in the KIDS survey of 1998 and 2004 were asked to estimate the value of 
assets such as land, buildings, equipment and furniture that they had access to and I 
have summed these. Where the data are missing, I have used the median amount to 
value individual assets.103 I then summed those productive, natural and financial 
capitals that can be valued using the KIDS data which I have referred to as the group 
of economic capitals. Secondly, I have calculated present values for 'unearned 
incomes' such as remittances and grants and used this as a proxy for social, legal and 
political capital.104 Finally, the value of human capital in each wave of data collection 
is measured as the mean years of education of household members over the age of 20 
in the year of the survey. The results are shown in Table 7.2. 
Table 7.2: Value of Assets (2000 Prices) 
Assets 
Economic Capital105 
Human Capital (years of education) 













* statistically different at the 95 percent confidence interval between years. 
n=840 
There has been an increase in the mean value of land, livestock, equipment, durables 
/ Values for durable goods were not collected in 1993 and the value of these items has been imputed 
using the median of 1998 figures. 
104/ A modest interest rate of 5 percent per annum is assumed, and recognising the life-cycle effects and 
the often tenuous nature of these claims, the income stream is discounted over five years. Although 
perhaps a crude outcome based measure, this approach does not rely on assumptions regarding the 
value and costs of group membership used more commonly as an indicator of social capital. However 
this approach does not take in to account the possibility that group membership might indirectly affect 
household income through increasing returns on other assets (land, labour). In Maluccio et al, (2000) 
we show that this does occur, although largely through groups that are intended to promote savings or 
entrepreneurial activity. 
1 5/ Several households were identified as having a strong influence the distribution of these data. After 
investigation, I have removed ten cases for this analysis as being likely errors or outliers. As examples, 
HHIDs 620140 and 2140020 reported economic assets worth in excess of R4 million in 1993 and 1998 
respectively, but reported low or zero asset values in 1998 and 1993 respectively. 
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and savings (economic capitals), the mean number of years of education (human 
capital), and the mean present value of remittances, pensions and other grants (social, 
legal and political capitals). However, only in the case of human capital are the 
results statistically different across all three years. The mean value of economic 
capitals dramatically increases from 1993 to 1998, though this result must be treated 
with caution as it is largely driven by the increase in the value of durable goods rather 
than assets that are conventionally though of a being productive. To some extent this 
is likely to be the result of the expanded list of assets which were collected in 1998 
and 2004 and need not reflect a significant increase in the wealth of households in the 
face of increasing expenditure-based poverty reported in Chapter Six (Section 2.1). 
The mean value of social, legal and political capital also increases substantially 
between 1998 and 2004. This most likely reflects the introduction of the CSG in 1998 
that increased the number of people eligible for state transfers. 
The aggregated figures conceal significant mobility within the sample and some of 
this variation in experience is shown in Table 7.3. This provides the means and 
median values (in italics) of the measured assets by quintiles of the normalised real 
household expenditure measure used in Chapter Six (Section 3.1). 


















































































































'/ Recall that this is total household expenditure divided by the Hoogeveen and Ozler poverty line. 
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While all expenditure groups improved their situation between 1993 and 1998 in 
terms of the economic capitals that have been measured, only the top two quintiles 
sustained this progress to 2004. In the case of the social, legal and political capital 
that has been measured, all groups except the top quintile experience similar 
increases, which is to be expected given that the grants that make up the bulk of this 
category are means tested and thus would not be accessible to the majority of the 
wealthier group. This is confirmed by the median which confirms that more than 50 
percent of this group did not have this asset. Finally, all groups experienced an 
increase in the mean number of years of education although the rate of change is 
highest for the poorest quintile. 
In terms of differences arising from spatial location, Table 7.4 shows the value of 
assets of households surveyed in all three waves according to the spatial classification 
of the 1993 PSLDS. Once again means and median (in italics) are provided.107 


























































Substantial and statistically significant differences emerge between households in 
urban and non-urban areas in terms of their access to most assets.108 This is especially 
noteworthy for the assets that make up economic capitals, in which households in 
urban areas have experienced a sustained increase since 1993 while non-urban 
households experienced first growth and then decline. Urban areas were also more 
advantaged in terms of access to human capital in 1993 and, despite rapid gains made 
by non-urban households urban households were able to maintain this position. Non-
urban households do enjoy an advantage in terms of social, legal and political capital, 
at least in the way which these have been measured for this thesis. In respect of 
107/ The results are similar if the population density variable released in 2004 is used. 
10 / T Tests for the equality of means were significant for all assets and all years with the exception of 
social, legal and political capital in 1998. Levene's Tests for the equality of variance were significant 
for all assets and all years with the exception of social, legal and political capital in 1998 and 2000, and 
human capital in 2004. 
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remittances and grants, non-urban households are better off in all three years. 
Access to assets is also strongly determined by gender relations and, as a proxy 
indicator of this, Table 7.5 shows the value of the measured assets for households 
surveyed in all three waves by the sex of the household head. Again means and 
median (in italics) are provided. 
Table 7.5: Value of Assets by Sex of Head (2000 Prices) 
Sex of Head 
De facto S 








































































The asset data follows a similar picture to the poverty profile described in Chapter 
Five (Section 2.1) with some interesting insights being added. De facto male headed 
households emerge as having significantly higher economic capital compared to either 
of the female headed households, while dejure female headed households are 
poorer in terms of this asset. In the case of social, legal and political capital, dejure 
female headed households have a comparatively high value of this asset, while de 
facto female households are poorer than the other groups, although they experience a 
dramatic improvement in 2004, most likely due to the introduction of the CSG. 
Finally de facto male headed households have the highest human capital, although the 
difference between the groups is not as striking as is the case with the other assets.11 
The last table in this section returns to Carter and May's (2001) structural poverty 
classes discussed and revised in Chapter 6 (Section 6.2). The revised classification is 
used in Table 7.6. Means and medians (in italics) are provided. 
/ T Tests for the equality of means were significant for all assets and all years. Levene's Tests for the 
equality of variance were significant for all years with the with the exception of de facto female and de 
jure female heads in 1998. 
u o / T Tests for the equality of means were significant for all assets and all years with the exception of 
social, legal and political capital in 1998. Levene's Tests for the equality of variance were significant 
for all assets and all years with the exception of social, legal and political capital in 1998 and 2000, and 
human capital in 2004. 
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The Structurally Poor group have noticeably less access to the economic capital in all 
years compared to all groups other than those households classified as stochastically 
mobile. The structurally poor group also has the least access to human capital, and of 
the groups classified as poor, the least access to the measure of social, legal and 
political capital. Interestingly, the structurally downward group appears well 
resourced in terms of the economic and social, legal and political capitals, but has 
comparatively low access to human capital. This might be the result of the life-course 
of these households and this will be examined later in this chapter. 
The advantage that the structurally not-poor group enjoy in terms of access to key 
assets emerges as an important feature of this table. Access to human capital was far 
more evident among the structurally not-poor in 1993 than for any of the other 
structural poverty classes. However, this gap is closing, especially in comparison to 
the structurally upward. This possible explanation of changing well-being will be 
returned to later in this chapter. 
7.2.2 Activities111 
Four broad classes of activity that make use of the assets available to the household in 
different combinations in order to generate a livelihood. Households surveyed in the 
11V In Chapter Three I referred to both activities and tactics when discussing the actions that poor 
households take in assembling a livelihood strategy. For the purposes of this chapter I will confine the 
discussion to activities only since many of the actions that might be thought of as survival tactics are 
difficult to identify or measure in a quantitative survey. The examples referred to in Chapter Three 
included actions such as scrimping, adaptation, unpaid domestic labour and changing household size or 
composition. 
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KIDS study reflect this diversification and Table 7.7 shows the incidence of 
livelihood activities that can be identified and measured for all households surveyed 
in the 1993, 1998 and 2004 waves of data collection. 
Table 7.7: Incidence of Livelihood Activities 
Activity 
Wage Labour112 
Primary labour market 
Secondary labour market 
Casual labour 
Agricultural 
Crop production (subsistence only) 
Crop production (marketed) 
Livestock production (subsistence only) 




State Old Age Pensions (OAP)113 
Other welfare payments 

















































The table shows that the livelihood activities most frequently attempted over the 
course of the study are: employment in the primary labour market (some 35 percent in 
1993 and 1998 but falling to 30 percent in 2004), state OAP, subsistence crop 
production and subsistence livestock production. In the case of pensions, it is not 
/ The PSLSD questionnaire was not designed to provide accurate labour market information and as a 
result, the KIDS panel is an imperfect instrument for the analysis of labour market segmentation. I 
have defined secondary labour as all labourers, agricultural workers and domestic workers. All other 
forms of regular employment have been defined as being in the primary labour market. Arguably, 
casual employment could also be included into the secondary labour market. However, the manner in 
which the question was posed in 1993, 1998 and 2004 suggests that a wide range of answers may have 
been provided. In all three questionnaires, this question read: "Did (Read each name in turn) do any 
casual or temporary work in the past month for which he/she was paid in some way, for example, by 
being given money or food?" and gave as examples: "Examples of the kind of work I mean include: 
gardening or cleaning, typing, temporary work in a factory, looking after someone's children, and so 
on". The code list also included professional and managerial activities. For this reason, casual labour 
lies as the subsistence end of the continuum and has been kept as a separate item in the analysis to 
follow. 
113/ Note that the CSG, now an important source of livelihood for many poor households, was only 
introduced in 1998 and none of the surveyed households reported receipt of this grant in the 1998 wave 
of KIDS. 
I14/ The PSLSD provides information on payments received from employee contributory pensions, 
workman's compensation and UIF. 
115/ Households that received a cash or kind remittance every month or more frequently, were regarded 
as having a regular remittance. Households that received a cash or kind remittance less frequently were 
regarded as having an irregular remittance. 
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surprising that there has been an increase in the proportion of households deriving an 
income from this source given the underlying demographic changes that take place 
over the course of any panel study. The sudden increase in other welfare payments in 
2004 is due to the take up in the CSG, while the decline in secondary labour market 
activities, and accompanying increase in casual labour, suggests a move to casualised 
labour that has been seen in other surveys. This might also be a result of the aging 
structure of KIDS households in which older people are no longer permanently 
employed. This change may also be simply due to the change in the questions asked 
in 1993 and 1998 although this would not account for the decline in 2004 when the 
questions were identical to 1998. 
Although a marginal increase, there is a statistically significant difference for those 
marketing livestock, from 5 to 9.5 percent between 1993 and 1998, with about 0.5 
LSU being sold per annum by those households engaging in this activity in both 
years. Regular and irregular remittances first increase and then decline as a source of 
income while involvement in SMME activities was confined to some 18 percent of 
the sample in 1993 falling to 14 percent in 1998 and 15 percent in 2004, half of which 
are in the distribution and hawking sub-sector. 
The livelihood activities engaged in by households in 1993 to 2004 suggest greater 
stability than might have been expected given the considerable mobility in incomes 
described by Agiiero et al, (2007). Nonetheless, these findings are consistent with 
previous research that has shown that multiple income sources are an important 
characteristic of poor households (May, 1987a; Murray, 1987; Sharp and Spiegel, 
1985). This characteristic has persisted well into the post-apartheid period, and in 
fact grown with some 37 percent of the core KIDS households relying upon a single 
livelihood strategy in 1993, which declined to just 24 percent of households by 1998 
and 21 percent in 2004, a statistically significant change. Once again, this 
diversification might reflect life course changes in the KIDS cohort. 
As with access to assets, involvement in these livelihood activities differs according 
to household type. Table 7.8 shows the percentage of households according to the sex 
and residential status of the head of household. 
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Table 7.8: Incidence of Livelihood Activity by Sex of Household Head 
Activity 
Wage Labour 
Primary labour market * 
Secondary labour market # 
Casual labour# 
Agricultural116 
Crop production * 




Old Age Pension (OAP) * 
Other welfare payments # 
Contrib. social protection 
Regular remittances * 





























































































































* denotes that chi square tests show a significant difference between the headship groups at the 0.05 
level of confidence in all years. # denotes that chi square tests show a significant difference between 
the headship groups at the 0.05 level of confidence in one year only. 
The most striking difference between those households headed by men and those 
headed by women is that just under half of male-headed households (49 percent 
falling to 37 percent by 2004) with a resident head derive an income from 
employment in the primary labour market compared to between 29 and 21 percent of 
dejure female-headed households and less than ten percent of households with an 
absent male head. Incomes from the secondary labour market are more evenly 
distributed according to the sex of the household head, although once again few de 
facto female-headed households derive an income directly from this source. Instead 
these households derive incomes through regular remittances from a migrant who 
may be employed in this sector of the labour market. However, the incidence of both 
regular and irregular remittances decline between 1993 and 2004 for all groups. 
Incomes in cash or kind from crop and livestock production are also concentrated in 
this group with approximately 40 and 51 percent of de facto female-headed 
households deriving incomes from these sources respectively. Although the incidence 
of participation in agricultural activities changes significantly between 1993 and 2004 
/ For this and future tables, subsistence and marketed agricultural production has been combined due 
to the small number of households involved in marketed production. 
117/ Recall that household headship has had to be imputed in 2004 and the difference in sample size 
arises from heads that died between 1998 and 2004 resulting in the exclusion of these households from 
the analysis. 
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for this group, for de facto male-headed, and dejure female-headed, there was a 
noticeable increase in 1998 and again in 2004 in the proportion of households 
involved in crop production. Taken with the corresponding declines in the incidence 
of households in these groups who were receiving incomes from primary and 
secondary labour market involvement, the greater reliance on agricultural production 
and remittances among these households therefore is likely to reflect either the 
absence of other income-earning or income-generating opportunities available to 
household members or the inability of members to seek out such opportunities. An 
increasingly large number of the dejure female-headed households were in receipt of 
the OAP, reflecting the longer life expectancy of women, although the incidence of 
households in receipt of the OAP increased for all of the groups. Access to other state 
welfare increases dramatically for all groups, but most noticeably for the two women 
headed household groups. 
The continued and rising dominance ofde facto female-headed households in 
agricultural activities merits further comment. In South Africa during the 1980s, 
Sharp and Spiegel (1990) noted that arable activities were actively encouraged as 
wives were expected to engage in these activities to share in the husband's attempts to 
build a homestead as a rural resource base against the day of their retirement from 
oscillating migration. However, they argued that men might also prevent, or try to 
prevent, women within their household from engaging in certain non-farm income 
generating activities, such as the running of shebeens/tavems and hawking (Sharp and 
Spiegel, 1990: 530). This control over the allocation of labour roles appeared to differ 
between communities. In areas in which a local economy has some longer term 
viability, they noted that men appeared to be more willing to sanction their wives 
engaging in such cash earning activities, or were less able to enforce control over 
women's work. In addition, Sharp and Spiegel suggest that women were increasingly 
able to, or were forced by economic necessity, to defy such attempts to regulate their 
choice of livelihood activities. The similarity between male and female participation 
in SMME activity in the KIDS data suggests that this resistance has been at least in 
part successful. 
Finally, while the period under investigation in the KIDS study is one in which all 
constraints on the movement of the African population had been removed, it seems 
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that aspects of this gender based diversification persisted and that households 
continued to split their efforts between migration for employment while still (and 
perhaps increasingly so) maintaining a rural and agrarian based homestead. It is not 
surprising then that spatial location remains an important determinant of livelihood 
options as is shown in Table 7.9. 
Table 7.9: Incidence of Livelihood Activity by Spatial Location 
Activity 
Wage Labour 
Primary labour market * 
Secondary labour market 
Casual labour 
Agricultural 
Crop production * 




Old Age Pension (OAP) * 
Other welfare payments 
Contrib. social protection 
Regular remittances * 














































































* denotes that chi square tests show a significant difference between the spatial groups at the 0.05 level 
of confidence in all years. # denotes that chi square tests show a significant difference between the 
spatial groups at the 0.05 level of confidence in one year only. 
Almost three times the proportion of urban households participated in primary labour 
market activities in all years than did the non-urban households and there was a steady 
decline in both areas in terms of the incidence of this activity, most noticeably in the 
urban areas. Secondary labour market participation was more concentrated among 
non-urban households, although the difference between urban and non-urban was not 
statistically significant in 1998 or 2004. Not surprisingly, crop and livestock 
production were concentrated in non-urban areas, although it is noteworthy that the 
percentage of urban households involved in crop production increased from just 2 
percent to almost 22 percent by 2004. Non-urban households also tended to 
participate more in livelihood activities involving claiming, especially from the OAP, 
other state grants and from both regular and irregular remittances. In the case of other 
state grants, the percentage of households adopting such activities had increased 
significantly in both urban and non-urban areas between 1993 and 2004 while the 
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incidence of the OAP had increased slightly. Interestingly remittances received by 
urban households steadily increase over the period of the survey although these 
differences are not significant. 
Finally, Table 7.10 compares the livelihood activities undertaken by the structural 
poverty classes developed in Chapter Six. In order to simplify the table, the groups 
whose position was deemed to be stochastically determined have been excluded from 
this analysis. 
Table 7.10: Incidence of Livelihood Activity by Poverty Class 
Activity 
Wage Labour 
Primary labour mkt * 
Secondary labour mkt § 
Casual labour # 
Agricultural 
Crop production * 





Other welfare payments 
































































































































































* denotes chi square tests that show a significant difference between the poverty groups at the 0.05 
level of confidence in 1993 and 1998. # and § denote chi square tests that show a significant difference 
between the poverty groups at the 0.05 level of confidence in one and two years respectively. 
The reliance of the structurally not-poor group upon livelihoods earned in the primary 
labour market is evident, with more than 50 percent of the households in this category 
deriving income from this source. Most other livelihood activities were engaged in by 
less than 25 percent of this group in any of the study years, although the modest 
increase in participation in crop production and the incomes derived from the OAP 
are noteworthy. In contrast, just 11 percent of the households in the structurally poor 
group participated in the primary labour market in 1993, increasing slightly to 17 
percent by 2004. However 34 percent of this group derived income from the 
secondary labour market in 1993, falling to 29 percent by 1998 and 5 percent in 2004. 
Instead the incidence of crop production and access to the OAP both increased from 
24 percent to 55 percent, and 27 percent to 43 percent of households in this group 
respectively. The dramatic increase in livelihoods derived from other state grants is 
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particularly evident among this group. 
The structurally downward group of households is of particular concern since in time, 
this group will swell the numbers of the Structurally Poor households. This group has 
seen a decline in the percentage of households with members in both the primary and 
secondary labour markets but an increase in the percentage involved in casual labour. 
Unlike the other groups, access to the OAP declined between 1998 and 2004, perhaps 
due to the death of a pensioner, and perhaps contributing towards their households' 
declining well-being. Finally, although small, the structurally upward group is 
interesting as this group promises the option of escape from poverty. However, their 
upward mobility appears to have emanated from the access gained to livelihoods in 
the primary and casual labour markets and in SMME activities. Curiously, this group 
also did not see an increase in the proportion of households in receipt of an OAP. 
Finally a short comment on non-monetised livelihood activities is required. These 
were not collected by the KIDS questionnaire, although the qualitative data contained 
in the SA-PPA and similar studies are able to reveal some of the activities in the 
South African context. The SA-PPA describes activities such as performing casual 
labour in exchange for food; helping to harvest maize, pumpkins, potatoes and beans 
in exchange for food; receiving gifts of food from neighbours either on request or 
given freely; using children to fetch water in exchange for food. 
7.2.3 Outcomes 
Household incomes and adequacy of these incomes have already been discussed in 
the poverty profile presented earlier. The purpose of this section is to describe the 
individual outcomes of the livelihood activities that are employed by households. The 
contribution made by these different activities to overall household income is a useful 
starting point. The percentage of total income contributed by the source for all 
households, and for those who receive income from this source is shown in Table 7.11 
on the next page, along with the mean and median (in italics) amounts earned by 
households engaged in the activity. 
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There have been some important shifts in the amounts generated by some of the 
livelihoods strategies being undertaken. Real mean and median incomes derived from 
primary and secondary labour have increased over all three yeas and the means are 
significantly different. 
The mean percentage of household income derived from each of these sources also 
increased between 1993 and 1998, and between 1998 and 2004. These differences are 
also statistically significant. 
/ The total household income used in this table differs from the income provided in the original 
KIDS data due to additional imputations and the exclusion of imputed rental incomes. 
119/ 
/ This is not to imply that real wage rates may have increased since these are aggregate figure for 
the household and not per worker. 
197 
Mean household incomes from casual labour more than doubled between 1993 and 
1998, before declining slightly in 2004. The differences in the means for 1993 and 
1998 are again statistically different. The mean share of income derived from this 
source has increased from just under 33 percent to 50 percent in 2004. 
A cautious interpretation of these results must start by acknowledging that there has 
been some inconsistency in the questionnaire design regarding the classification of the 
type of work across the survey years, with apparent confusion between work in the 
formal labour market and casual labour in all years. Notwithstanding this, incomes 
earned from primary wage labour rose between 1993 and 2004, while both incomes 
and the share of income derived from irregular sources increased between 1993 and 
1998 and then declined. 
Similar trends have been found in earlier studies. In the 1992 Income and 
Expenditure study of KwaZulu-Natal, it was found that wages comprised 46 percent 
of household income, remittances made up 18 percent, 14 percent was derived from 
pensions and social welfare, five percent from agricultural activity, and 15 percent 
from income from entrepreneurial activities (DRA, 1993 a). The 1993 National Rural 
Energy Survey reports that 36 percent of household income is derived from wages, 25 
percent from remittances, 18 percent from pensions and social welfare, five percent 
from agriculture, and eight percent from entrepreneurial income (DRA, 1993b). 
Moreover, there are indications that this dependency on wage labour has increased 
over time. Comparing income and expenditure studies undertaken in 1985 and 1992 
in KwaZulu-Natal, the proportional breakdown of the source of income does not 
appear to have changed radically between 1985 and 1992 although there are a number 
of important shifts (Nattrass and May, 1986; DRA 1993a). In 1985, wages and 
remittances accounted for 76 percent of household income compared to 64 percent in 
1992. Pensions and transfers were virtually unchanged as a proportion although the 
amount received had substantially increased. Income from agriculture had declined 
from eight percent in 1985 to six percent in 1992. Finally, income from 
entrepreneurial activities had increased from 1.5 percent to 15 percent. 
At one level then the changes in the importance of wage employment among the 
KIDS households is unsurprising given that at least part of the period covered by 
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KIDS was one of job losses while global trends in employment have seen an increase 
in casualised labour. However this finding could also account to for the widening 
inequality observed in the Mobility Planes provided in Chapter Six (Section 3.3), 
whereby those with waged employment have been able to benefit from the economic 
and political reforms in the post 1994 period and the incomes that they receive from 
this livelihood activity have increased both in absolute terms and relative to their 
other sources of income. 
Turning to crop production, although mean incomes received, and the contribution to 
total income, appear to have declined by more than half between 1993 and 1998, there 
is a recovery by 2004. However the variation in the data, particularly in 1993, means 
that these figures are not statistically different. This result is supported by findings 
from earlier studies where it has been noted that although households maximise what 
they can from available land and livestock, agriculture is not the mainstay of rural 
households' existence (Bembridge, 1990; Heron, 1991; May, 1992). The increase in 
the incidence of crop production has already been noted, while the decline in the share 
of income contributed by crop production between 1993 and 1998 is statistically 
significant. Income derived from livestock sale and slaughter remained constant in 
terms of both the mean amount and the share of household income. 
Once again, a cautious interpretation of these results must stress the possibility of 
misreporting of agricultural output, consumption, sales and costs as well as errors 
arising from the imputations used when calculating the value of home production.120 
Nonetheless it would seem that more households are including agricultural production 
as a livelihood activity even though the contribution that is made is small and 
declining relative to other income sources, and may also be declining in real income 
terms. A possible explanation for this could lie in the increased uncertainty of income 
from regular wage employment. This explanation is given support by the respondents 
in the SA-PPA who commented on the importance of home gardens as a form of 
insurance in the face of unreliable remittance flows (May et al., 1997). 
/ Since the imputations used in each of the survey years were largely unchanged, the latter problem 
would have applied equally to all years. However, as mentioned in Chapter Four, the 1993 survey was 
conducted in the second half of the year while the 1998 and 2004 surveys were conducted in the first. 
In addition, the agricultural module of the questionnaire was redrafted in each year and so the questions 
that were asked differ in a numbers of places. 
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Although the mean income received by those involved in SMME activities increased 
by 15 percent between 1993 and 1998, while the share of income contributed by the 
source has also increased, the means are not statistically different, probably due to the 
very large variation in the 1993 data. The number of households involved in this 
source of income have declined by one third from 180 households to 120 households. 
As already noted, there has been a good deal of change in SMME participation but 
this has not translated into unambiguous changes in the income received nor in the 
mean share that this source contributes towards household incomes. Once again this 
result is probably sensitive to errors in data collected on production, sales and costs, 
but a cautious interpretation would be that SMME involvement serves as a useful 
short-term activity for the majority of households participating in this activity rather 
than as a long term strategy of accumulation. 
All forms of livelihood activity based on claiming show little change between 1993 
and 1998 either in terms of the mean or median income that is received or in the 
contribution towards total household income that this source makes. It must be 
acknowledged that this was not a period in which any dramatic changes were made to 
South African social policy since the greatest progress towards parity for the OAP and 
other grants took place prior to 1994. However the impact of the CSG is revealed in 
the share of other grants to the income of all households in 2004. These jumped from 
3 percent in 1998 to 17 percent in 2004, a statistically significant difference. 
Regular remittances remained at approximately the same mean income between 1993 
and 1998 and then declined. This source of income declines throughout the 11 year 
period in terms of its contribution towards total household income. Irregular 
remittance declined between 1993 and 1998 and then recovered both in terms of the 
mean income received from those who received income from this source and in terms 
of the share of total income that it contributed. From this, it can be observed that 
remittances persisted as an important source of income into the post-apartheid period. 
Overall, Table 7.11 repeats the finding of increasing income throughout the period 
covered by KIDS as has already been noted in Chapter 6 (Section 2.1). The 
uncertainty that this introduces into any analysis of poverty lends support for the 
asset-based forms of measurement also put forward in Chapter Six that can be applied 
to poverty measured either in terms of income or consumption. 
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As with access to assets and participation in different types of livelihood activity, 
outcomes of these activities demonstrate differences in terms of the sex of the 
household head, their spatial location and their structural livelihood class. I will 
return to these breakdowns in the discussion that follows on differentiation in which I 
use a cluster analysis to statistically identify livelihood classes. 
7.2.4 Vulnerability and Shocks 
In 1998 and 2004, in order to ascertain the incident and cost of economic shocks, 
respondents were asked whether the surveyed household had experienced any bad or 
good surprises that had hurt or benefited the family financially during the past five 
years. A list of possible negative and positive shocks was then read out to the 
respondent, and an opportunity was allowed for any unprompted responses as well. If 
a shock was identified, the respondent was then probed as to the timing of the shock, 
its duration, the loss or gain in income that resulted and the economic value of the 
positive or negative shock in terms of income gains or assets/gifts received. In the 
case of negative shocks, the respondent was also asked to estimate the expenses that 
might have been incurred. Table 7.12 shows the incident of these shocks on the 
KIDS households between each wave and over the eleven years of the panel as well 
as the mean and median (in italics) impact measured in Rand at 2000 prices. The table 
also provides the mean number of shocks per year of those who reported such events. 
Table 7.12: Incident, Mean and Median Impact of Shocks 
Negative Shock (% hhds) 
Positive Shock (% hhds) 
Mean negative (number) 
Mean positive (number) 
Total income loss (R) 
Total expenses (R) 
Total value loss (R) 
Total income gained (R) 















































I When the respondent was unable to estimate the value of the loss, median values have been 
imputed by shock type. 
201 
The vast majority of households reported both negative and positive shocks between 
1993 and 2004. Those who were poor in 2004 reported a higher incidence of negative 
and positive shocks than the non-poor, as well as a higher average number of shocks, 
and like Hunter and May's (2002) finding for the Durban region, there was a 
statistical difference between the groups in terms of the number of shocks reported by 
poor households and the expenses that they incurred as a result of the shock. 
However the difference between poor and non-poor in terms of the value of the loss 
or the income lost was not significantly different. 
T-tests of the equality of means revealed that there was not a statistical difference 
between the means and distribution of all the reported shock variables between de 
jure women headed households and other types of household heads, nor between de 
facto male headed household and other types of household head. Non-urban 
households were more likely to have experienced a shock than urban households for 
both the 1993-1998 and the 1998-2004 periods although there was no difference in 
the value of the shock in terms of income, expenses or assets. 
We would expect structural poverty classes to be differently vulnerable to negative 
and positive shocks and Table 7.13 compares the incidence and impact of shocks on 
the structural poverty classes for the total period from 1993 to 2004. 
Table 7.13: Incidence and Impact of Shocks by Poverty Class 
Negative Shock (% hhds) 
Positive Shock (% hhds) 
Mean negative (number) 
Mean positive (number) 
Total income loss (R) 
Total expenses (R) 
Total value loss (R) 
Total income gain (R) 






























































The stochastically mobile group are included in this table since it might be thought 
that shocks account for part of the mobility of this group. 
/ Levenes Test for Equality of Variance and the T-Test for Equality of Means confirmed that the 
means and distribution of poor and non-poor were statistically different for number of negative shocks 
and the value of expense. 
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The structurally downward group experienced significantly more negative shocks 
than other groups and incurred the highest expenses from these shocks. Positive 
shocks also benefited this group to a greater extent that the others in terms of income, 
though this may have more to do with the small sample size that any real difference 
and the T-Test was not significant. The structurally poor experienced significantly 
more negative shocks than other groups, with the exception of the structurally 
downward, although the expenses resulting from the shock were less for the former. 
This group also received significantly less income from positive shocks than the other 
groups. Finally the structurally not-poor experienced significantly fewer negative 
shocks that other groups and benefited more than other groups from positive shocks in 
1 9S 
terms of the value of assets or gifts received. 
When expressed as a percentage of consumption, the mean income loss amounted to 
9.4 percent of total expenditure estimated for all shocked households over the eleven 
year reporting period.126 
However this differed by structural poverty class rising to 13 percent for the 
structurally Poor category compared to 6.5 percent for the structurally not-poor, and 8 
percent for the other groups.127 Mean expenses amounted to just less thanl percent of 
the total expenditure of each structural class over the eleven years, with the exception 
of the structurally downward where this reached 1.5 percent. The mean value of assets 
lost were highest for the structurally downward and structurally poor groups at 1.5 
123/ Levenes Test for Equality of Variance and the T-Test for Equality of Means confirmed that the 
means and distribution of structurally downward and the combined mean and distribution for all other 
groups were statistically different for number of negative shocks and the value of expenses. 
124/ Levenes Test for Equality of Variance and the T-Test for Equality of Means confirmed that the 
means and distribution of structurally poor and the combined mean and distribution for all other groups 
were statistically different for value of expenses. The T-Test only was significant for the number of 
negative shocks. 
[2tI Levenes Test for Equality of Variance and the T-Test for Equality of Means confirmed that the 
means and distribution of the structurally non-poor and the combined mean and distribution for all 
other groups were statistically different for number of negative shocks and the value of assets/gifts 
received. 
126/1 calculated this measure of the severity of the impact of the shock by calculating the different 
shock effects as the percentage of the total of the sum the 1993 household annual income adjusted to 
2000 prices for five years plus the total of the sum the 1998 household's annual income adjusted to 
2000 prices for six years. A more precise estimate would make use of the growth rate of household 
expenditure between each wave of data collection but is unnecessary for the illustrative purpose of this 
paragraph. 
127/ Levenes Test for Equality of Variance and the T-Test for Equality of Means confirmed that the 
means and distribution of the results of structurally poor and the structurally not-poor and the combined 
mean and distribution for all other groups were statistically different for value of income loss expressed 
as a percentage of total expenditure over eleven years. 
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percent and 1.2 percent of total expenditure over eleven years respectively, compared 
to 0.7 percent for the other groups. Turning to positive shocks, the mean value of 
assets gained equalled 1.7 percent of the total expenditure of the structurally not-poor, 
1.6 percent for the structurally downward and below 0.5 percent for all of the other 
groups. Finally the mean value of income gained was equal to 5.5 percent for the 
structurally downward and stochastically mobile groups, and between 3 and 4 percent 
for the other groups. 
Given the economic, social and political changes that took place during the eleven 
years of the KIDS data collection, it is of interest to catalogue the incidence of the 
different types of shocks about which information was collected. This is shown in 
Table 7.14 that identifies the specific shocks received between 1993 and 2004. 
Table 7.14: Incidence of Shock Type 
Death 
Illness 




















































































Negative shocks arising from a death in the household were a significant and 
increasing shock to the KIDS household, an unsurprising finding in view of South 
Africa's maturing HIV/AIDS epidemic. This suggests an important concern for the 
/ Death was not included in the shock module in 2004 as a detailed module on mortality was 
inserted. For this reason I have assumed that all deaths would be regarded as shocks by the respondent. 
While the death of some may have been anticipated, it seems reasonable to assume that the majority of 
deaths would have carried some economic costs given the importance of the OAP to household 
livelihoods and the costs associated with deaths due to AIDS. See Carter et ah, (2007) for a fuller 
discussion of this using the KIDS data. 
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analysis provided in this thesis, and indeed in any analysis of poverty that adopts 
measures dependent on household size and structure. Apparent improvements in 
well-being, even those that appear structural in nature, may in fact be due to a smaller 
household size if the marginal earnings of the person who has died or left the 
household are lower than the subsistence costs of maintaining that person. While this 
may not be a major issue in societies in which deaths are infrequent and are a 
normally distributed phenomenon, this will become a larger concern in societies in 
which there is a high HIV infection rate that is concentrated among the poor such as 
in South Africa (Carter et al, 2007). 
Illnesses, potentially associated with HIV/AIDS and the loss of a job, were other 
important and frequently occurring shocks, while theft is a noteworthy and rising 
occurrence, affecting some 30 percent of households over the eleven year period of 
the survey. Turning to positive shocks, the receipt of a new grant stands out, with 45 
percent of respondents indicating this as a positive event. In many cases this would 
have been the CSG, although the aging profile of the KIDS sample would mean that 
an increasing proportion of households would have members who would have 
become eligible for the OAP over time. Finally, not obvious from this table, is the 
large number of households that fell behind (and who did not appear to have received 
an entitlement shock between 1993 and 2004) that were struck by asset shocks. As 
many as 51 percent of the households who fell below the poverty line in 2004 had lost 
household assets, and in most cases this was human capital. 
7.3 IDENTIFYING LIVELIHOOD STRATEGY CLASSES 
As already noted in Chapter Five (Section 2.5), studies completed for the SA-PPA 
suggested that common characteristics in the definition given by respondents of 
poverty related to particular 'life situations'. These not only related to demographic 
characteristics, but included other social, spatial and economic attributes (May et al, 
1997:42). The composition of the livelihoods of the household was frequently given 
as the defining feature and included the assets that were owned, activities that were 
undertaken and the shocks that household members had experienced. These included 
casual labour or not working for cash, being dependent upon remittances, not owning 
129/ Strictly speaking then, receipt of the OAP should not have been a 'shock' since it will have been 
anticipated. 
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cattle, and experiencing ill health. Likewise descriptions of greater wealth also 
included livelihoods features: having household members who were wage workers; 
owning a small enterprise; deriving an income from farming. Finally, for the wealthy, 
livelihood characteristics included shop-owners and households in which there were 
people with salaried jobs. 
This suggests that it may be possible to distinguish households engaging in common 
sets of activities that make up different livelihood strategy classes. As discussed in 
Chapter Five (Section 3), this has been attempted by a number of researchers in South 
Africa. Examples include the seven categories of livelihood strategy that I identified 
in previous studies using income and expenditure data from KwaZulu-Natal and the 
PSLSD (DRA, 1993a, DRA, 1993b, May et al, 1995). These papers distinguished 
wage earning households according to the amount of income earned and the 
proportion of household income that was contributed by wages. As was pointed out 
in Chapter Five, this analysis is unsatisfactory for two key reasons. Firstly, it persists 
in the stratification of households according to income levels that are set arbitrarily, 
and secondly, it is extremely sensitive to the under-reporting of income and to 
outliers. With more complex statistical techniques, the KIDS data now allow a 
number of improvements to be made to past attempts to create a typology of 
households from a differentiation analysis. 
The discussion on differentiation (Chapter Three, Section 5 and Chapter Five, Section 
3) allows us to conceptually define a categorisation of households into livelihood 
classes, while the livelihoods function used in Chapter Six (Section 4.2) permitted the 
identification of structural poverty classes based on movement around the poverty 
threshold. From this analysis, and the findings of the SA-PPA, I hypothesise the 
following groupings of livelihood strategy and propose that these constitute different 
classes of household as narrowly defined by Elster (1986) as being the product of 
'endowment-necessitated behaviour'. 
1. Reliant upon wages earned in the primary labour market: These 
households have access to wages earned by people employed in the 'primary' 
labour market who are not categorised as migrants. This income may be 
reinvested in agricultural and non-farm production. This group is expected to 
be categorised as structurally not-poor unless the employment status of 
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household members had changed between waves, and in which case, they 
would be structurally upward, or potentially structurally downward if 
employment had been lost or the wage earner has died or moved; 
2. Reliant upon wages earned in the secondary labour market or from 
casual labour: These households have access to wages earned by people 
employed in the 'secondary' labour market or as casual labourers who are not 
categorised as migrants. This income may be reinvested in agricultural and 
non-farm production. This group is expected to be categorised as structurally 
poor or stochastically mobile depending on what other strategies are being 
adopted and with what success. This group could also move into the 
structurally downward class if employment was lost between waves; 
3. Reliant upon social grants: These households rely on social grants, 
principally the OAP and to a lesser extent the CSG, with limited other 
economic activities being attempted. Subject to the size of the household, it is 
likely that this group will be categorised in the structurally not-poor, or if they 
only became eligible between the three waves of KIDS, as structurally mobile 
or stochastically mobile. This group could also move into the structurally 
downward class if a grant-holder died or moved between waves; 
4. Reliant upon entrepreneurial activities: These are households that combine 
a mix of activities in which crop, livestock and non-farm production are 
important, although casual and secondary labour, grants, and claims on 
remitted income will also feature. It is expected that this group will largely 
be found in the structurally poor poverty class although some may be 
classified as structurally not-poor depending on the scale of the activity; 
5. Reliant upon remittances: These are households that rely upon some mix of 
regular and irregular remittances sent from a migrant family member against 
whom claims can be enforced. This income is likely to be reinvested in 
130/. In the PSLSD, income from self-employment was gathered for all types of enterprises making it 
difficult to distinguish petty commodity production from formal capitalist production. As a result, a 
class of business people and commercial farmers were included who derived substantial incomes from 
these activities. 
13V Recall that in the context of the KIDS study, a migrant is a household member who is resident at 
least 15 days out of the previous year, but less than 15 days out of the previous month. 
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agricultural and non-farm production. This group is expected to be found 
within the structurally poor; 
In essence, each of these categories refers to different combinations of activities being 
undertaken by members of the household and can be regarded as comprising 
households that share common livelihood strategies. The approach is dynamic in the 
sense that, over time, households could move between categories as the economic 
status of their members change or if there is a policy change that affects their 
livelihoods. Examples might be the introduction of a new grant (such as the CSG) or 
asset redistribution that enables entrepreneurship (such as land reform). 
To operationalise this proposed categorisation using the KIDS data, I made use of 
multivariate two-step cluster analysis. Cluster analysis treats the groups to be 
identified as unknown, and thus looks for purely statistical associations between the 
set of variables that are defined. Thus while cluster analysis is most frequently used 
as an exploratory data-mining tool in the initial stages of data analysis, it can also be 
used as a technique for the stratification of data in order to identify taxonomies such 
as social class (Golder and Yoemans, 1973; Hartigan, 1975; Vanneman, 1977): the 
purpose of the current section. Two-step cluster analysis first groups cases into pre-
clusters (the initial tree-building) and then standard hierarchical clustering is applied 
to the pre-clusters in the second step. This form of cluster analysis is required when 
one or more of the variables to be used are categorical, and where the data set is 
comparatively large. 
The variables used are firstly the percentage of total household income derived from 
five groups of the activities discussed in this chapter: 1) salaries and wages from the 
primary labour market; 2) the sum of salaries and wages from the secondary and 
casual labour markets; 3) the sum of social grants from the OAP and other 
government grants from other sources, most notably the CSG; 4) regular and irregular 
remittances; and 5) the sum of income from crop, livestock and non-farm 
/ This statistical procedure is used to classify a set of observations into mutually exclusive groups 
based on combinations of interval variables (Stockburger, 1998:1). The purpose of cluster analysis is to 
identify a way in which observations can be organised into groups, where members of each group share 
common properties and where differences between groups are maximised. 
133/ This is in contrast to discriminant function analysis which is used to classify known groups. 
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production. I also included the three sources of capital for which I have data and 
which have also been discussed in this chapter: human capital proxied by the mean 
education of adult household members 20 years of age and above; social, legal and 
political capital proxied by the present value in 2000 prices of remittances and grants; 
and economic capital being the sum of the value of assets and durables in 2000 prices. 
Lastly, I included the structural poverty classes for each year developed in Chapter 
Six to provide the categorical variables required for this approach and to take account 
of predicted well-being. The distance measure that I used to cluster the data is log-
likelihood whereby cases are categorised under the cluster that is associated with the 
largest log-likelihood. As two-step cluster analysis allows the number of groups to be 
set by the researcher, I have chosen to specify five groups in order to generate the 
same number of clusters as the classes that are hypothesised.136 
A number of technical caveats are required concerning the robustness of the cluster 
analysis. Firstly, as the clustering procedure can be sensitive to the ordering of the 
cases, the households were randomly sorted and re-sorted and the analysis repeated 
five times to test for the stability of the classification solution. Secondly, cluster 
analysis is also sensitive to outliers and variable scales, and so the data were checked 
for outliers and converted to standard scores.1 7 At the end of the process, this SPSS 
procedure places residual outliers into an independent cluster that can be excluded 
from the analysis. Thirdly, contingency tables and Chi square tests were run on the 
resulting pairs of classification to check that the groups remained statistically different 
regardless of sorting or of the options used and to identify which orderings of the data 
consistently produce similar clusters. This sensitivity test identified one ordering of 
the data that was particularly sensitive to the case order in 1993 and 1998, and that the 
data from 1998 were consistently most sensitive to case order, while the data from 
1 4/ Initially this analysis was attempted on seven groups of livelihood activity with non-farm 
enterprises and other state grants being considered separately. While cluster analysis allowed the 
formation of separate groups that were statistically different, these results did not suggest any dominant 
livelihood activity and instead appeared as low earning-combinations of many activities. 
135/ These variables simply classify the households as structurally or stochastically poor/not poor rather 
than assessing their long term trajectory as was done in Chapter Six (Section 4.2). 
136/Allowing the cluster analysis to adopt the SPSS default option (the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion) 
produces three clusters in 1993 and 1998, and four clusters in 2004. This would be of use had the 
purpose of this section been data mining. 
137/ Two-step cluster analysis makes provision for the treatment of outliers whereby outliers are set 
aside at initial step of tree-building, then checked for matching when the tree is rebuilt. Since a 
maximum of 13 households were placed in this outlier group in any year, I have excluded them from 
the analysis. 
209 
2004 were not at all sensitive to case order. Further, in 1993 and 1998, one of the 
clusters was consistently sensitive to case order. I will return to this below. 
One of the four orderings that yielded generally consistent results was then randomly 
chosen for the analysis that follows. Finally, the results of this ordering were checked 
for stability across the three years of data collection. This revealed that between 33 
percent and 80 percent of cluster membership remained stable between each wave of 
data collection, and between 33 percent and 67 percent of cluster membership 
remained stable between the 1993 and 2004 waves. 
Having confirmed that the cluster analysis is sufficiently robust for further 
interrogation, the first step is to describe the clusters identified. This shows the mean 
value (also called the centroid) of each cluster in terms of the value of the different 
capitals (Rand in 2000 prices) and the percentage of total income that is contributed 
by the five income sources. To discuss the shared characteristics of the different 
clusters over time, I have sorted the clusters, placing groups with common 
characteristics in each of the survey years into the same table. These results are 
provided in, Table 7.16, Table 7.17, Table 7.18, and Table 7.19. 
138/ The clusters were regarded as stable if less than 20 percent of the cases were differently classified 
in any pass of the data. Chi square tests show that the orderings produce clusters are significantly 
different in each year, and one-way ANOVA tests confirm that the means of all variables which are 
significantly different between the five clusters that are created at the 95 percent confidence limits in 
each ordering. In both instances this result is to be expected since the cluster procedure seeks to 
maximise differences. 
139/ At this stage, the clusters are no more than statistically defined groups with similar characteristics 
and my purpose is sensitivity testing. I have therefore not included these transition matrices which can 
be made available on request. 
140/ Note that there is no reason to expect that the clusters will be numbered in the same way in each 
year, and that outliers may still influence the mean values that are reported in an individual cluster. 
Note also that the analysis is based on cases in which data are present for all variables in each year and 
that I have chosen not to impute values for missing data given the sensitivity of cluster analysis. 
Finally, since cluster analysis seeks to maximise differences, standard deviations within clusters would 
not be informative and have not been reported. These are available on request. 
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Table 7.15: Livelihood Strategy Classes - Primary Wages 
Cluster Number assigned by SPSS 
Economic capital (R) 
Social, political and legal capital (R) 
Human capital 
% income from primary wages 
% income from remittances 
% income from secondary wages 
% income from grants 
% income from SMMEs 






































A clear cluster of households that receive a high proportion of their income from 
wages earned in the primary labour market emerges in each year. This group is also 
associated with high and increasing mean adult education, and experienced a 
substantial improvement in the value of their economic capital especially between 
1993 and 1998. Incomes from other sources are negligible in terms of their 
contribution to total household income, although these households are comparatively 
well endowed with social, political and legal capital proxied by the present value of 
remittances and grants. The proportion of these households in the KIDS sample is 
increasing over time. Households in these clusters thus conform to the first livelihood 
strategy class hypothesised above in which income from primary wages is a shared 
characteristic. 
Table 7.16: Livelihood Strategy Classes - Secondary Wages 
Cluster Number assigned by SPSS 
Economic capital (R) 
Social, political and legal capital (R) 
Human capital 
% income from primary wages 
% income from remittances 
% income from secondary wages 
% income from grants 
% income from SMMEs 






































An unambiguous cluster of households with a high proportion of income contributed 
from secondary and casual wages is also evident in each year. Mean education levels 
are lower than those reported by the 'high primary wage' group, but are relatively 
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high and increase over time. Although more modest, there has been a steady increase 
in the value of economic capital while the proportion of households in this cluster 
remains relatively consistent over time. Households in these clusters thus conform to 
the second of the livelihood strategy classes hypothesised above in which income 
derived from secondary wage labour is a shared characteristic. 
Table 7.17: Livelihood Strategy Classes - Social Grants 
Cluster Number assigned by SPSS 
Economic capital (R) 
Social, political and legal capital (R) 
Human capital 
% income from primary wages 
% income from remittances 
% income from secondary wages 
% income from grants 
% income from SMMEs 






































Clusters can also be identified each year in which social grants play an important role. 
Households in these clusters have seen an increase in the proportion of total income 
derived from grants such as the OAP and the CSG. Mean education levels of 
household members are the lowest of the clusters that were identified and fall between 
1993 and 1998. This is to be expected if those in, and entering this group are aging 
households in which young adults have completed their education and have moved 
out of the household, or if these are households with young children in receipt of the 
CSG whose education is excluded from the variable chosen to represent human 
capital (years of education completed by adults over 20 years of age). The fall in the 
percentage of income derived from primary wages supports the notion that 
households in this cluster are aging. The proportion of households in this cluster 
increased between 1993 and 1998 and has since remained relatively consistent. 
To a large extent then, households in these clusters conform to the third of the 
livelihood strategy classes hypothesised above in which income from grants is a 
shared characteristic. However it seems likely that membership in this cluster varies 
over time due to eligibility criteria of the grants involved and is expanding partly due 
to the life course changes of the households in KIDS and the introduction of new 
grants. 
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Table 7.18: Livelihood Strategy Classes - Enterprises 
Cluster Number assigned by SPSS 
Economic capital (R) 
Social, political and legal capital (R) 
Human capital 
% income from primary wages 
% income from remittances 
% income from secondary wages 
% income from grants 
% income from SMMEs 






































There is some indication that clusters can be identified in which income earned in 
farm and non-farm enterprises are comparatively important in each year, but the 
results of the cluster analysis are not as clear cut as before. In 1998 and 2004, 
households in which more than 75 percent of income is derived from such enterprises 
are found, in which education levels are comparatively high along with the value of 
the economic capitals that were included into this analysis. Unlike what is 
hypothesised for the fourth livelihood class, earnings from the primary labour market 
are unimportant. Anomalies are the low share of earnings from enterprises in 1993, 
the high share of earnings from remittances in 1993 and the very large size of this 
group in 1993 compared to the subsequent years. Only to some extent then do 
households in these clusters correspond to the fourth livelihood class in which income 
derived from enterprises is a shared characteristic and many change their status over 
time. 
Table 7.19: Livelihood Strategy Classes - Remittances 
Cluster Number assigned by SPSS 
Economic capital (R) 
Social, political and legal capital (R) 
Human capital 
% income from primary wages 
% income from remittances 
% income from secondary wages 
% income from grants 
% income from SMMEs 






































Finally a rather ambiguous grouping of households remains as a residual. While 
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remittances feature as an important component in 1998 and to some extent in 2004, in 
1993 remittances form a low percentage of total household income. Instead these 
households receive a high proportion of their income from primary wages, but are 
distinguished from the primary labour group by their low economic capitals. The 
proportion of households in this cluster have increased over time, but given the 
instability of this group, it is unlikely that this represents a trend of any kind. 
Households in this cluster are least likely to be consistently assigned and a stable 
cluster does not emerge for the final livelihood class in which remittances are the 
dominant source of livelihood. 
The data thus far provide descriptive statistics for the variables used in the cluster 
analysis. While pointing towards a degree of shared characteristics based on the types 
of livelihood being undertaken by households, at least in three of the hypothesised 
livelihood strategy classes, it is useful to also consider other socio-economic 
characteristics. This information is provided in Table 7.20, Table 7.21, Table 7.22, 
Table 7.23 and Table 7.24.141 
Table 7.20: Socio-Economic Characteristics - Primary Wages 
Cluster Number assigned by SPSS 
% Structurally Poor 
% Structurally Not Poor 
% Structurally Downward 
% Structurally Upward 
% Stochastically Mobile 
% Poor 
Mean normalised poverty measure 
% Urban 
% De facto male 
% De facto female 
% Dejure female 
Mean Age of head 
Mean Household size 





















































The notion that a livelihood strategy class can be identified around involvement in 
primary wage labour is reinforced by these data. In 1993 and 1998, households in 
these clusters are predominantly classified as structurally not-poor, while there is a 
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growing trend of structurally upward households emerging after 1998. No, or very 
few, households are below the poverty line used in Chapter Five (Section 2.1), while 
the mean poverty measure normalised by need (described in Chapter Five: Section 
3.1) reveals that the position of households in this cluster have improved from 3.4 
times the poverty line to 4.5 times that poverty line. The majority of households in 
these clusters live in urban areas, although this had declined by 2004. Although 
dominated by de facto male headed households in all years compared to the clusters 
that follow, the proportion ofde jure female headed households rapidly increases 
between 1998 and 2004. Household sizes are small and declining and the mean age 
of the head of the household is increasing, as is the demographic dependency ratio 
(the proportion of the household below 20 years of age) suggesting that that although 
initially comparatively youthful in 1993, these are aging households, although less 
rapidly than would be expected given the six year gap between 1998 and 2004. This 
is an unsurprising finding that can be attributed to the imputation procedure used to 
identify household heads in 2004 whereby the older heads are more likely to have 
died and the replacement head could not be identified. 
Table 7.21: Socio-Economic Characteristics - Secondary Wages 
Cluster Number assigned by SPSS 
% Structurally Poor 
% Structurally Not Poor 
% Structurally Downward 
% Structurally Upward 
% Stochastically Mobile 
% Poor 
Mean normalised poverty measure 
% Urban 
% De facto male 
% De facto female 
% Dejure female 
Mean Age of head 
Mean Household size 





















































Those households in which wages from participation in the secondary labour market 
also share many socio-economic characteristics and can thus be said to constitute a 
/ Unless otherwise stated, the characteristics of all clusters in each year were significantly different at 
the 95 percent confidence interval. As before, this is to be expected for variables included in the Cluster 
Analysis. 
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livelihood strategy class. Although the majority of households are classified as 
structurally poor, this declined between 1993 and 2004 and there has been an increase 
in the proportion that are structurally not-poor and structurally upward. As a result 
the percentage of households below the poverty line has consistently declined, while 
the mean normalised poverty measure has increased from 0.9 of the poverty line to 
1.5 times the poverty line. There has been a slight increase in the proportion of 
households in these clusters which live in urban areas. As is the case with the primary 
labour clusters, de facto male headship has declined while dejure female headship 
has increased. Although the mean age of household heads in 1993 is almost 10 years 
more than the primary labour cluster, this declines over time suggesting that new 
households join these clusters over time. Household sizes are comparatively large, 
but declining, while the demographic dependency ratio first increases then declines. 
This suggests that the type of household belonging to a secondary labour market 
cluster has changed over the course of KIDS, with younger, smaller households with 
fewer children joining the cluster while older, larger households are moving to one of 
the other groups. 
Table 7.22: Socio-Economic Characteristics - Social Grants 
Cluster Number assigned by SPSS 
% Structurally Poor 
% Structurally Not Poor 
% Structurally Downward 
% Structurally Upward 
% Stochastically Mobile 
% Poor 
Mean normalised poverty measure 
% Urban 
% De facto male 
% De facto female 
% Dejure female 
Mean Age of head 
Mean Household size 





















































Despite being in receipt of grants, households in these clusters have seen an increase 
in poverty. There has been a dramatic increase in the proportion classified as being 
structurally poor, an increase in the percentage below the poverty line reaching almost 
100 percent by 2004, and a decline in their mean normalised poverty measure from 
0.9 time the poverty line to half the poverty line. The anomaly is at least partly 
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explained by the very large household sizes which increased between 1993 and 2004, 
and the persistence of large numbers of young people in these clusters. This finding 
supports the arguments of Case and Deaton (1998) and others that pensions are being 
used as a means of survival for other households members. The proportion of 
households in this group living in urban areas declined between 1993 and 1998, and 
fell to just 4 percent by 2004. This finding is likely to be influenced by the 
introduction of the CSG which would have changed the characteristics of those in 
these clusters. This is evident in the increasing proportion of households with a de 
facto female head and perhaps the younger heads in 2004. As with the secondary 
labour market cluster, while a livelihoods strategy class does emerge, the composition 
of this group has changed over time, largely due to the changes in social policy. 
Table 7.23: Socio-Economic Characteristics - Enterprises 
Cluster Number assigned by SPSS 
% Structurally Poor 
% Structurally Not Poor 
% Structurally Downward 
% Structurally Upward 
% Stochastically Mobile 
% Poor 
Mean normalised poverty measure 
% Urban 
% De facto male 
% De facto female 
% Dejure female 
Mean Age of head 
Mean Household size 





















































The fortunes and composition of those households placed in the enterprises cluster 
have changed over the three years of data collection. The proportion that is 
structurally poor has declined, with a corresponding increase in the proportion who 
are structurally not-poor especially for the period 1998 to 2004. The proportion of 
households below the poverty line has decreased over time while the mean normalised 
poverty measure has increased from 1.1 times the poverty line in 1993 to 1.7 times in 
2004. Households in these clusters have also been increasingly from urban areas, 
although most are still to be found in non-urban areas. The mean age of the head has 
remained constant, while household size has declined along with the demographic 
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dependency ratio. Of interest is the increasingly large number of de facto male heads 
in these clusters. This is then another livelihood strategy class into which new 
members come over time. 
Table 7.24: Socio-Economic Characteristics - Remittances 
Cluster Number assigned by SPSS 
% Structurally Poor 
% Structurally Not Poor 
% Structurally Downward 
% Structurally Upward 
% Stochastically Mobile 
% Poor 
Mean normalised poverty measure 
% Urban 
% De facto male 
% De facto female 
% Dejure female 
Mean Age of head 
Mean Household size 





















































Finally, the residual group which was expected to be most closely associated with 
livelihoods derived from remittances also shows varying socio-economic 
characteristics. The proportion of households in the different structural poverty 
groups varies each year, with many being structurally poor in 1998, and very few 
being in this group in 1993 and 2004. This also applies for the percentage of 
households below the poverty line as well as for the mean normalised poverty 
measure. The percentage of households that are urbanised is comparatively high in 
1993 and 2004, although households in these years have different characteristics in 
terms of the age and sex of the head. Mean household size also varies with the figures 
for 1998 being far higher than in the other years. These results confirm that a 
livelihoods cluster based on remittances cannot be identified, and that these clusters 
reflect groupings of households that are simply distinct from those already described. 
It should also be noted that these are the clusters that were most sensitive the ordering 
of the data. 
In summary, I have used a cluster analysis of the KIDS data using the share of 
household income derived from different livelihood activities and the asset-based 
structural poverty classes developed in Chapter Five to assess whether a hypothesised 
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set of livelihood-based classes can be identified. The results reveal that three classes 
can clearly be identified in all three waves of KIDS: those dependent upon wages 
earned in the primary labour market defined as wage-paying regular employment 
which is accompanied by benefits and contractual security; those dependent upon 
wages earned in the secondary labour market including casual labour defined as wage 
paying regular and irregular employment without benefits or contractual security; and 
those dependent upon state grants. A fourth rather diverse group can be identified 
who are involved in self-employment in agricultural and non-farm enterprises. 
Finally, although expected in the South African context, the cluster analysis suggests 
that households dependent upon remittances are neither a stable nor unambiguous 
group, with changing membership and variable participation in other forms of 
livelihood. 
7.4 QUALITATIVE SUPPORT FOR LIVELIHOOD STRATEGY CLASSES 
The livelihood classes just identified by cluster analysis receive support from 
qualitative data. The SA-PPA contained many examples of the shared livelihood 
characteristics of groups of people who were considered by respondents to be poor. 
These included female single parents, pensioners supporting grandchildren, and the 
homeless as well as the unemployed (May et ai, 1997: 42). As an example not 
already given, in KwaJobe, KwaZulu-Natal, the productive means used for farming 
was a major characteristic for defining the richer and poorer for two groups of 
women. The poorest are seen as those who 'work for others, then plough', 'plough by 
hand', were 'pensioners without livestock', 'sell labour and have no time to plough', 
and 'children who grow into adults but have opted to go to school instead of being 
shepherds' (May et al, 1997: 112, 114). The less poor ploughed with tractors, cattle, 
donkeys, and owned livestock. The wealthiest of all, however were shop owners or 
those employed with steady jobs. 
Perhaps the most important entitlement failure reported from the perspective of the 
participants in the SA-PPA relates to the functioning of labour markets, and, in 
particular, the increasing incidence of long-term unemployment. Although 
employment was perceived as an important way in which the problems of the poor 
could be solved, the labour markets which are open to the poor appear to be highly 
restricted in terms of the possibility of any form of accumulation. This is particularly 
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true in the case of agricultural and domestic labour. Here, low wages, insecure 
working conditions and poor access to services have resulted in little, if any, long 
term occupational or social mobility (May et al, 1997: 110). 
More importantly, during the first period of the KIDS study (1994-1998), the 
contracting South African economy appears to have greatly eroded the livelihoods of 
poor households. This is supported by all of the reports prepared for the SA-PPA 
which indicated that people, particularly men, had lost employment as a result of 
retrenchment, and, generally, very few of the participants in the various studies lived 
in households in which there were employed people. People interviewed in rural 
KwaZulu-Natal explicitly commented that male access to regular formal employment 
had reduced, and that this was threatening the survival mechanisms of households 
(May et al, 1997:110). In addition to the impact on the household's assets base, 
participants in the SA-PPA saw unemployment as acting to erode the assets of other 
households who relied upon remittances for support. 
The SA-PPA also shows the variety of activities that make up casual labour. As an 
example, the following casual labour undertaken in Nhlangwini was recorded in 
return for a cash income (May et al, 1997: 134).142 
Figure 7.1: Casual Labour in Nhlangwini 
Services 
Fetching water (RIO 
for a 25 litre container 
which can be filled 3 or 
4 times daily); 
Fetching firewood; 
Washing clothes and 
cleaning homestead 
yards; 
Treating children with 
home remedies; 
Plastering floors; 
Helping to harvest 
maize, pumpkins, 
potatoes and beans in 
exchange for food; 
Children fetch water in 
exchange for food. 
Manufacturing 
Mudding - mixing 
water and soil to make 




The production of 
grasswork mats, 
baskets, beadwork and 
other craft; 
Building and wood 
work, including the 
construction of toilets. 
Preparation of cooked 
food such as fried fish, 
scones, sheep's heads, 
pig's trotters and pap. 
Retail 
Collecting and selling 
thatch grass; 
Sale of traditional beer; 
Sale of clothes, 
grasswork mats, 
baskets, beadwork and 
other craft; 
Sale of'tobacco'; 
Sale of cooked food 
such as fried fish, 
scones, sheep's heads, 
pig's trotters and pap. 
Agricultural 
Weeding, planting in 




Growing their own 
food in fields or 
gardens; 
Source: SA-PPA 
7 In this area, casual labour was known as 'cheap labour' or amatoho. 
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However, the income earned from many of these activities is very small. As an 
example, the collection of 25 kilogram drums of water for other people was said to be 
"...enough to buy ball-pens, salt, matches and candles" (May et al., 1997: Appendix). 
Furthermore, there is some seasonality with these activities, with some more prevalent 
in winter (fetching water/firewood and "mudding") or summer (weeding). 
The S A-PP A also suggests that cultivation of land, particularly garden plots, is an 
important safeguard for many rural households, although this is probably limited to 
the areas in which there is sufficient rainfall to permit dryland cultivation. Maize was 
regarded as the most important crop and the main staple, although vegetable 
production performed an important stabilising role: 
Mielie-meal is the most important crop because it is what we eat: 
however the rains have been late this year and the mielie-meal has 
not be been good. The vegetable gardens have become very 
important because you can grow some food during the winter but 
there is not much water and we have to sell the vegetables to buy 
mielie-meal (May etal., 1997:132) 
Gardens and community garden schemes were also seen as making a significant 
contribution towards the livelihood of the very poor. In Hlabisa, both men and women 
indicated that farming was their most important source of income. Their rationale 
was that even if pension or remittances sometimes contributed larger amounts to 
household income, they were quite often irregular whereas farming was something 
they could rely on. A wide range of crops were reported to be cultivated, although 
maize, beans and pumpkin were most frequently grown. Inter-cropping was also 
common, with beans and maize being planted together, or in the same field at 
different time (May et al, 1997:128) 
Home production of food is not necessarily an option open to all. In some instances, 
these schemes required a joining fee which could not be afforded by the very poor. 
From a mapping exercise undertaken in Mabundeni, it was observed that: 
...many of the poorest households were female headed where it was 
left to the grandmother or single female to look after the whole 
family. Consequently, they were excluded from many of the local 
income generating activities because they could not afford the 
joining fee or the time. (May et al, 1997: 98) 
The important role played by entitlements such as pensions and disability grants for 
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household survival is stressed by almost all the studies. Amongst the six women with 
whom Murphy worked, pensions had consistently formed a part of the household's 
survival strategy. Indeed, the loss of the pension was tantamount to a shock which 
dramatically impacted on the household's well-being. Gaining access to pensions also 
appeared to be a motivation for spatial and domestic mobility: 
From information gained on household structures it is evident that 
extended families and children of single mothers are often grouped 
around old age pensioners. Individual interviews established that 
these pensioners often contribute to the support of young children 
within the family. One group of old age pensioners interviewed in 
Patensie described their role as burdensome, claiming that their 
pension monies are spent on children from teenage pregnancies and 
transport for children to the high school... (May et al, 1997: 85) 
The receipt of a pension also impacts on other tactics used by households in order to 
make a plan. In particular, pensions were given as being an important asset in gaining 
access to credit from shops and a number of households indicated that the pensioner 
in the house was responsible for paying instalments. Teixeira and Chambers note that 
people in employment or receiving pensions have been prioritised for receiving 
housing in a new housing scheme because they are perceived as being able to pay 
service fees. 
Finally, an important strength of qualitative studies such as the SA-PPA is the 
identification and categorisation of non-monetised and often unrecorded activities 
which is not possible when using the KIDS data. Varying household size and 
composition has been found to be an important coping strategy. Empirical evidence 
suggests that the composition of household membership changes not only due to life 
cycle changes, but also as a result of economic and social factors (Sharp and Spiegel, 
1985; Russell, 1993). This permeability of household boundaries has been described 
by Ardington (1988), Guyer and Peters, (1987), Murray (1987) and Spiegel (1987). 
Murray (1987:246) has noted that rapid 'internal' changes of household membership 
are features of households living in the Bantustans. Spiegel (1987) and Ardington 
(1988) provide evidence of this and show that if the source of income is lost, 
individuals may disperse to join households which have an income. In addition, when 
a new source of income is accessed, individuals may break away from a household to 
establish their own household. It appears that these moves in search of, and in 
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response to, a source of income are not confined to rural areas only. Ross (1993), for 
example, describes similar processes in a dense informal settlement. Sharing 
accommodation was frequently mentioned by respondents in the SA-PPA, particularly 
in the urban areas in which access to housing is a major constraint, which in some 
instances results in children dispersed between rural area, a shack settlements and 
formal housing in a township. (May et al, 1997). 
In addition, Annecke (1993) has also noted the continuous and extensive movement 
of family members, with one or two members moving between several dwellings, 
both elsewhere on the urban fringe and in a rural area. Movement itself thus becomes 
a survival strategy as individuals and households attempt to locate themselves in the 
best possible way. There are three components to this movement: labour migration, 
in which the move is made in order to take up employment; distress migration of 
entire families when coping strategies fail; and finally, migration in search of better 
opportunities, such as gaining access to the job market, or to take advantage of 
kinship ties. 
Using the environment to meet certain basic needs is another important activity that is 
often unrecorded. The existence and continuing availability of local resources is 
especially important since poor households have to exploit the environment in order 
to survive. Local resources include the land itself (for cultivation and grazing), as 
well as forests, (for energy and building materials) and natural water sources, (for 
drinking water and irrigation) (Sharp and Spiegel, 1990). Access to communal or 
private reserves of trees and natural forest is particularly important and the use of 
these resources can be extended to medicinal plants, reeds for craft work, building 
materials, beer brewing, trees for carving, wild animals and crops for food. All of 
these strategies can significantly decrease the vulnerability of the poor, although their 
use could indicate the absence of more secure alternatives. 
Households may also deliberately opt for dietary changes. Qualitative research shows 
that households appear to experience shifts from preferred to lower status foods 
(starchy tubers, grain ground with stalks/husks/bran) where household members eat 
beans and bread when money is scarce as well as unconventional foods (wild foods, 
insects, game [Annecke, 1993]). In addition, households may resort to indigenous 
crops such as morogo/imifino and stinging nettles. Local sharing also occurs between 
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families or households and often intensifies when food is scarce (Ross, 1993). 
Quantitative expenditure changes or scrimping is another aspect of this form of 
livelihood activity. There is little research which provides concrete examples of this, 
although Frankenberger's research suggests that meal patterns may be varied with 
fewer meals, and that there would be a reduction in actual consumption 
(Frankenberger, 1992). Studies around energy usage also provide important insights 
into this activity (Annecke, 1993; Ross, 1993). Highly vulnerable households adapt 
their energy consumption patterns as a coping strategy. Examples include switching 
down the energy ladder (electricity to paraffin to wood to dung and crop residuals), as 
well as varying purchase intervals (buying one candle at a time, as opposed to a 
week's supply and conserving energy). 
The unpaid work required for reproductive activities are an essential part of the 
livelihood strategy of most households and require large amounts of time from the 
women who are seen to usually perform these activities. This has already been 
highlighted earlier in the section on the gendered experience on poverty which 
showed that women performed the majority of the tasks critical to the daily 
functioning of the household. Of most importance was the provision of energy and 
water. In the SA-PPA, women in Hlabisa indicated that fulfilling these needs meant 
that they were often too exhausted to take proper care of their children, let alone 
engage in other forms of income earning activity (May et al., 1997:53). This 
combination of roles expected of women can thus lead to women being unable to gain 
the independence of having their own income source. In addition, the survival 
activities adopted by the poor vary within the household according to gender. As an 
example: 
Unlike men, women tended to focus their strategies against poverty 
at the neighbourhood level and dealt with the risks involved by 
investing heavily in local supportive networks. Men, on the other 
hand, have often looked beyond the neighbourhood and specifically 
towards the nearby rural areas as a means of dealing with the 
insecurities, poverty and dangers of urban life (May et al, 1997:94). 
The flexible usage of family links is striking throughout all the studies with these 
links serving a wide range of functions. While financial assistance is probably the 
most frequently mentioned support offered by social and kin networks, support in 
times of shock is another dimension of social support. This usage of family networks 
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includes drawing on the assistance of siblings, as well as support from parents and 
parent-in-laws. For women however, there is some limit to this support. In the time 
lines recorded in the SA-PPA, several women stated that their own parents were 
unable or unwilling to help them (May et ah, 1997: 86-87). This was due to the 
institutional arrangements within traditional marriage whereby a woman moves to the 
kraal of her husband and into the control and care of his parents. To the extent that 
this arrangement has collapsed, women may become exposed with neither the support 
of their own families nor that of their husbands. 
7.5 CONCLUSION 
The analysis in this section has attempted to follow the logic of the livelihoods 
approach, and has separately considered the assets controlled by households, the use 
to which these are put to generate livelihoods, the returns which are achieved from 
these activities, and finally, the way in which activities are combined into a livelihood 
strategy. An examination of the assets available to the KIDS sample between 1993 
and 2004 shows that there has been a general improvement in household access to the 
majority of the five categories of assets identified in Chapter Three, with education, 
group membership, agricultural equipment, a electricity connection and savings being 
particularly noteworthy. While distinct differences between households according to 
spatial location and the sex of the household head are evident, the structural poverty 
classes also reveal noteworthy differences in the fortunes of the structurally poor, 
structurally upward, structurally downward and never poor. 
Overall, educated and literate labour appears to be the most commonly available 
resource in the KIDS households, and it follows that wage labour and claiming 
remittances from migrant family members are the most commonly adopted activities 
used to generate entitlements. Perhaps, given the low returns which are achieved, it is 
surprising to note that agriculture is the third most commonly adopted livelihood 
activity. Comparing household types, it emerges that, with the exception of labour, 
female-headed households tend to have fewer endowments, and achieve lower returns 
from their livelihood activities than do men. It is noteworthy that households in 
which there is a migrant male head are most likely to engage in agricultural activities. 
Although shocks, especially negative shocks, are widespread and comparatively 
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costly in terms of the income loss, expenses incurred or value loss, they do not 
emerge as an important explanation for these differing experiences. If anything, the 
structurally upward are more prone to such shocks, but appear to be better able to 
weather the long-term negative impact of the shock than do the other poor groups. 
Using cluster analysis, the notion that there are distinct classes of livelihood activity is 
supported for at least some groups. Three groups were clearly identified: those 
deriving a livelihood from employment in the primary labour market, those deriving 
an income from the secondary labour market and those deriving an income from 
grants. A fourth group could be identified, those reliant upon incomes earned from 
self-employment, although the characteristics of this groups is diverse. The evidence 
did not support the identification of the final group, those dependent upon 
remittances. The qualitative data from the SA-PPA support the notion of livelihood 
groups, but remind us that there are many livelihood activities that are not readily 
identified by quantitative survey methodologies. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION, SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The dismal shame of poverty, suffering and human degradation of my continent 
is a blight that we share. The blight on our happiness that derives from this... 
leaves us in a persistent shadow of despair. This is a savage road to which 
nobody should be condemned. (Deputy President Thabo Mbeki on the occasion 
of the adoption of the Republic of South Africa Constitution Bill, 1996). 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The analysis in this thesis set out to make four contributions to the analysis of poverty 
in South Africa. The first of these is in the creation of the database that has been 
used. The KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS) was the first major panel 
study in South Africa and a third wave of data collection in 2004 means that it is the 
longest running panel in the country. Although always a collaborative venture, I have 
played a leading role in the development of KIDS and in many of the publications that 
have documented the methodology and initial findings of the each wave. The second 
contribution is in the synthesis of conceptual frameworks from the asset/vulnerability 
and sustainable livelihoods approaches with the capability approach. The third is the 
application of this framework in an analysis of structural poverty. This is proposed as 
a complementary approach to analyses based on observed movement in, and out of, 
poverty often used which comparing chronic and transitory poverty. Many aspects of 
these contributions were undertaken collaboratively, although for this thesis I have 
extended and adapted the analysis, incorporating the third wave of data collection and 
providing more detail on the changes in assets and livelihoods that underpinned the 
earlier analysis. The final and wholly new contribution is the examination of 
livelihoods and differentiation of households using a cluster analysis based on their 
livelihood strategies. In this last chapter I will summarise the key findings of the 
thesis and then comment on some of their implications for policy. 
8.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
8.2.1 Microeconomics and Poverty Dynamics 
Analysts in the field of development studies are beginning to recognise that there are 
many ways in which the economic fundamentals required for macroeconomic stability 
can be translated into policy. It is also becoming apparent that underlying 
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microeconomic conditions may prejudice the chances of the poor to benefit from 
economic growth and that poverty cannot be solved by macro-economic policies 
alone. Further, the poverty is now recognised as not being a static condition but rather 
something that varies in terms of its conditions, effects and causes. How poor people 
engage with markets over time, how assets are used and how assets are accumulated 
have been the themes analysed in this thesis. 
8.2.2 Measuring Dynamic Poverty 
Poverty is generally characterised as the inability to command sufficient resources to 
satisfy a socially acceptable minimum standard of living. Chronic poverty sees this 
inability as something that may persist over time and even over generations. Assets, 
livelihoods and asset based vulnerability are one way in which these dynamics can be 
examined. The measurement of dynamic poverty is difficult as it refers to potential 
circumstances rather than to observed conditions. However, a differentiation approach 
can provide a hopeful direction for the analysis of dynamic poverty by directly 
analysing the asset base on which household well-being is grounded. Using an asset-
based multi-period poverty model developed by Carter and May (2001), a dynamic 
poverty line ( J ) is defined as: 
(3) 
where t indexes years and 8P is a discount factor. J_ is then the present value of a 
sequence of poverty level living standards. 
A household can now be defined as being dynamically poor if: 
(4) J\AJ<J 
A household is thus dynamically poor if their expected long-term stream of well-
being, J*(AQi) is less than the certain equivalence value of a stream of single- period 
poverty living standards. 
J{u,8p) = 




8.2.3 Poverty in Post-Apartheid South Africa 
The poverty profile of South Africa in the post-apartheid period shows that South 
Africa still lags behind countries of similar economic strength. Most studies using 
available national data point to an increase in money-metric poverty until 2000. Data 
are scarce for the period subsequent to this, but it seems possible that this trend has at 
last been reversed, and that at least the poverty headcount index has declined between 
2000 and 2004. These data confirm that the post-transition government faced an 
enormous challenge in reducing poverty, and that high and probably increasing levels 
of poverty persisted for much of the period between 1993 and 2004. KIDS allows 
new insight into the dynamics of post-apartheid income distribution and shows that 
the initial increase in poverty rates has been reversed from an increase between 1993 
and 1998 from 52 percent to 57 percent, to a decline to 47 percent. 
8.2.4 A Database for the Analysis of Poverty Dynamics 
As the analysis of poverty dynamics imposes special data requirements, the analysis 
in this thesis would not have been possible without the collection of panel data set that 
contained observations for at least three points in time. Panel data in which the same 
households are re-interviewed are an especially useful source of information since 
these studies can reveal what has happened to individuals and households over time. 
Although no longer the only panel study in South Africa, and confined only to 
African and Indian households in KwaZulu-Natal, the KIDS data base is unique in 
that the first wave of data collection predates the democratic elections in 1994. The 
data collected by KIDS thus opens a window on the post-apartheid period allowing an 
analysis of poverty dynamics during a time of profound structural change. 
8.2.5 Structural Poverty in KwaZulu-Natal 
Using the model of dynamic poverty just described, seven groups of household have 
been identified according to their structural position as determined by the changes in 
assets and consumption-based well-being that the household has experienced between 
1993 and 1998. Four of these groups represent structural positions: the structurally 
poor; the structurally upward; the structurally downward and the never poor. Three 
are transitory positions dependent upon bad or good fortune between 1993 and 2004. 
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These are the dual failures (unlucky in two or more years years); stochastically 
upward (fortunate in 1998 or 2005); and the stochastically downward (fortunate in 
1993). This analysis shows that approximately 30 percent of the KIDS households are 
found to be structurally poor over the eleven year period of the survey, 30 percent 
structurally never poor, 9 percent structural upward and 7 percent were structurally 
downward. The remaining 24 percent are in transitory poverty in that the changes in 
their poverty status arise from either short-term windfalls or shocks, or from 
measurement error. 
Qualitative findings from the SA-PPA support the notion of poverty that is both 
structural and linked to good and bad fortune. Participants in this study provide 
commentary on job losses, the death and illness of household members, theft and 
destruction of property, and in each case, link these shocks to permanent declines in 
income. Education is perceived as an important route out of poverty, while access to 
land provides a buffer against misfortune, unreliable remittances from migrants and 
job loss. 
8.2.6 Livelihood strategies classes in KwaZulu-Natal 
A general improvement in household access to the majority of the assets discussed in 
this thesis, with education, group membership, agricultural equipment, a electricity 
connection and savings being particularly noteworthy. While distinct differences 
between households according to spatial location and the sex of the household head 
are evident, the structural poverty classes also reveal differences in the fortunes of the 
structurally poor, structurally upward, structurally downward and never poor. 
However, although shocks, especially negative shocks, are widespread, they do not 
emerge as an important explanation for these differing experiences. 
Using cluster analysis, distinct classes of livelihood activity can be identified for at 
least three groups. These are those deriving a livelihood from employment in the 
primary labour market, those deriving an income from the secondary labour market 
and those deriving an income from grants. A fourth group could be identified, those 
reliant upon incomes earned from self-employment, although the characteristics of 
this groups is diverse. The evidence did not support the identification of the final 
group, those dependent upon remittances. Once again, these findings are supported 
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by the qualitative data from the SA-PPA. 
8.3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The finding of this thesis that different forms of poverty can be identified has 
significance for policy for poverty reduction. As Kanbur and Squire (1999:6) note, 
"if one household is experiencing a fall into poverty while the other is chronically 
poor, the appropriate policy responses towards the two households should probably be 
quite different". Moreover, earlier in this thesis, the analysis of poverty was discussed 
from two perspectives, actor-based and system-based and this distinction has been 
operationalised in the analysis that has been presented. These approaches can also be 
associated with two different and to some extent conflicting approaches with respect 
to policy development. The perspective seeing the poor as entrepreneurs underscores 
support for liberalising policies, enhancing individuals' opportunities and capabilities. 
Those who have emphasised the idea of poverty trap perspectives often advocate state 
intervention policies that establish citizens' rights, redistribute wealth and assets, and 
reduce structural inequalities. In practice, pro-poor policies tend to address both 
individually determined and structurally imposed poverty. For example, even when 
institutions such as the World Bank emphasise structural adjustment strategies for 
enabling economic growth, attention is paid to the redistributional effect (so-called 
'broad based growth'), and the need for social safeguards. Nonetheless, pursuing both 
perspectives in tandem is difficult and often comes down to a choice of what to do 
first. 
The risk that the perpetuation of extreme inequality will act as a brake on the 
achievement of the South African government's ambitious growth targets is an 
important concern. Moreover, the sluggishness in employment creation through out 
the 1990s already discussed suggests that even if higher growth rates were achieved, a 
noticeable reduction in poverty or inequality may not follow. Several analysts have 
argued that more assertive action by the South African government to reduce poverty 
and inequality is a feasible option and indeed, is necessary (Bond, 2000; May and 
Hunter, 2005; SACC, 2003). Others have also argued that South Africa can pursue 
more redistributive policies without undermining current growth objectives, and indeed, 
it has been suggested that such policies would promote growth (May et al, 2004). 
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However, if the reduction of inequality is to be accompanied by the reduction of poverty 
the least well-off will need to be the beneficiaries of such transfers. Particular kinds of 
social spending and employment creating strategies are more effective for the 
reduction of poverty and inequality. With respect to social spending, (such as health, 
education, social security, water supply and sanitation) both the level and focus of the 
spending are important. The more government spends on basic social services the 
more poor people are likely to benefit. Within that, particular types of spending are 
also more beneficial. A focus on primary and preventive health care delivered a strong 
public health system, and a focus on primary and secondary education have been 
found to yield high private and social returns. Policies that focus on labour intensive 
technologies, increasing access to credit, extension services and creating an 
appropriate regulatory framework for encouraging small, medium and micro-
enterprises are important. 
Pro-poor policy thus extends beyond the maxim of 'getting institutions right' through 
the reform of public administration and should encompass strategic actions that guide 
market forces. The implication is that the policy framework for the reduction of 
poverty and inequality in South Africa has to take into account the complementarity 
that exists between different kinds of assets and the nature of the markets in which 
they operate. In other words, the implementation of such policy requires that 
consideration be given to the relationship between the role of government, the 
operation of markets and the distribution of the benefits of growth. 
Despite the success in terms of delivering connections, due to privatisation and the 
impact of cost recovery policies, services may well be the 'Weakest Link' in South 
Africa's poverty reduction strategy. In this respect at least, the credibility accorded 
by the South African government to the market as the instrument of regulation 
appears to have been misplaced resulting in disconnections, indebtedness and further 
hardship. For this reason, these policies have been described as representing a neo-
liberal agenda and have been robustly attacked as being fundamentally poor 
unfriendly while benefiting big business (Bond, 2000). 
To deal with these dynamics, rather than separating policies supporting the asset poor 
from those for the asset rich, stronger action is needed to address the market 'failures' 
that shape the adverse relationships. Redistributive policies should form part of 
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microeconomic strategy. Recent measures to increase the resources available for land 
reform, the access to finance for poorly resourced individuals and enterprises and 
access to quality education are welcome steps in this regard. However these need to 
be matched with improvements in the capacity of the state both to deliver the relevant 
services and to monitor progress in delivery. In addition to this, greater clarity must 
be achieved in the aims of crucial redistributive policies like education and land 
reform, the former dogged by problems of quality and exclusion, the latter a 
distressing failure in terms of the pace of redistribution. 
The tendency to load policy goals with excessively ambitious targets needs to be 
curbed as must the tendency to formulate potentially misleading conceptualisations of 
how the South African economy functions. Fewer measures, fewer ambitious 
theories, and more precisely conceived and designed policies tailored to the country's 
capabilities ought to be the order of the day. Finally, the ability of the official 
statistics gatherers to collect and analyse data on development needs very urgently to 
be augmented. This includes basic information on the measurement of money-metric 
poverty using instruments such as those reported earlier, as well the collection of 
social indicators, employment in the informal economy and the participation in small 
scale or subsistence agriculture. 
8.4 LAST WORD 
While there is some gain to be made from identifying the constraints faced by those 
that are poor in the manner adopted by this thesis, better measurement and targeting 
will not necessarily translate in policy and action. As with underdevelopment, 
poverty is often not the result of neglect or oversight, but is rather the result of 
deliberate action of those that are not poor as they seek to further improve their 
position. The impact of these actions on the poor may often be unintended or unseen, 
although not always. The consequence is that poverty reduction is not necessarily the 
outcome of win-win game theory, and may require sacrifice on the part of the non-
poor. This will not be easily given in most cases. 
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1 APPENDIX O N E : KIDS 1998 AND OHS 1998 
Unless refreshed, all panel data are no longer representative of the population from which 
they are drawn in subsequent waves of data collection. This is also the case with KIDS, 
although in 2004 data were collected from 'next generation' households. This appendix 
compares the KIDS 1998 wave with the OHS 1998 in order to illustrate some of the 
differences that had begun to emerge at the mid-point of KIDS data collection. 
1.1 Demographic Profile 
In terms of population, KwaZulu-Natal is South Africa's largest province and contained 
8 417 021 people in 1996 increasing to 9 426 017 in 2001 (Stats SA, 1998; Stats SA, 
2003). This amounts to about 20.7 percent of South Africa's population in 1998 
increasing to 21 percent in 2001. It is relatively urban (46 percent) compared to 
provinces such as the Eastern Cape (33 percent) and Limpopo Province (12 percent) and 
more in line with South Africa as a whole (54 percent). It is ethnically diverse: 83 percent 
of the population are African, nine percent Indian, six percent white, and 1.4 percent 
coloured (Stats SA, 2001). 
Age and sex pyramids usefully depict demographic profiles of the province and Figure 1 
shows pyramids from the 1998 OHS data. 
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The data from the OHS '98 shows a comparatively youthful age structure for the African 
and Indian population in South Africa with a noticeably tapering base. The longer life 
expectancy of women is also evident. This can be compared to Figure 2 that shows the 
age/sex pyramids in 5-year age cohorts for both years of the KIDS sample and for the 
total and resident groups. 
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Although the age structure for the sample population is also youthful, the largest cohorts 
shift from being in the 5-9 year cohort in 1993 to the 10-14 year cohort in 1998. The 
pyramids do reveal the same tapering base confirming observations of declining fertility 
rates in South Africa. In both 1993 and 1998 the migrant male population is clearly 
shown, as is the longer life expectancy of women. 
Table 1 provides further information on the demographic profile of KwaZulu-Natal using 
the KIDS 1993 and 1998 data and the OHS'98 for comparison. 
Table 1: Demographic Profile of Household Members (1993/1998) 
Gender 
Masculinity Ratio 
Demo. Dep. Ratio 
(<16, >63) 
% < 20 yrs 


















































In 1993, the masculinity ratio of all members was 0.9 with women making up 53 percent 
of all individuals in the surveyed households. When residents only are included, the 
masculinity ratio declines to 0.83 indicating that more migrants tend to be male. In 1998, 
the masculinity ratio of all members had declined slightly to 0.87 although the ratio for 
all members remains unchanged. This suggests that returning male migrants has offset 
deaths among older resident males. By 1998, masculinity ratios have declined as men 
have died at younger ages, dependency ratios have also declined as children and potential 
mothers have aged and the age/sex pyramid shows a maturing population. 
Turning to the demographic dependency ratio (the ratio of those not in the economically 
active age groups to those that are), the ratio for all members declined from 0.77 in 1993 
to 0.73 in 1998, with a more pronounced change for the resident members. Since this 
decline is also reflected by the OHS'98 data, this may reflect more than simply the ageing 
of the households in the KIDS sample, and points to a more general decline due to falling 
fertility rates. As would be expected, the percentage of household members younger than 
20 years declined between the two surveys, while the percentage 60 years and older 
increased. This trend was more pronounced among the resident household members 
although,once again, this appears to have been a national trend. 
While there is some disagreement about the usefulness of the concept of household 
headship for South African households, in many studies headship has been found to 
correspond with differences in well-being, household structure, and household livelihood 
and asset accumulation strategies.1 As already indicated, in the 1993 wave of KIDS, 
respondents were asked to self-identify a dejure household head and then to relate all 
household members to this reference person. For this reason, this demographic overview 
of the KIDS households will include an examination of the characteristics of the 
household head. Table 2 provides this information for 1993 and 1998 and also include 
data from OHS'98. 
Table 2: Age/Sex Profile of Household Heads (1993/1998) 



























Of the 1354 households for which the data is available, 31 percent had a dejure female 
head, while 69 percent had a dejure male head. The proportion of female headed 
households increased noticeably to almost 40 percent in 1998, partly as a result of women 
replacing deceased male heads, although the OHS'98 data suggests that this may be a 
national trend in which women are increasing assuming more control over households.2 
I See Budlender (1999) and Posel (2001) for examples of this discussion. 
21 Women had replaced 78 percent of male heads who died between 1993 and 1998 and 73 percent of those 
male heads who had been replaced but who were still alive. Just under half of the replacements were the 
spouse of the former head (46 percent), almost all of whom were women, while 35 percent of these 
replacements were the child of the former head, with 22 percent of these replacements being women. 
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Not depicted in this table is a further breakdown into households that are effectively 
headed by women {de facto headship) when the male head is absent for more than 15 
days out of each month. In 1993 15 percent of households had a de facto female head 
(one fifth of the dejure male headed households) while by 1998 this had fallen to 10 
percent of the sample or one sixth of the dejure male headed households. For 39 percent 
of the de facto female headed households in 1993, the male head had become resident by 
1998, while for 19 percent, the de facto female head had assumed dejure headship. 
Turning to the age structure, the KIDS data show that in 1993, the mean age of the head 
was just less than 50 years, as was the median showing that there had been some 
replacement of heads during the five year interval. This had increased to a mean of 53 
and median of 52 in 1998. This conceals important gender differences with male headed 
households being significantly younger than female headed households in both periods . 
In both periods, the youngest head was 19 years, while the oldest was said to be over 100 
years of age. Almost 11 percent of household heads in 1993 had died, with women being 
slightly over-represented (34 percent of those heads who had died). Of those who were 
nominated as the head in 1993, and who were still alive in 1998, almost all (93 percent) 
were again nominated as the head. As would be expected, the mean and median ages of 
heads in the OHS'98 are lower than in the 1998 wave of the KIDS sample. Finally in 
terms of residence, 88.7 percent of heads were resident in 1993 that increased slightly to 
89 percent in 1998. 
1.2 Household Size and Structure 
In order to qualify as at least a non-resident household member in the 1993 PSLDS, 
individuals must have shared food from a common source when they are in the 
household, contribute to or share in a common resource pool, and must have spent at least 
15 nights out of the past 12 months in the homestead. If they spent at least 15 days of the 
last 30 days in the household, then they were further categorised as "resident household 
members." In general, domestic help and lodgers usually would not have qualified as 
household members since they usually do not eat out of a common pot with other 
household members and they do not share resources with other household members. This 
definition was also adopted in the 1998 wave, although additional information was 
collected concerning those who not resident members, and data was also gathered on 
2118 individuals who although not household members, were identified as having 
financial ties to the household. Similar definitions have been adopted by Stats SA for the 
OHS. 
As can be seen in Table 3 household size has increased on average, largely due to births 
exceeding deaths during the study period. 
/ In 1993, male headed households had a median age of 45 years compared to female headed households 
with a median age of 58 years. In 1998, the median age of male heads had risen to 49 years while that of 
the female heads remained almost constant at 57 years. 
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In 1993, the mean total household size was 7.4 (resident and non-resident members), a 
figure that decreases to 6.5 members when looking specifically at those that were resident 
in the household 15 days in the past month. In 1998, mean household size for both groups 
was higher at 7.7 for all household members, and 6.5 for resident members only5. In both 
years, the sample reported a larger household size than the OHS'98, where the average 
size of African and Indian rural households was 5.2.6 
The median household size was six for all household members and five for resident 
members in both 1993 and 1998. The largest household comprised 31 individuals in 1993 
compared to 34 in 1998, while the largest household had 24 resident members in 1993 
and 27 members in 1998. In general, households in KwaZulu-Natal appear larger than the 
national average, and the households in the KIDS sample larger than those surveyed in 
the OHS'98 in KwaZulu-Natal. Overall, 805 children less than five years of age had been 
added to the sampled households while 344 household members recorded in 1993 were 
no longer alive in 1998, yielding a crude death rate of 4 percent. While it might be 
expected that this group would be concentrated in the older age groups, just over 10 
percent were more than 60 years of age and the average age of those who had died was 
only 35 years with 25 percent being less than 25 years when they died. Possible 
explanations for this might be deaths due to AIDS and violence. 
The resident size of the households does not differ to any significant extent when 
examining the gender of the dejure household head in either year, nor in the OHS'98, 
although, in 1998, the median total size of female headed households was larger than 
male headed households at seven members. 
Using the relationship to the household head, the sampled households have been 
categorised as being nuclear (one or both parents plus children), three generation (one or 
4/ It is possible that differences may arise due to the definition of residence used in KIDS and the OHS. 
Residents are defined as those resident 15 days of the previous month in KIDS while the OHS uses those 
who are resident four days of the previous week. The definition of migrants in the OHS may be problematic 
since respondents were asked information about those "who may be away for a month or more because 
they are migrant workers." The unemployed, and those absent for less than a month, but more than one day 
of the previous week are missed from this definition, and it is not surprising that the mean household size 
of all members of households in the OHS is little different from those who are considered to be residents. 
Future tables will therefore only provide data on resident members. 
5/ Standard deviations are 3.98 and 4.45 for all members in 1993 and 1998 respectively, and 3.46 and 3.83 
for resident members in 1994 and 1998. 
6/ All further comparisons with the OHS 1998 are to the sub-sample of 14621 African and Indian 
households that were surveyed nationally. 
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more grandparents, one or both parents and children) and extended (all other 
combinations). In 1993, 48 percent of the households were nuclear families with a mean 
size of 4.3 members, while 31 percent contained three generations and 21 percent were 
extended, with a mean size of 8.9 and 8.5 members respectively. The gender of the 
household head does have an impact, with 23 percent of female-headed households being 
nuclear compared to 52 percent of male-headed households.7 The situation was markedly 
different in 1998, with only 30 percent of the households being nuclear, 36 percent being 
three generations and 33 percent being extended. Furthermore, the impact of the gender 
of the household head is more pronounced with just 13 percent of female headed 
households being nuclear compared to 38 percent of male headed households.8 
1.3 Educational Attainment 
The general pattern in terms of education is of an improvement in attainment over all age 
groups, a trend that seems both to do with the ageing of the household members, and a 
national improvement in educational attainment. More children are attending school, 
adolescents are achieving higher levels and more adults have higher levels of educational 
attainment, and the gap between men and women in terms of educational attainment has 
closed 
Just over 91 percent of children of primary school attending age (6-13 years) were 
enrolled in school in 1993, increasing to 93 percent in 1998 (according to the OHS'98 the 
figure was 86.7 percent nationally) with similar levels of enrolment for boys and for girls 
for both years. More importantly, while 55 percent of those in this age group who were 
not at school were six or seven years in 1993, this had risen to 73 percent in 1998 
suggesting that more children are starting school as soon as they are eligible to do so. 
Furthermore, in 1993 16.5 percent of children in primary school attending age groups had 
not completed any years of schooling with just over half (51 percent) having completed 
only Sub-A or Sub-B (Grades 1 and 2). There seems to have been some improvement in 
enrolment by 1998 with 14 percent of this age group having completed no years of 
education and 48 percent having completed only Sub-A or Sub-B. 
On average, youth aged 14 to 19 years of age in 1993 had received 5.3 years of schooling 
which had increased to six years of schooling in 1998 (nationally 7.5 years in the 
OHS'98), with girls having received marginally more schooling than boys had in both 
years. In 1993, 82 percent of youth in this age group were still at school rising to 87 
percent in 1998 (85 percent nationally), with no statistical difference in the enrolment of 
boys and girls in both years. Just less than 2.5 percent had received no education at all in 
1993, declining to 2 percent in 1998. The average age of those at school was 13.5 years, 
with the oldest person at school reported to be 33 years of age although 93 percent of 
school goers were younger than 21 years. Of those between 16 and 25 years of age, 32 
percent in 1993 were in the expected Standards 9, 10 or in tertiary education rising to 43 
percent in 1998. This suggests that many adolescents experience grade slippage. Studies 
on education attainment have observed that South Africa follows a Latin American 
pattern of high enrolment rates with high drop-out and repeat rates (Hunter and May, 
7/ Pearson chi2(2) = 99.645, Pr = 0.000 
8/Pearson chi2(2) = 79.7897 Pr = 0.000 
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2002). Finally, while most school-goers were resident members of the household in 1993 
(less than 1 percent were categorised as migrants) 11 percent were categorised as 
migrants in 1998. 
Turning to the adult population, as Table 4 shows, in the KIDS sample 17 percent of 
those older than 20 years in 1993 had received no education falling to 13 percent by 
1998, while the mean years of schooling was 5.1 years in 1993 rising to 5.8 years in 
1998. Nationally, the proportion was still around 17 percent who had no schooling, but 
with the mean was 6.9 years of schooling. Just more than 0.7 percent had completed a 
university degree in both years, while 17 percent had completed Standard 10/Grade 12 or 
more in 1993 improving to 23 percent in 1998. 
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In 1993, 5 percent of adults were still in school or were students, increasing to 9 percent 
in 1998. In both periods, adult women received less schooling than adult men did at 4.9 
years (5.6 years in 1998) as compared to 5.3 years (6 years in 1998), and in both years 
there is a statistical difference between the educational attainment of men and women. 
This is largely due to lower levels of educational attainment among older women as can 
be seen in Figure 3 which uses the 1993 and 1998 KIDS data and shows that the gap does 
appear to have closed in the younger age groups.9 
7 In 1993, Pearson chr(5) = 12.9212 Pr = 0.024. In 1998, Pearson chr(5) = 15.9690 Pr = 0.007 
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Figure 3: Educational Attainment of Adults by Sex (1993/1998) 
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Source: KIDS; n=4523 
Finally, in both years, heads of the household had lower levels of education than other 
adult family members did at 3.8 years in 1993 (4.3 years in 1998) compared to 5.6 years 
(6.6 years in 1998) for other household members. 
1.4 Main Activity Status 
This section examines the main activities of household members in the PSLDS, KIDS 
and OHS'98. However, in the 1993 wave of the KIDS study, summary activity status 
was not assessed and although all household members were supposed to have been asked 
questions concerning their main activities, it is likely that the different format of the 
question may have led to different responses in some instances. Nonetheless, Table 5 
provides a breakdown of the economic status for sampled individuals older than 15 years 
of age. 
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The table reveals that, in 1993, 31 percent of the sample 16 years and older are engaged 
in some form of employment rising to 33 percent in 1998; the majority of this group 
being formally employed with a small contingent of casually- and self-employed. This 
does not imply that unemployment had declined in the period, and in fact, using a broad 
definition of unemployment, a slight increase occurred from 24 percent in 1993 to 27 
percent in 1998. Looking only at those in the economically active age groups (16-64 
years), at 29.5 percent this is a little less than the national average of 33.9 percent 
reported by official statistical sources (Stats SA, 1998). 
Most other categories remained consistent, with a larger percentage of students in 1998, 
fewer people defined as engaged in housework or as disabled. While the former trend 
reflects the changing life cycle of the household, the latter shift is mostly likely 
attributable to the way in which these questions were posed. A comparison of the two 
periods reveals that considerable mobility between these categories. Just over 61 percent 
of those in formal employment in 1993 were still in this category in 1998 while 13 
percent were unemployed, 8 percent were in casual employment and 7 percent were 
described as retired. Forty five percent of those who were unemployed in 1993 were 
again categorised as unemployed in 1998, 23 percent were in regular employment and 11 
percent were in casual or self-employment. Finally, an economic dependency ratio has 
declined, from 2.1 non-employed adults for each worker in 1993 to 1.9 in 1998. 
A substantially higher percentage of male household members are employed in regular 
jobs (32 percent in 1993 and 1998) relative to female household members (17 and 18 
percent in 1993 and 1998 respectively) and there is a significant difference between the 
activity profile of men and that of women.'' Although broad definition unemployment 
/ It should be noted that there are many definitional differences between the OHS and the KIDS/PSLSD 
surveys. For example, the recall period is 7 days in the OHS compared to one month in the other studies, 
while disability is defined as 'permanently unable to work' in the OHS. 
"/ Pearson chi2(8) = 619.8236, Pr = 0.000 ; Pearson's chi2(9) = 430.4166, Pr = 0.000 in 1993 and 1998 
respectively. 
264 
patterns differ for men and women in 1993 (22 percent of women, 27 percent of men), by 
1998 a similar proportion of men and women were defined as being unemployed. 
Looking at age specific unemployment rates, unemployment is highest for the 20-24 and 
25-29 year age groups in 1993 at 37 and 38 percent respectively. In 1998, the 
unemployment rates for these age groups reach 40 and 46 percent respectively, while the 
30-34 year group has an unemployment rate of 38 percent and the percentage of 15-19 
year olds who are scholars or students increases from 75 to 84 percent. 
1.5 Migration Patterns 
Despite the complete removal of all laws on settlement in urban areas, temporary 
migration remains a feature of the sampled households with the percentage of households 
with migrants remaining constant between 1993 and 1998 and a slight increase in the 
percentage of individuals who are migrants. Largely this is due to an increase in the 
proportion of women who are migrating. 
Table 6 reveals that 12.5 percent of individuals in the 1993 sample were non-resident 
household members or migrants, increasing slightly to 14.5 percent of the 1998 sample. 
The percentage of households with migrants remains the same in the two periods at just 
over 40 percent. According to the OHS 1997, 37.6 percent of rural African households 
have at least one migrant worker. 
Table 6: Residency status (1993/1998) n 
Type of Household 
% migrants (absent more than 
15 days from last month) 











Proportionally more men are migrants than women, respectively at 16 and 10 percent in 
1993 although the difference narrowed with migrants remaining 16 percent of men, and 
increasing to 12 percent of women. As a result, women comprised 40 percent of all 
migrants in 1993 increasing to 46 percent in 1998. 
In terms of age, in both years migration was most frequent in the 25-34 year age group in 
which some 25-27 percent of the age group were resident less than 15 days out of the 
previous 30 days. 
/ Due to the differences in the definition of migration, the OHS'98 data is not reported. 
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2 APPENDIX TWO : POVERTY MEASUREMENT TECHNICALITIES 
2.1 Estimation and Calculation of Income, Expenditure and 
Consumption 
Any analysis of changes in money-metric well-being is confronted with the choice of 
indicator, in this case between the reported incomes and expenditure. An important 
change made in the questionnaire design was to adjust the recall period for food 
expenditure. In 1993 this could be reported for either weekly or monthly purchases, for 
1998 (and 2004) for monthly consumption only. There are two potential problems with 
this: a longer recall period is typically associated with lower reported expenditure 
(Deaton and Grosh, 2000) and consumption may be lower than expenditure; bulk or even 
lumpy purchases may mean that expenditure stores were recorded or missed in 1993. In 
the first case the adjustment would tend to overstate the change in consumption poverty 
between 1993 and 1998, in the second, an error in either direction is possible. Overall, 
the adjustment will provide a more accurate reflection of well-being in 1998 and of trend 
between 1998 and 2004. 
An additional area that is of critical importance relates to the manner in which the income 
data was originally calculated in the PSLSD. Two main areas of concern were isolated: 
• The recording of income from pensions and other forms of social welfare; 
• The imputation of rent. 
With respect to the first of these, four types of problems showed up in the 1993 data: 
• In a large number of cases white and African social old age pensions were higher 
than the official maximum; 
• A significant number of Africans were far too young to receive social old age 
pensions; 
• Respondents reported other grants from governments, when they were too old to 
receive these, and should have been receiving social pensions; 
• In a number of cases it was reported that social pensions were received, but the 
amounts received were missing. 
While the latter three problems may well have been the result of an enumerator error, the 
first problem can be traced to the questionnaire design. At the time of the original PSLSD 
study in August to November 1993, in many areas, Africans were still receiving on a bi-
monthly basis. However, the questionnaire asked for the sum received in the previous 
month, resulting in enumerators filling in a bi-monthly amount. While this problem could 
have been off-set if enumerators had also entered a zero when a pension payment had 
been made in the month of the interview, examination of the data suggests that there had 
been an asymmetrical error towards bimonthly amounts. For the purposes of this thesis, 
it was decided to make no additional assumptions to correct errors 2 to 4, but state 
pensions which were in excess of the maximum paid were divided by two. 
Turning to the problems relating to the imputation of rents, two problems were identified: 
266 
• Only those houses, against which a bond or a loan had been taken up, were 
included in the calculation of the imputed rent, thus skipping four fifths of the 
houses owned by the occupants; 
• There was some contention as to whether rent should be imputed on the basis of a 
6.5 percent return rather than 13 percent as originally done; 
Given these problems, it was decided to exclude imputed rents from the total household 
income for all three years. This will have the effect of understating the incomes of 
households in non-urban and informal urban settlements who are less likely to have been 
paying a rent or a mortgage. 
To illustrate the impact of this, the final descriptive statistics for household income and 
expenditure in 1993 and 1998 is shown along with the food expenditure and the incomes 
without adjustments. 13 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for Income and Expenditure 
Food Expenditure 1993 
Total Expenditure 1993 
Total Income 1993 
Income w'out rent 1993 & OAP corrected 
Food Expenditure 1998 
Total Expenditure 1998 
Total Income 1998 
















































Several things are apparent from this table. Firstly, mean and median food expenditure 
shows a steep decline between the two waves, depressing the expenditure total for 1998. 
However, only the means for food expenditure and for uncorrected income are in fact 
statistically different owing to the distribution of the data in all years. Indeed, none of 
these key variables show a normal distribution, confirmed by the Shapiro-Wilk and 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of normality. 
As a second exploration Table 8 shows Pearson's correlation coefficients for these 
variables. 
13/ In the course of this analysis, one more outlier was identified. Case 620140 reported respectively a high 
and very high expenditure and income, a trend also reported in 2004. Although the data for this household 
seems entirely valid, it has an income six times that of the next wealthiest household and thus distorts 
measures of distribution. It has been removed only from this table. 
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Unsurprising all of these coefficients are significant at the 99 percent level. Noteworthy 
though, are the relatively high correlations found between expenditure in 1993 and 
income in 1993, as well as with expenditure in 1998. By comparison, the relatively low 
coefficient between income in 1993 and income in 1998, and expenditure in 1998 and 
income in 1998 is of concern. 
These findings support the views of many analysts of poverty data who agree that 
consumption is a more reliable and consistent indicator due to fluctuations in income 
over time and the tendency to under-report income (Deaton, 1997, Lipton and Ravallion, 
1997). In the case of KIDS this problem will have been exacerbated by the change in the 
questionnaire just noted. For these reasons, household monthly expenditure is the 
measure of well-being that is used in this thesis, although the deficiencies of this 
approach should be acknowledged and which include problems associated with any 
money-metric conceptualisation of poverty, and issues of intra-household distribution. 
Nonetheless, all poverty measures have been calculated using expenditure data 
(consumption for food items in the case of 1998) as a proxy for household income, 
further reducing the potential for error. 
2.2 Constructing a Food Basket Poverty Line in South Africa 
In the previous work using KIDS that has been cited in this thesis, the Household 
Subsistence Level (HSL) calculated by the Institute for Planning Research (IPR) was 
used as a poverty threshold (IPR, 1993; Potgieter, 1993). This measure uses a standard 
approach whereby a hypothetical minimum shopping basket is identified which will 
allow a minimum food energy intake to be satisfied. This is then valued in different areas, 
weighted by the size of the household, thereby allowing the calculation of a minimum 
household income that would permit the purchase of this shopping basket. The HSL uses 
a second line, which is taken to include more that this minimum basket. 
Close inspection of the methodology used in the calculation of the HSL revealed a 
number of critical problems. Firstly, as noted earlier, the line is based upon costing 
surveys of basic food ration scales. The scales that are used by the IPR are based on 1975 
estimates issued by the Department of National Health, although the Department revised 
these in 1982 and 1993. The costing surveys are carried out on a bi-annual basis in the 
major urban centres of South Africa. Even in the case of the 'rural' HSL, the surveys are 
undertaken in nearby smaller towns and thus do not necessarily reflect the higher prices 
that are found in most rural areas. Furthermore, the rural HSL was calculated as a part of 
a consultant's report to the Rural Foundation which was largely concerned with minimum 
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wages for farm workers. As such, most transport costs are not included in the HSL, and 
education costs are not considered at all. At this stage these problems can only be noted 
and it must emphasised that the use of the HSL provides no more that a convenient point 
of departure for the analysis of poverty in South Africa. 
To calculate a head-count measure of poor households, average adjusted household 
expenditure has been compared to a minimum income level or poverty line. Income may 
be measured either in terms of the stream of income flowing into the household, or by the 
stream of expenditure flowing out of the household. Given some uncertainty over data 
handling procedures for income, and the inherent advantages of measuring expenditure, 
the analysis in this thesis has opted for an expenditure based poverty gap ratio. As such, 
the household's economic well-being has been estimated using its reported expenditure 
which includes basic commodities such as food and energy, as well as on less frequent 
purchases such as consumer durables, and on investments such as expenditure on 
education and savings. 
Poverty lines are sometimes expressed in per-household or per-capita terms. The first 
approach implies that there are no economies of scale to be gained in larger families, 
while the second implies that adults and children have the same nutritional and non-food 
requirements. Although both are clearly unrealistic assumptions, resolving these issues is 
not a straight forward process and monetary measures of well-being are usually 
standardized or scaled in order to account for the fact that large households need more 
income than do small households to reach a similar level of well-being, that adults need 
more food and other commodities than do children, and that there are some economies of 
scale in household (re)production. 
A variety of methodologies that vary in their technical and information requirements are 
available to deal with both of the problems. Thus while children may consume less than 
adults, this rapidly changes as they age. In addition, as Lanjouw (2001: 14) points out, 
despite a considerable literature there is no agreed approach to determine what is a 
reasonable adjustment for equivalence. The first concern can be solved by calculating 
adult equivalence scales based on recommended dietary allowances for men and women 
in difference age groups. Thus individuals in a household can be expressed in equivalent 
terms to a reference person, conventionally an adult female, and the food basket or the 
household size can be re-weighted accordingly setting either household specific poverty 
thresholds or an equivalent poverty threshold. A recent South African Medical Research 
Council report makes use of this methodology to estimate the calorie availability for 
South African households (Rose et ah, 2002). 
The consumption-based, money-metric poverty line that has been chosen for this thesis is 
based on the methodology adopted for the Household Subsistence Level (HSL) that has 
been calculated in South Africa since the early 1980s.14 The HSL is an expenditure line 
and represents the minimum level of expenditure that would be required to allow a family 
to satisfy its basic needs. The HSL is built up based on fixed household subsistence costs 
1 / As discussed in Chapter Three, analysis based on a poverty line is at best indicative of levels of poverty 
in South Africa, and the level of the line itself is perhaps less interesting than the composition of those 
classified as being below it. To some extent then, the choice of a poverty line is largely an issue of 
expediency in terms of the type of analysis that is to be undertaken. 
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(to cover shelter, fuel and transport), as well as food and basic clothing costs calibrated to 
individual resident household members' age and sex and based on caloric requirements 
for men, women and children in different age groups. The advantage of the HSL is that 
two separate poverty lines have been specified for 1993: one for urban areas, where the 
minimum level of income required by a family of two adults and three children is 
specified as R825.10 per month; the other HSL is for rural areas, where minimum income 
for a family of two adults and four children is taken to be R723.05 per month (IPR, 1993, 
Potgieter, 1993; 1995). The 1998 HSL was calculated only for urban households 
(Potgieter, 1998). Rural cost parameters for 1998 were derived by appropriately inflating 
the 1993 rural cost parameters. 
Recalculating Potgieter's expenditure estimates for adults and children broken down by 
sex yields the following table showing equivalence scales for 1993 and 1998, and 
following Rose et al, (2002), these have been expressed as urban adult female 
equivalents. 































































Using these HSL cost parameters, a specific HSL was calculated for each household 
based on its demographic and residency structure. Household members who were not 
resident for 15 days out of the previous month were excluded from the HSL, while 
members whose age was not known, but whose gender was, were assumed to be adults. 
Household economies of scale are less easily resolved, but are no less important 
(Lanjouw and Ravallion, 1997). A common practice has been to adjust household size by 
some parameter, typically 0.9 which allows for a rather modest gain from sharing 
resources. Studies in South Africa that estimate the fixed costs for low income 
households suggest that these gains are higher and that a parameter closer to 0.7 may be 
more appropriate (Potgieter, 1993). Similar orders of magnitude are supported by 
international studies. Potgieter's fixed cost per household translates into an economies of 
scale parameter of between 0.86 and 0.90 depending on the year in question and the mid-
point has been adopted for this thesis. 
Having established poverty lines for 1993 and 1998 expressed as per urban adult female 
equivalents, adjusted for an economies of scale parameter of 0.88, poor households in 
270 
urban and rural areas respectively are then identified as all households whose total 
expenditure falls short of the poverty threshold estimated to be required for that 
household for that year. Households whose expenditures fall below their HSL were 
deemed poor. Because subsistence food costs constitute approximately 50 percent of the 
HSL, households were deemed as indigent if their expenditures are less than 50 percent 
of their HSL. 
The total number of households in poverty represents the sum of the urban poor plus the 
rural poor. Using the household as the basic unit of analysis, the number of poor women 
and men is estimated as the sum of all women and men who live in households that are 
classified as poor, in other words where average monthly expenditure per urban female 
adult equivalent was less than Rl 72.36 in 1998, and Rl 18.89 per urban female adult 
equivalent in 1993. In addition, a fixed cost comprising housing and transport 
expenditure has been added to each household. On average, this equalled R55.13 per 
urban female adult equivalent in 1993 and R79.83 per urban female adult equivalent in 
1998. Without these adjustments for equivalence scales and for economies of scale, the 
per capita poverty threshold in 1993 would be R348.69 and R325.41 in urban and non-
urban areas respectively, and in 1998: R559.85 and R461.00 in urban and non-urban 
areas. 
In order to deal with price inflation, in most of the work in which I have been involved, 
household expenditure data for 1993 has been adjusted to 1998 prices using community 
level prices collected from local shops during the two waves of KIDS. These have been 
fixed weight, Lespeyeres type indices where (normalized) expenditure shares were 
calculated using the 1993 data. Two indices were created using the variable Metro in 
the PS LSD data: one for urban and metropolitan areas and the second for non-urban 
areas. This gave an index of 143.31 for urban areas and 120.79 for the non-urban areas. 
These indices are below the price indices implicit in the HSL which are 145.03 for urban 
women and 139.73 for rural women, as well as the national CPIX (147.38) produced by 
Stats SA. Given that it is unlikely that rural price increases would be this much below the 
national average, in this thesis it has been decided to use the national CPIX to adjust 
prices to 2000 amounts for both urban and non-urban areas. 
2.3 Poverty Measurement 
Having established an indicator, income, expenditure or consumption, and a poverty line, 
the next step is an instrument for the measurement of poverty. In keeping with the 
seminal axioms that Sen (1976) posited as fundamental requirements for a good absolute 
poverty measure,16 the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) or P-alpha class of poverty 
measures mentioned earlier have been widely adopted for poverty analysis (Foster, Greer 
and Thorbecke, 1984). The general equation for these measures is as follows: 
15/ The price index is based on a set of 12 basic commodities. For each commodity, prices were measured at 
the community level at both informal and formal shopping places (to the extent that both were available). A 
simple average of the formal and informal prices was used to create the index. 
I6/ Three are of particular relevance to this discussion. These are the focus axiom: the poverty measure can 
only depend on incomes of the poor; the monotonicity axiom: reduction in income of any poor individual 
must increase the poverty measure; and the transfer axiom : a transfer of income from a poor individual to a 




Where q is the number of poor households, z is the poverty line which may be absolute or 
relative,^, is the standard living indicator (i.e., expenditure) of the z'th household, and a 
is an 'aversion to poverty' parameter. 
When a=0, the headcount ratio (P°) is produced, which is simply the proportion of the 
population for whom consumption is less than the poverty line, that is, the incidence of 
poverty. When a=l, the poverty gap (P1) is given, which shows the aggregate shortfall of 
the expenditure of poor households from the poverty line (the depth of poverty). Finally, 
the squared poverty gap (P ) is attained when a=2, and shows heightened sensitivity to 
the situation of the poorest households (a severity index). This thesis will make use of the 
FGT class of measures as just described when measuring poverty in South Africa and 
KwaZulu-Natal unless otherwise specified, although in line with common practice, the 
headcount ratio will be expressed as a percentage of the total population. 
Useful recourse can also be made to the notion of poverty dominance. This analytical 
framework assesses whether the results of differing poverty lines are robust in that the 
poor are consistently identified and ranked whatever poverty line is used. A sensitivity 
analysis using a low, medium and high poverty line is used to test the ranking of 
whatever unit of analysis is used, which are then mapped onto the cumulative distribution 
function (CDF) of the indicator that is used. If the CDFs of the indicators for different 
groups do not intersect below the maximum possible poverty line, then one group can be 
definitively considered to be poorer than the other/s. Second order dominance testing can 
be used if the CDF's do intersect below the maximum possible poverty line with much 
the same result.17 
2.4 Calculating Livestock Units 
The livestock unit (LSU) is a standardized animal unit obtained by multiplying total 
number of animals with conversion factors that take into account "feed requirements" for 
the animal. Although several alternative factors are available, this thesis makes use of the 
Food and Agricultural Organisation's conversion factors for South Africa available at 














l7/ Poverty dominance analysis has been usefully described by Atkinson (1987), Foster and Shorrocks, 
(1988) and Jenkins and Lambert (1997). 
P =-T 
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2.5 Measurement Error and Mobility1 
As a number of authors have recognised, mobility measures are potentially biased 
upwards due to measurement errors in the underlying data. When expenditures are 
measured with errors (due to misreporting or coding error) the observed data has 'noise' 
added to it. Otherwise 'stable' households, that did not change their economic position, 
may thus appear to exhibit mobility (up or down). Estimates of mobility are thus 
potentially biased upward. 
Glewwe (2005) proposes a methodology for uncovering the degree overall observed 
mobility is purely the spurious result of measurement error. Glewwe defines mobility in 
several ways but the focus of this thesis is on mobility measured by m=l-p(yt,yt-i) where 
yt is income or expenditure at time t and p(a,b) is the correlation between a and b. He 
shows that p(yt,yt-i) can be computed by (fijfiz)
0'5 where fi/ is the OLS estimate of 
regressing yt against >w and^2 is the corresponding estimate for a regression oiyt.i onyt. 
In order to calculate this true mobility measue, we need unbiased estimates of/?/ and^2-
Glewwe proposes obtaining the needed unbiased estimates through an instrumental 
variable procedure in which variables which cause the true values oiyt and j>/_/ are used as 
instruments for j>, andy,./. The intuition is that the fitted or predicted values ofyt andjv/ 
will be purged of the confounding noise of measurement error. Using these fitted values 
as the basis for calculating^/ and JS2 should thus permit us to get the needed unbiased 
estimate of the true degree of mobility. Following Glewwe, health-related measures at the 
household level have been used as instruments for household living standards for all three 
waves of KIDS. In particular, the instruments that are used (one at time) include the 
proportion of adult members of the household that were sick during the fifteen days prior 
to each survey and three anthropometric measures for children: height-for-age, weight-
for-age and body mass index. Following Glewwe's method, measurement error in one or 
more of the waves is found to account for at least 14 percent, and could account for as 
much as 60%, of the observed mobility between 1993 and 1998 (but only as much as 4% 
between 1998 and 2004). Unfortunately, these estimates of the degree of mobility bias 
are robust to changes in the specification used to implement the Glewwe method. 
Nonetheless, Glewwe's methodology does not guarantee that the bias estimates fall in the 
sensible range between 0-100%. A number of our instruments gave nonsensical results 
(bias estimates outside of the 0-100%). However, the alternative estimates did 
consistently show that the bias was larger for the 1993 to 1998 sub-period. In future 
work, the KIDS team hope to build on Glewwe's contribution and derive more stable and 
reliable measures of the degree of mobility. 
Efforts beyond the scope of this thesis are needed to better understand this difficult issue. 
Nonetheless, these issues do suggest that some of the observed mobility (especially in the 
first time-period) may be more spurious than real. 
'/ This is derived from Agiiero et a\ (2007:8) in a section to which I contributed but was not a lead author. 
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3 APPENDIX THREE: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
This Appendix provides means, medians and standard deviations of the variables used in 
the regression and cluster analyses presented in Chapters Six and Seven. 
93: Durables plus productive k in 2000 prices 
93: mean education of household members 
98: Durables plus productive k in 2000 prices 
98: Mean education of household members 
04: Durables plus productive k in 2000 prices 
04: Mean education of household members 
93: Present value unearned income 2000 
98: Present value unearned income 2000 
04: Present value unearned income 2000 
93: Incidence of poverty 
98: Incidence of poverty 
04: Incidence of poverty 
93: Household size 
98: Household size 
04: Household size 
93: Total Monthly Exp in 2000 prices 
98: Total Monthly Exp in 2000 prices 
04: Total Monthly Exp in 2000 prices 
93: Standardised poverty measure 
98: Standardised poverty measure 
04: Standardised poverty measure 
93: Age of head 
98: Age of head 
04: Age of head 
93: Number of people < 20 years 
98: Number of people < 20 years 
04: Number of people < 20 years 
93: Number of people < 20 years/hhsize 
98: Number of people < 20 /hhsize 
04: Number of people < 20 / hhsize 
Primary activity undertaken in 93 
Primary activity undertaken in 98 
Primary activity undertaken in 04 
Secondary activity undertaken in 93 
Secondary activity undertaken in 98 
Secondary activity undertaken in 04 
Grant activity undertaken in 93 
Grant activity undertaken in 98 
Grant activity undertaken in 04 
Entrepreneurial activity undertaken in 93 
Entrepreneurial activity undertaken in 98 
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